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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1930s, the fundamental tenet of American labor law has 
been that the government should foster employee organization and 
regulate industrial relations to promote equity in bargaining between 
employers and employees and to promote industrial peace. 1 Those 
1. The findings and policies set forth in § 1 of the original Wagner Act stated in part: 
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers 
to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial 
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing 
commerce .•.. 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom 
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who enacted our basic labor laws, as well as the majority of legal 
scholars who have since commented on those laws, believed unions 
necessary for workers to achieve the benefits of industrial democracy 
and a larger share of industry's profits.2 Thus, they believed, the gov-
ernment should remove barriers to employee organization such as in-
junctions, 3 yellow-dog contracts, 4 and employer discrimination against 
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corpo-
rate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of 
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates 
and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of 
competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries. 
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and 
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and pro-
motes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and 
unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial dis-
putes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by 
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees. 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate 
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the pur-
pose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection. 
Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version, the National Labor Relations 
Act, at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)); see also the preamble to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 3, 
47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1988)). 
2. See SENATE COMM. ON Eouc. AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., lST SESS., COMPARISON OF s. 
2926 (73D CONGRESS) AND s. 1958 (74TH CoNGRESS) 15 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in I 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Bo., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS ACT, 1935, at 1338 (1985) [hereinafter NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (arguing that, 
"[i]n the absence of equality of bargaining power, the rate of wages fails to keep pace with the 
rate of industrial expansion, profits, etc., thus aggravating depressions and impairing economic 
stability, with consequent detriment to the free flow of interstate commerce"); 79 CONG. REc. 
6183, 6184 (1935); ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 87 (11th 
ed. 1991) ("[C]ollective bargaining replaces the weakness of the individual in bargaining and ... 
substitutes ... industrial democracy ... for the unilateral and sometimes arbitrary power of the 
employer."); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 3 (Charles J. Morris et al. eds., 2d ed. 1983); 
JULIUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS 1 (1988); 1 JAMES A. 
GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 16 (1974) (quoting letter 
from Sen. Robert F. Wagner to the Honorable Marion Smith dated Oct. 22, 1933, where Sen. 
Wagner wrote that program was designed to "make America safe for industrial democracy"); 
LEROY s. MERRIFIELD ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW 20 (8th ed. 1989) ("Sooner or later it 
was inevitable not only that worker organizations should be tolerated under the law, but that 
they should be regarded as necessary and desirable institutions in promoting an effective democ-
racy •..• "); James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of 
NLRB Law Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7, IO (1985) (noting that Senator Wagner 
"considered the advancement of economic and social justice, rather than the reduction of indus-
trial strife, to be the primary objective of the Wagner Act"); Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner 
Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 199, 218 (1960) (noting that 
Senator Wagner "valued the measure ... as an affirmative vehicle for the economic and related 
social progress to which his life-long efforts were devoted"). For a contemporary call for indus-
trial democracy, see Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984). 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1988). This section withdraws from the jurisdiction offederal courts the 
authority to issue injunctions in nonviolent labor disputes. 
4. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Ayellow-dog contract is an agreement between an employer and 
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employees on the basis of union affiliation. 5 Moreover, these same leg-
islators and scholars believed that the government stewardship of la-
bor relations should go beyond the mere removal of barriers to 
organization, to the active regulation of industrial relations conflicts 
with respect to organizing, collective bargaining, and enforcing collec-
tive agreements. Elections, the requirement of bargaining in good 
faith, and arbitration were advanced to replace the parties' cruder 
methods of resolving such conflicts. 6 Without this extensive tutelage 
of labor-management relations, the legislators and legal scholars be-
lieved that conflicts in labor relations would escalate into strife and 
economic warfare and that many workers would be denied the benefits 
of dealing with their employers on equal terms. 7 
The traditional economic analysis of unions and collective bargain-
ing calls into question this fundamental tenet and thus the basis for 
much of American labor law. Proponents of this analysis argue that 
individual bargaining will secure for each worker all of the benefits to 
which she is entitled in accordance with her productivity.8 Unions 
achieve higher wages and benefits for employees by establishing a la-
bor cartel, to which the employer responds by raising prices, cutting 
output, substituting capital for labor, and laying off workers.9 
Although the union may gain benefits for some workers, these benefits 
come only at the expense of consumers, other workers, and economic 
efficiency.10 Thus, the traditional economic analysis suggests that, 
employee that the employee will not join a union during the employee's tenure of employment. 
Section 103 declares all such agreements to be contrary to public policy and unenforceable. 
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). This section makes it an unfair labor practice for employers 
to discriminate in hiring or other conditions of employment on the basis of union membership. 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988) (elections); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1988) (bargaining in 
good faith); Labor Management Relations ('I'aft-Hartley) Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988) 
(arbitration). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 301 as providing federal substantive law for 
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U.S. 448 (1957). The Supreme Court strengthened and elaborated its support for arbitration in 
the Steelworkers Trilogy cases. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); infra notes 198-200. 
7. See H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLA· 
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 2956, 2962-63; SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, supra 
note 2; 79 CONG. REc. 7565, 7565-67 (1935); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1935), 
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 2300, 2300-01; Cox ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 86-87; MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 20-21, 25; see also JAMES B. ATLESON, 
VALUES AND AssUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 111 (1983). 
8. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSED. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 228-47 (1980); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legisla-
tion, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1365-67, 1382 (1983); Henry C. Simons, Some Reflections on 
Syndicalism, 52 J. PoL. EcoN. 1, 12 (1944). 
9. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT s. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THE-
ORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 350-60 (1982). 
10. Id. 
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rather than fostering unions and collective bargaining, the government 
should undertake measures to extirpate them.11 Far from promoting 
equity in bargaining between employers and employees, unions pro-
mote workers to a superior bargaining position - that of a labor cartel 
- and cause inefficiency and inequitable redistributions of income 
among similarly situated workers. Moreover, under this analysis, no 
sound basis exists for the government's efforts to regulate industrial 
relations to promote industrial peace.12 
This traditional economic analysis of unions and collective bar-
gaining is deficient for several reasons. First, it focuses on only one of 
several possible sources of union wage increases. Logical arguments 
and recent empirical evidence suggest that, as sources of union wage 
increases, employer rents, quasi-rents, and productivity increases asso-
ciated with unionization are at least as important as labor carteliza-
tion.13 Second, the analysis assumes that the employer responds to a 
union wage demand by moving up her labor demand curve to substi-
tute capital for labor.14 However, it can be shown that such a response 
is not Pareto optimal 15 for the union and employer and that both can 
make themselves better off by bargaining in a Coasean fashion 16 to 
achieve a contract off the demand curve with a lower wage and more 
employment. Again, recent empirical evidence suggests that the bar-
gaining solution is the better model and that unionization causes only 
small capital and labor misallocations.17 Finally, despite the fact that 
collective bargaining is commonly cited as an activity involving strate-
gic behavior, 18 the traditional economic analysis of the union as a car-
tel and the employer as a price taker in collective bargaining precludes 
any rigorous consideration of employer and union strategic behavior. 
As a result, the monopoly model implicitly assumes that all of the 
costs of collective bargaining are ordinary time and information trans-
11. See Simons, supra note 8, at 25. 
12. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1358; Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase 
Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 245-47 (1987). 
13. BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS 211-14 
(1986); see also infra notes 202-25 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text. 
15. Under the Pareto criterion, a resolution of a conflict or problem is said to be "Pareto 
optimal" if under that resolution no one can be made better off without making someone else 
worse off. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 269 (2d ed. 1984). 
16. To assume that two parties bargain in a Coasean fashion is to assume that they effectively 
negotiate to exhaust all benefits of trade. See generally R.H. Cease, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). 
17. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g .• ROBERT M. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CoOPERATION 221 n.5 (1984); 
HENRY HAMBURGER, GAMES AS MODELS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA 107-08 (1979); Robert 
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (1982). 
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action costs, with no tendency to escalate as each side seeks to gain the 
upper hand. Thus, it is not very surprising that the traditional eco-
nomic analysis admits no comprehension of the purpose in American 
labor law of promoting industrial peace. 
In this article, I present an alternative economic analysis of unions 
and collective bargaining that utilizes recent advances in labor eco-
nomics and some simple applications of game theory to address the 
deficiencies of the traditional monopoly model. First, I assume that 
the primary sources of union benefits are employer rents, quasi-rents, 
and productivity increases associated with unionism. These rents and 
productivity increases constitute the cooperative surplus that the par-
ties divide through collective bargaining. Individual bargaining will 
not secure for employees a share of this surplus. The workers must 
organize and bargain collectively to raise themselves to a position of 
rough equality relative to the employer and gain a share of the surplus. 
Second, in examining the problem of dividing the cooperative sur-
plus, I assume that the parties bargain in a Coasean fashion to achieve 
a Pareto optimal solution that maximizes the value of the cooperative 
surplus to the parties. If one assumes such optimal bargaining, then 
one can show that the parties will agree to a contract that specifies a 
level of employment exceeding that given by the employer's labor de-
mand curve. Indeed, if one assumes that the parties bargain to maxi-
mize the monetary value of the cooperative surplus and that the 
surplus consists of employer rents, one can demonstrate that the em-
ployer will set the same product market price and that the parties will 
agree to the same level of employment that would have prevailed in 
the absence of a union. 19 This follows because, assuming the employer 
was optimally pricing and mixing capital and labor to maximize his 
rent before the advent of the union, any adjustment of these parame-
ters will only decrease that rent. Combining this assumption of opti-
mal bargaining with my previous assumption concerning the primary 
sources of union wage increases, I argue that employees' gains from 
organization come largely at the expense of their employers, rather 
than other employees or consumers, and that the productivity gains 
associated with unionism may outweigh any attendant inefficiencies. 
It is therefore equitable, and perhaps wealth maximizing, for the gov-
ernment to encourage employee organization. 
Finally, I argue that in conflicts over the division of the coopera-
tive surplus, including organizing, collective negotiations, and enforce-
ment of the collective agreement, both sides have incentives to act 
19. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
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strategically, wasting a portion of the cooperative surplus in hopes of 
capturing a larger share of the surplus for themselves. Such strategic 
activities include discriminatory discharges, recognition strikes, in-
transigence in bargaining, and strikes or lockouts to enforce a given 
interpretation of the collective agreement. Moreover, because parties 
are often rewarded in these activities based on their recalcitrance rela-
tive to the other party, the costs of these conflicts are positional exter-
nalities that tend to escalate in the absence of government regulation. 
To illustrate these arguments, I present a simple game representing 
collective negotiations, which demonstrates that strategic behavior 
may be individually rational for each party to undertake, but collec-
tively irrational, because it results in strikes that waste the cooperative 
surplus. Thus, it makes sense for the government to structure the con-
duct of organizing, collective negotiations, and enforcement of the col-
lective agreement to prohibit or discourage strategic behavior and 
minimize waste of the cooperative surplus. 
The article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I provide a brief pri-
mer on the economic analysis of unions and collective bargaining. I 
discuss the various possible sources of union wage increases, possible 
employer responses to union wage demands, and alternative models of 
the costs of collective bargaining. In Part II, I outline the traditional 
monopoly theory of unions by combining the appropriate elements of 
the model discussed in the primer on economic analysis. I present 
both the theoretical implications of the traditional economic analysis 
for American labor law and a critique of this analysis from an eco-
nomic perspective. In Part III, I describe my alternative bargaining 
analysis by combining the alternate elements of a model of unions and 
collective bargaining presented in the primer on economic analysis. 
Once again I examine the implications of economic analysis for Amer-
ican labor law, although this time with very different results. Finally, 
I present my conclusions about American labor law based on my 
analysis. 
I. A PRIMER ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
In this Part, I present alternate economic assumptions with respect 
to three issues that must be addressed to construct an economic model 
of unions and collective bargaining. First, I examine the source of 
union wage and benefit increases and present three possible alterna-
tives. Next, I examine the employer's response to union wage and 
benefit demands and present both a demand curve and a bargaining 
analysis. Finally, I examine the costs of collective bargaining and 
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present alternative treatments of these costs, first as simple transaction 
costs, then as positional externalities. As I show in Parts II and III, 
which of the alternate economic assumptions one uses to construct a 
model of unions and collective bargaining greatly affects the model's 
implications for public policy. 
A. Sources of Union Wage and Benefit Increases 
The primary objective of unions is to negotiate the employment of 
workers at wages and benefits superior to those that the employees 
would have received individually. Indeed, workers will desire to or-
ganize into unions only if such organization provides benefits in excess 
of the costs of organization. Empirical studies estimate that organized 
employees receive wages that are generally about ten to fifteen percent 
higher than similarly situated unorganized employees.20 Organized 
employees also enjoy other benefits from collective bargaining, such as 
pensions, medical benefits, protection from discharge without just 
cause, and a grievance and arbitration system to enforce the collective 
agreement.21 The value that these benefits confer on organized em-
ployees can also be represented as a wage increase in simple models of 
unions and collective bargaining. 
However, if unions simply raised the wages of their members in a 
perfectly competitive economy, all they would achieve would be the 
unemployment of their members, through either their replacement 
with lower-paid unorganized workers or the bankruptcy of their em-
ployers.22 Such a wage increase would raise the production costs of 
organized firms, putting them at a competitive disadvantage. If the 
organized firms failed to replace the organized workers with lower-
paid unorganized workers, they would either have to raise their prices 
or accept lower profits to cover the wage increase. If the organized 
employers raised their prices to cover the increase in production costs, 
unorganized firms would sell their products at lower prices, expanding 
20. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 46-47 (1984); 
H. GREGG LEWIS, UNIONISM AND RELATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES (1963); Orley 
Ashenfelter, Union Relative Wage Effects: New Evidence and a Survey of Their Implications for 
Wage Inflation, in EcONOMETRIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC POLICY 31, 32·38 (Richard Stone 
& William Peterson eds., 1978); H. Gregg Lewis, Union Relative Wage Effects, in 2 HANDBOOK 
OF LABOR EcONOMICS 1139, 1163-76 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986). 
21. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 68; Greg J. Duncan, Earnings Functions and 
Nonpecuniary Benefits, 11 J. HuM. REsoURCES 462 (1976); Richard B. Freeman, The Effect of 
Unionism on Fringe Benefits, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 489 (1981). 
22. For previous presentations of this argument, see FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 
6-7; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21-22, 208-10; compare PAUL c. WEILER, GOV· 
ERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 132 (1990) ("(A] 
union is not and cannot be a cartel that exercises true monopoly power in an otherwise competi· 
tive market."). 
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their production in the affected markets and driving the organized 
firms out of the market. Similarly, if the organized employers ac-
cepted lower profits, the organized employers would not be able to pay 
a competitive rate of return to borrow capital and would go out of 
business. In time, only unorganized workers and firms would exist. 
To survive for any appreciable period of time in an economy, unions 
must derive their members' benefits from a source that is insulated 
from the machinations of the competitive market. At least three such 
sources exist. 
1. Labor Cartel Rents 
The first possible source of union wage increases, although by no 
means the most likely, is the formation of an effective labor cartel by 
the employees. 23 In order for this source to bear fruit, both the organ-
ized employees' labor market and the organized employers' product 
market must have barriers to entry - cost advantages enjoyed by the 
incumbents of a market but not by new entrants.24 Examples of barri-
ers to entry in the labor market include licensure, locatlon, firm-spe-
cific training, and expensive general training;25 examples of barriers to 
entry in the product market include patents, tariffs, transportation 
costs, and large start-up investments in capital, advertising, or learning 
how to produce the product. 26 If the employees can establish a labor 
cartel in a market with the requisite barriers to entry, they can raise 
their wages without fear that their employers will replace them, and 
their employers can raise prices to cover the increased production 
costs without fear that unorganized firms will drive them out of the 
market. The size of the barriers to entry in the relevant labor and 
product markets will limit the size of the union wage increase. 27 
23. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21-22. 
24. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 236 
(2d ed. 1980). 
25. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975). Firm-specific training is training 
that has value only to one firm; general training is training valuable to more than one firm. See 
id. at 26. 
26. RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, EcONOMIC 
NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 513-16 (2d ed. 1981). There is some disagreement over 
whether large initial investments such as expensive general training for employees or start-up 
costs for firms are really a barrier to entry, because the incumbents in the market also once had 
to undertake those costs. See id. at 514. However, at least in an economy with imperfect capital 
markets that make borrowing large sums of money impossible or costly, the necessity of such 
borrowing for start-up costs may effectively limit the number of potential entrants. 
27. The employees cannot raise their wages above the value of the barriers to entry to the 
labor market; if they do, the employer will replace them. Similarly, if they raise their wages so 
high that their employer must price above her product market barriers to entry, unorganized 
employers and employees will enter the market and replace them. 
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To establish an effective cartel, the employees probably need not 
organize all of the members of an occupation of a given employer, or 
all of the employers in the product market. Unions may be able to 
establish effective bargaining power with an employer by organizing 
only a significant subset of the firm's employees. Moreover, although 
the short-run individual interests of unorganized employers will be to 
cut prices and expand their market share,2s a small number of unor-
ganized employers may be able to see their long-run collective interest 
in declining to cut prices, earning excess profits, and using part of 
those profits to raise their workers' wages to stave off employee organi-
zation. 29 To the extent the employees' cartel is imperfect, however, its 
wage-setting ability will be undermined, and organized employers will 
have greater ability and incentive to replace organized with unorgan-
ized workers. 
2. Employer Rents 
The second possible source of union wage increases is employer 
rents on capital. 30 In economics a rent is any payment for a resource 
in excess of what would be necessary to entice the owner of the re-
source to bring it into employment in a perfectly competitive market.31 
In other words, a rent is any payment for a resource that exceeds the 
competitive price for that resource. At least two forms of such rents 
may serve as sources for union wage increases for an indefinite period 
of time, and an additional form of "quasi-rent" could serve as a source 
of union wage increases in the short run. 32 
The first form of employer rent that can serve as a source of union 
wage increases is employer market power rents from the product mar-
ket. 33 Market power rents are those profits earned by the employer in 
28. POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 26, at 334. 
29. The strategy of offering wage and benefit increases to stave off unionization seems fairly 
benign, because by redistributing wealth from the employer to the employees it achieves one of 
the objectives of allowing unions. However, if society wants to encourage employee organization, 
such "bribes" are undesirable because they encourage free riding on union efforts and result in 
too little union organizing activity. See infra note 317 and accompanying text. 
30. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21. 
31. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN EcONOMICS 120 (David w. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 
1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9-10 (4th ed. 1992). 
32. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21; BARRY T. HIRSCH, LABOR UNIONS AND 
THE EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS 3 (1991). An additional employer "rent" that may 
serve as a source of union wage increases is employer profits due to monopsony power in the 
labor market. However, although employer monopsony power may be an important source of 
union wage increases in certain industries and professions, labor economists generally do not 
believe it to be a pervasive source of union wage increases in the economy as a whole. See 
EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 9, at 65-66. For further treatment of the monopsony em-
ployer case, see infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. 
33. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21. 
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excess of the competitive rate of return because the employer is a mo-
nopoly or participates in an oligopoly or cartel in the product mar-
ket. 34 As in the case of the labor cartel, there must be barriers to entry 
in the labor and product markets for employer market power rents to 
yield union wage increases. If the employees in an occupation with 
barriers to entry can organize an employer who enjoys market power 
rents in a product market protected by barriers to entry, then the em-
ployees can raise their wages without fear of replacement, and the em-
ployer can raise her prices or cut her profits without fear of 
replacement or fear that she will not be able to borrow capital. As 
before, the relevant barriers to entry limit the size of the union wage 
increase. If the employer has already increased her product price to 
the full extent of the product market barriers to entry, then the wage 
increase will have to be paid entirely out of profits without any in-
crease in price. Again, the employees need not organize all of the 
members of a given occupation employed by an employer or all of the 
employers in a given product market to succeed in obtaining union 
wages. In fact, if employer market power rents represent the source of 
the union wage increase, the workers can achieve a wage increase even 
if they organize only one employer. 
The second form of employer rent that can serve as a source of 
union wage increases is Ricardian rents. 35 Ricardian rents are profits 
earned on a resource that exceed the competitive rate of return be-
cause the resource is not generally available in the market and has 
some characteristic that makes it unusually productive. 36 Examples of 
such resources include particularly fertile soil and a particularly rich 
vein of ore. 37 There must be some limit on the availability of the re-
source in the market; otherwise, competing producers who owned the 
resource would have incentives to cut prices and vitiate the rent. If 
the employees in an occupation with barriers to entry can organize an 
employer who enjoys Ricardian rents, the employees can raise their 
wages without fear of replacement, and the employer can pay these 
higher wages out of his rent without raising prices or going out of 
business. Indeed, if the only source of the union benefits is Ricardian 
rents, then the competitive market will set the product price, and the 
34. See SCHERER, supra note 24, at 11. 
35. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21. 
36. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND TAXATION 91-
108 (R.M. Hartwell ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1817). 
37. Although both of these examples are capital resources, human or labor resources can also 
earn Ricardian rents. For example, a person may have an unusual talent that makes him very 
productive at a given activity. However, as long as there is more than one employer for this 
unusual talent, the employee will theoretically be compensated for this superior productivity. 
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employer will not be able to raise the product price without being 
driven out of business. The size of the possible union wage increase is 
limited to the size of the labor market barriers to entry or the Ricar-
dian rent, whichever is smaller. As in the case of monopoly rents, the 
employees can gain a share of Ricardian rents even if they organize 
fewer than all the employees of only one employer in the relevant 
product market. 
The final form of employer "rent" that merits discussion here is 
quasi-rents on capital investments. Quasi-rents are those profits 
earned on a resource in excess of what could be earned on that re-
source by transferring it to its next best use.38 As the name implies, 
quasi-rents are not true rents, because they are not payments in excess 
of the competitive rate of return. For resources that are readily trans-
ferrable to other uses through transport or sale, such as common ma-
chinery like an adding machine, quasi-rents will be very small or zero. 
However, for resources that are highly specialized and hard to trans-
port, such as a unique steel smelter, quasi-rents may constitute nearly 
the entire competitive return on the resource. If the employees in an 
occupation with barriers to entry can organize an employer who earns 
significant quasi-rents on a specialized machine, then the employees 
can raise their wages to the limits of their barriers to entry, and the 
employer will be forced to pay the higher wages out of the competitive 
return she would have earned on the machine. The employer will not 
be able to recapture the value of the machine through resale or trans-
fer and, assuming the employer is operating in a competitive market, 
will not be able to raise her product price. Moreover, as long as the 
employer earns some positive return on the machine that will mini-
mize her losses, the employer will not shut down the machine. How-
ever, such a strategy for gaining wage increases can only be a short-
run strategy because, if the employer earns less than the competitive 
rate of return on her investment, the employer will probably avoid 
future investments in the same plant or perhaps even the same indus-
try. 39 Accordingly, as soon as the useful life of the specialized 
machine is exhausted, the employer will close the plant, and the or-
ganized workers will find themselves unemployed. As with true em-
ployer rents, the employees can obtain a share of quasi-rents even if 
38. HIRSCH, supra note 32, at 7; see also Armen A. Alchian, Decision Sharing and Expropri· 
able Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory of First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 
SUP. Cr. EcON. RE.v. 235 (1982); Carliss Y. Baldwin, Productivity and Labor Unions: An Appli· 
cation of the Theory of Self-Enforcing Contracts, 56 J. Bus. 155 (1983). 
39. HIRSCH, supra note 32, at 10. 
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they organize fewer than all of the employees of only one employer in 
a product market. 
3. Productivity Increases Associated with Employee Organization 
The final possible source of union wage increases is productivity 
increases associated with employee organization. 40 Labor economists 
have advanced several theories explaining how unions may increase 
productivity. 
The first theory is the union shock effect. 41 Proponents of this the-
ory argue that, as a result of lax management, some inefficiency exists 
in every firm, particularly firms insulated from competition by barriers 
to entry. Such laxity may occur because managers enjoy an easygoing 
management style and the owners of the firm cannot adequately moni-
tor the managers to prevent waste. 42 An increase in wages brought on 
by employee organization, the argument goes, "shocks" the manage-
ment into curing the existing inefficiencies to preserve profitability.43 
Others argue that, because employees have an interest in the profitabil-
ity of their firm and are present in the workplace, they may sometimes 
be superior to absent owners as monitors of management efficiency.44 
Of course, to play this monitoring role without fear of discharge, the 
employees must be organized in a union. Thus, unions may raise pro-
ductivity by prompting greater effort on the part of management. 
The second theory asserts that unions allow for the enforcement of 
efficient, long-term implicit labor contracts.45 To prevent shirking and 
40. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 7-11, 14-16; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 
13, at 22. 
41. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 188. 
42. Even where the owner runs the firm, unproductive practices can continue if the owner 
enjoys the practice. For example, it has been argued that discrimination persists in the economy, 
despite the fact that discriminatory firms are at a competitive disadvantage, because owners of 
businesses enjoy the practice and are willing to accept a lower rate of return on capital to indulge 
in it. See Matthew S. Goldberg, Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials, 97 
Q.J. EcON. 307 (1982). 
43. See id. at 308-14. 
44. See PETER KUHN, MALFEASANCE IN LONG TERM EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: A NEW 
GENERAL MODEL WITH AN APPLICATION TO UNIONISM 28-29 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper No. 1045, 1982); see also Peter Kuhn, Union Productivity Effects and 
Economic Efficiency, 6 J. LAB. RES. 229 (1985). 
45. For excellent expositions of this argument, along with some interesting applications of 
the argument to legal problems, see Keith N. Hylton & Maria 0. Hylton, Rent Appropriation and 
the Labor Law Doctrine of Successorship, 70 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1990); Douglas L. Leslie, Labor 
Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 364-71 (1984); Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, 
The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the 
Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1356-67 
(1988). There is an extensive economic literature on implicit labor market contracts. Recent 
surveys can be found in Donald 0. Parsons, The Employment Relationship: Job Attachment, 
Work Effort, and the Nature of Contracts, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, supra note 
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to compensate workers for investments in firm-specific training, it is 
efficient for employees and employers to enter into long-term contracts 
in which some of the employees' compensation is deferred until later 
in their careers.46 These contracts remain implicit because of the costs 
of negotiation and enforcement.47 Unfortunately, such deferred com-
pensation creates incentives for employers to act opportunistically and 
fire employees before they receive their deferred wages.48 Unions facil-
itate the enforcement of such long-term implicit contracts by protect-
ing employees from employers' opportunistic behavior with collective 
action, seniority rules, just-cause provisions, and arbitration provi-
sions. Accordingly, unions promote efficient measures to prevent 
shirking and encourage efficient investment in firm-specific training.49 
The third theory contends that unions raise productivity by pro-
moting the efficient consumption of public goods in the workplace. 50 
Many conditions of employment, including the level of safety, lighting, 
heating, and speed of the production line, are uniform and shared 
among all workers in a given workplace. Such uniform and shared 
conditions of employment are public goods, in that other workers can-
not be excluded from improvements negotiated by one worker. As a 
result, in individual bargaining, workers tend to let others negotiate 
improvements in such conditions and enjoy the benefits at no cost. 
20, at 789, 799-802; Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1144 (1985). 
46. The employer can defer a portion of an employee's compensation by paying the employee 
less than her marginal product early in the employee's career and more than her marginal prod-
uct later in the employee's career. This creates disincentives for shirking because, if the employee 
is caught shirking and fired, the employee loses the deferred wages. Wachter & Cohen, supra 
note 45, at 1360-61. Deferred wages can also represent employee investments in, and payments 
for, firm-specific training. When the employee is young, she invests in firm-specific training by 
taking a wage below her marginal product; when the employee is older, she is paid returns on 
that investment in the form of wages in excess of her marginal product. Id. 
47. To be complete, such contracts would have to specify appropriate conduct by the parties 
in a wide variety of situations, such as how much diligence the employee was required to under-
take in all circumstances and the required severity of economic hardship before the employer 
could lay off the employee. Completely specifying such a contract would be very costly. Leslie, 
supra note 45, at 368. Also, such a complete explicit contract would probably be of little use 
because proving in court whether one side had failed to comply with the complex terms of the 
agreement would be very costly. For example, it would be difficult to determine whether the 
employer laid off employees due to a legitimate reason, such as a decrease in demand for the 
employer's product, or to avoid paying deferred wages. 
48. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 45, at 1359, 1364. 
49. KUHN, supra note 44; James M. Malcomson, Trade Unions and Economic Efficiency, 93 
EcoN. J. 51 (1983); M.W. Reder, Unionism, Wages, and Contract Enforcement, in RESEARCH IN 
LABOR EcoNOMICS: NEW APPROACHES TO LABOR UNIONS 27 (Joseph D. Reid, Jr. ed., Supp. 
II 1983). 
50. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 7-11, 14-16; Richard B. Freeman & James L. 
Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PUB. INTEREST 69 (1979). For some interesting applica-
tions of this argument to labor law, see Keith N. Hylton & Maria 0. Hylton, Rational Decisions 
and Regulation of Union Entry, 34 V1LL. L. REV. 145 (1989); Leslie, supra note 45, at 377. 
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Such "free riding" results in an inefficiently low level of consumption 
of these public goods. Unions help to solve this problem by giving the 
workers a collective voice through which they can more accurately 
represent their preferences on such matters. 
Finally, some argue that unions raise productivity by promoting 
the adjustment of working conditions through the efficient expression 
of a collective voice rather than costly exit.51 In a competitive labor 
market, a worker's primary mechanism for expressing dissatisfaction 
with working conditions is to take another job or exit. Individual bar-
gaining over conditions of employment is difficult due to the free-rider 
effect previously discussed and because workers do not want to be 
identified by their employer as "troublemakers." However, exit is an 
inefficient mechanism by which to encourage changes in working con-
ditions. The mere fact that an employee leaves a job does not commu-
nicate much about what that worker felt was wrong with the 
conditions of employment. Exit also imposes search and retraining 
costs on both the employee who leaves and the employer who must 
replace the employee. Unions help solve this problem by giving work-
ers a collective voice through which they can express dissatisfaction 
with working conditions without the problems of free riding or em-
ployer retaliation. Besides being a more effective method of expressing 
dissatisfaction with working conditions, the collective voice also saves 
money by reducing the number of workers who leave jobs and thus the 
amount of search and retraining costs. 
If unions increase productivity, then, to the extent of the produc-
tivity increase, unionized employees can raise their wages without 
forcing their employer to raise output prices or putting their employer 
at a competitive disadvantage in obtaining capital. Indeed, to the ex-
tent that the unionized employer shares in the benefits of the produc-
tivity increase, the employer will be at a competitive advantage in the 
industry and will be able to lower product price and increase output. 52 
51. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 7-11, 14-16; Freeman & Medoff, supra note 50, 
at 70-78. 
52. This point has led some to argue that unions cannot yield productivity increases because, 
if they did, employers would voluntarily organize and split the benefits with their employees. 
See, e.g., Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 996-97 (1986); 
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 1000-01 (1984). I 
deal with this argument at length infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text. For now, suffice it 
to say that this argument misses the point that, in fact, employers in industries where employee 
organization yields productivity increases are anxious to organize employees in captive organiza-
tions or mimic union contracts in order to achieve a portion of the productivity increases that are 
possible through unionism. These employers just are not interested in independent employee 
organizations that may gain a share of employer rents or impinge on management prerogatives. 
As I will argue later, union wage increases generally exceed associated productivity increases, 
taking a share of employer rents and decreasing company profits. In addition, most American 
managers simply do not enjoy having their discretion compromised by negotiations with a union. 
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The nature of the problem of dividing productivity increases associ-
ated with employee organization between the employees and the em-
ployer depends on how widely such productivity increases are shared 
across the product market either through widespread unionization, 
growth of union firms, or free riding by unorganized employers who 
mimic union contracts. If such productivity increases are widely 
shared, then the benefits of the productivity increase will be divided 
according to the dictates of the market, with both the employees and 
the employer being paid according to their marginal product and con-
sumers enjoying a somewhat lower product price. If such productivity 
increases are not widely enjoyed across the market, then, at least in the 
short run, 53 they become Ricardian rents that the employees and em-
ployer split in an indeterminate bargaining problem. To the extent 
that employers do not like unions despite productivity increases, either 
due to union wages exceeding productivity increases associated with 
employee organization or because employers prefer to remain unor-
ganized, employees will need barriers to entry in the labor market to 
protect them. As with employer rents, wage increases based on pro-
ductivity increases associated with employee organization can proba-
bly be obtained by organizing only a substantial number of the 
employees of only one employer. 
B. Employer Responses to Union Wage Demands 
Even if the union wage increase is sheltered from the competitive 
market so that the employer will neither replace the organized em-
ployees nor go out of business, how the employer responds to a union 
wage demand may affect the analysis of unions and collective bargain-
ing. Labor economists employ two basic models of the employer's re-
sponse to union wage demands in their analyses. 
1. The Employer Demand Curve Response 
Under the first model, one simply assumes that, in response to a 
union wage demand, the employer moves up his labor demand curve 
Thus, employers generally resist independent employee organization even where such organiza· 
tion yields significant productivity increases. 
53. Absent barriers to growth, if only a few firms in an industry enjoy productivity increases 
associated with employee organization and the employers in those firms share in the benefits of 
the productivity increases, then those firms will enjoy a competitive advantage and could expand 
to dominate the market. The empirical significance of this scenario, however, is mitigated by the 
ability of unorganized employers to free ride on at least a portion of the productivity increases 
associated with unionism by mimicking union contracts and by the fact that employers rarely 
share in the productivity increases associated with unionism because union wage premiums gen· 
erally exceed estimated productivity increases. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
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and employs less labor.54 This response is depicted in Figure l, where 
the vertical axis measures the employees' wage, the horizontal axis 
measures the number of full-time employees, and the line marked D 
represents the number of full-time employees demanded by the em-
ployer at each possible wage. The employer's labor demand curve 
slopes downward because of the declining marginal product oflabor.55 
As the union raises the employees' wage from the competitive wage, 
W" to the union wage, W.,, the employer decreases the number of em-
ployees he employs from Ne to NII' The employer reduces the number 
of employees he uses in the plant by producing less and by substituting 
capital, such as labor saving machines, for the now more expensive 
workers.56 
However, unless one wants to assume that unions are entirely in-
different to the unemployment of their members, or that transaction 
costs prevent the parties from bargaining in a Coasean fashion57 over 
the terms of employment, such a simple labor demand response by the 
employer will not be Pareto optimal58 for the parties. The employer's 
labor demand curve may give the appropriate employer response to a 
market increase in the wage. If, however, the wage increase results 
from the formation of a union that can bargain over wages and em-
ployment, the employer and union can negotiate a wage and employ-
ment agreement that specifies a higher level of employment and a 
lower wage that both the employer and union will prefer to the em-
ployer's labor demand response. 59 Indeed, if one assumes that the par-
ties bargain to maximize the monetary value of rents and productivity 
54. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 10-14; James N. Brown & Orley Ashenfelter, 
Testing the Efficiency of Employment Contracts, 94 J. POL. EcoN. S40, S41 (1986); Kim B. Clark, 
Unionization and Firm Performance: The Impact on Profits, Growth, and Productivity, 74 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 893, 894-97 (1984); Thomas E. Macurdy & John H. Pencavel, Testing Between 
Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets, 94 J. PoL. 
EcoN. S3, S4, S8-S9 (1986). 
55. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 9, at 21-25. The marginal product of an input is the 
change in total output that results from the addition of the last unit of that input employed. To 
say that labor has a declining marginal product means that, as the employer adds additional 
workers to his plant, total production may go up, but production goes up by a smaller amount 
with each additional worker. Because the addition to total output is less with each additional 
worker, the employer will be willing to hire additional workers only if the wage of the workers is 
reduced. Accordingly, the employer is willing to employ more workers as the workers' wage 
declines, and the employer's labor demand curve slopes downward. 
56. Id. 
57. See supra note 16 for a definition of Coasean bargaining. 
58. See supra note 15 for a definition of Pareto optimality. 
59. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 14-18; Brown & Ashenfelter, supra note 54; 
Clark, supra note 54; Robert E. Hall & David M. Lilien, Efficient Wage Bargains Under Uncer-
tain Supply and Demand, 69 AM. EcoN. REV. 868 (1979); MaCurdy & Pencavel, supra note 54, 
at Sl0-13; Ian M. McDonald & Robert M. Solow, Wage Bargaining and Employment, 71 AM. 
EcON. REV. 896 (1981). 
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FIGURE 1 





increases due to unionization, one can demonstrate that the parties 
will seek to minimize the impact of the union on product price and 
firm employment levels. For example, if the union and employer seek 
to divide employer rents, then the parties will agree to the same level 
of employment that would have existed in the absence of the union, 
and no substitution of capital for labor will result from the union wage 
increase. 60 
2. The Employer Bargaining Response 
To demonstrate the superior bargaining solution, in Figure 2 I 
have redrawn the labor demand analysis of Figure 1 and added some 
graphical representations concerning the employer's profitmaking op-
portunities and the union's preferences among different wage and em-
ployment contracts.61 Just as in Figure 1, the vertical axis measures 
60. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 14-18; John M. Abowd, The Effect of Wage 
Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 774, 777, 793 (1989); 
Clark, supra note 54, at 897-98. As I discuss below, productivity increases associated with em-
ployee organization may even increase the optimal level of employment over what prevailed in 
the absence of a union. See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
61. The labor economics literature reaches no consensus on the best model to represent the 
preferences or objectives of unions. Some have developed models assuming that unions seek to 
maximize the wage bill; others have employed public choice analysis and modeled union objec-
tives according to the preferences of the median voter in union elections; still others have 
modeled union preferences in a manner analogous to an individual's utility function with a trade-
olf between wages and employment for union members. See, e.g., HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra 
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FIGURE 2 
The Employer and Union's Wage-Employment Contract Curve 
Wage (W) 
Employment (N) 
the employees' wage, the horizontal axis measures the number of full-
time employees employed, and the solid downward sloping curve la-
beled D represents the employer's labor demand curve. However, this 
time I have added the employer's isoprofit curves P0, P1t and P21 which 
descend on each side of the labor demand curve. Each isoprofit curve 
graphs wage and employment mixes that yield equivalent levels of 
profit. Isoprofit curves that are lower in the graph (Pi) specify a 
higher level of profits than those that are higher in the graph (Po). For 
any given wage, profit is maximized on the labor demand curve; how-
ever, identical profits can be made with either more or less labor at a 
lower wage rate. Accordingly, the isoprofit curves slope down on 
either side of the labor demand curve. Also shown in Figure 2 are the 
union's indifference curves, U0 and U1• Each indifference curve graphs 
wage and employment mixes that yield equal utility to the union as a 
collective entity. Indifference curves that are further from the origin 
(U J yield higher utility than those that are closer to the origin (U o). 
Assuming that the union's utility is an increasing function of both 
wages and employment, the union's indifference curves will be concave 
note 13, at 9-10; Henry S. Farber, The Analysis of Union Behavior, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
EcONOMICS, supra note 20, at 1039. I have chosen the third option because it is perhaps the 
most general and lends itself well to exposition of the arguments based on bargaining analysis 
that I want to make. 
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toward the origin as depicted in Figure 2. 62 
Figure 2 allows easy demonstration of the superior bargaining so-
lution. When the employees organize and demand a union wage, W,,, 
the employer's labor demand response will be to move to point A and 
decrease the number of workers employed to N,,. However, by moving 
to the right along the firm's isoprofit curve P<> which descends out of 
A, one sees that by agreeing to any point on P0 between A and C
1 the 
firm achieves the same level of profits while allowing the union to 
achieve a higher level of utility. Similarly, by moving to the right from 
A along the union's indifference curve U<> which comes out of A, one 
sees that by agreeing to any point on U0 between A and C
11 the union 
achieves the same level of utility while allowing the firm to achieve a 
higher level of profits. Thus, the employer's labor demand response is 
not Pareto optimal from the perspective of the employer and the 
union, and one or both of the parties can be made better off by moving 
off the demand curve to a point in the triangle A C'C'~ The tangencies 
between the firm's isoprofit curves and the union's indifference curves 
describe the set of Pareto optimal solutions to the bargaining problem 
between the employer and the union. 63 To the right or left of these 
tangencies, including points on the employer's labor demand curve, 
benefits remain to be gained from bargaining in that one or both par-
ties can be made better off without making the other worse off. The 
graph of these tangencies is called the contract curve between the two 
parties and is labeled C in Figure 2. 64 Depending on the technology of 
62. I also assume that the union's utility function is twice continuously differentiable and 
strictly concave. 
63. To be precise, such solutions are Pareto optimal taking the firm and the union as the 
relevant parties for application of the Pareto criterion. The "optimal" solution applying the 
Pareto criterion to the firm and the union may differ from the "optimal" solution applying the 
Pareto criterion to the firm and the individual workers, because the aggregate representation of 
workers' preferences through union democracy may differ from their representation through the 
marketplace. In particular, average workers' preferences probably receive greater weight under 
union representation while marginal workers' preferences probably receive greater representation 
in the marketplace. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 9-10. As a result, one might 
expect organized employees to negotiate contract terms more favorable to average workers than 
those negotiated by unorganized workers; examples might include pension provisions and just-
cause clauses. Moreover, the invariance hypothesis of the Coase Theorem would probably not 
hold with respect to the entitlement to organize because the workers would probably value the 
entitlement differently collectively, when the entitlement was to organize, than they would indi-
vidually, when the entitlement was not to organize. 
This possible variance between the workers' collective and individual preferences creates 
some ambiguity in the meaning of efficiency in labor law because it is not immediately clear 
whether the Pareto criterion should be applied to the union or the workers in defining efficiency. 
A strong tendency certainly exists in economics to choose the individual as the baseline for all 
arguments; however, the Pareto criterion is commonly applied to collections of entrepreneurs in 
the form of firms or corporations. For purposes of this article, I will define efficiency based on 
application of the Pareto criterion to individual workers. 
64. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 16. 
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the firm and the preferences of the union, the contract curve can slope 
to the left, be vertical, or slope to the right. 65 However, barring com-
plete union indifference to the employment of its members, the con-
tract curve will lie to the right of the employer's labor demand curve. 
Assuming the parties bargain in a Coasean fashion to exhaust all bene-
fits of trade, they will arrive at a wage and employment mix that is to 
the right of the demand curve on the portion of the contract curve 
between C' and C'~ Exactly where on this portion of the contract 
curve the parties will end up is an indeterminate bargaining problem. 
Under any of these possible solutions, however, the employer will con-
tinue to employ more labor after the union wage increase than the 
amount specified by the employer's labor demand curve. 
The argument can be made in a more simple and compelling man-
ner if one assumes that the employer and the union bargain to maxi-
mize the monetary value of the rents and productivity increases to be 
divided between them. In such a case, beyond any initial disruption of 
the competitive market necessary to generate the rent to be divided, 
the parties have incentives to minimize any deviations in the allocation 
of resources from what would have occurred under the competitive 
market. Additional deviations, such as a mix of capital and labor that 
varies from what would have occurred in a competitive market, only 
increase the costs of production and decrease the total value of the 
rent and productivity increase to be divided between the parties. 66 For 
example, if the parties negotiated to divide employer rents, one would 
expect the parties to agree to the employment of the same amount of 
labor that would have been used in the absence of a union and the 
employer to set the same product price that she would have set in the 
absence of a union. Assuming that, prior to the union, the employer 
mixed capital and labor and set the product price so as to maximize 
the value of her rent, adjustment of any of these parameters after the 
formation of the union only decreases the total value of the rent. In 
terms of Figure 2, assuming that the parties bargain to maximize the 
value of rents is analogous to assuming that union indifference curves 
65. Macurdy & Pencavel, supra note 54, at S10-S12. For example, given a well-behaved 
technology for the firm, if the union is willing to trade employment for wages, perhaps because it 
is dominated by senior workers who do not care about the job prospects of younger workers who 
will be laid off, then the contract curve will lean to the left. On the other hand, if the union 
desires to trade wages for employment, effectively spending a portion of its share of the rents on 
employing unneeded workers, then the contract curve will lean to the right. See id. This second 
case is commonly referred to as featherbedding and seems most likely to occur in industries that 
have recently suffered a massive contraction in the number of available jobs. See id. at S17-18, 
S34 (studying the wage and employment bargains of the International Typographical Union and 
finding employment above the rent-maximizing level); see also Brown & Ashenfelter, supra note 
54, at S43. 
66. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 14-18; Clark, supra note 54, at 898. 
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and firm isoprofit curves sketch out a contract curve that is vertical at 
the competitive level of employment (NJ. 67 
C. The Costs of Collective Bargaining 
Any economic analysis of collective bargaining should consider the 
costs associated with the phenomenon. First, organizing campaigns 
impose costs in the form of the resources expended on publicity, litiga-
tion, discriminatory discharges, and, prior to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, organizational strikes. Second, negotiation of the collective 
agreement imposes costs, the most dramatic of which is the lost pro-
duction due to a strike or lockout. Finally, enforcing the collective 
agreement imposes costs, including the resources expended on arbitra-
tion, litigation, and possibly strikes or lockouts. Irrespective of the 
source of the union benefit increase or the model of employer response, 
these costs are relevant to any consideration of the efficiency or equity 
of unions and collective bargaining. Under any model, these costs 
must be subtracted from any benefits derived from collective bargain-
ing, and under the bargaining model of the employer's response to a 
union wage increase, the costs of collective negotiations may prevent 
the realization of benefits of trade. 68 
1. The Costs of Collective Bargaining as Ordinary Transaction Costs 
Traditionally economists have modeled these costs without explic-
itly taking into account the strategic nature of the underlying activi-
ties. 69 Organizational activities are modeled in a market setting with a 
demand and supply for union services. 70 It is assumed that the 
amount employees spend on organizational activities increases with 
67. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 14-18; Clark, supra note 54, at 898. 
68. A model of the costs of collective bargaining may complete the basic economic analysis 
for purposes of the principal features of the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-La· 
Guardia Act. However, to examine the equity and efficiency of the duty of fair representation 
and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401·483 
(1988), one would have to add a model of how unions divide the employees' share of the rents 
and productivity increases among their members. On models of the internal workings of unions, 
see Farber, supra note 61. 
69. Many authors have acknowledged the strategic nature of collective bargaining. See, e.g., 
Epstein, supra note 8, at 1384-85; Posner, supra note 52, at 997. However, few have explicitly 
taken account of it in their models. 
70. See, e.g., HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 29-38; Orley Ashenfelter & George E. 
Johnson, Unionism, Relative Wages, and Labor Quality in U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 13 
INTL. EcoN. REV. 488 (1972); Orley Ashenfelter & John H. Pencavel, American Trade Union 
Growth: 1900-1960, 83 Q.J. EcoN. 434 (1969); Monroe Berkowitz, The Economics of Trade 
Union Organization and Administration, 7 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 575 (1954); John H. Pen-
cavel, The Demand for Union Services: An Exercise, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 180 (1971). 
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the expected rents available in a given industry,71 while employers 
concede these high-rent industries, spending more to prevent unionism 
in competitive industries where organization would threaten the life of 
the firm.72 Similarly, economists commonly assume that parties un-
dertake collective negotiations in a cooperative fashion.73 Under this 
assumption, strikes and lockouts become a very curious phenomenon. 
Why would two rational parties engage in such costly activity to arrive 
at a bargain that is necessarily inferior to the one they could have 
negotiated before the strike or lockout dissipated some of the mutual 
benefits of production?74 At the very least, one would expect two co-
operative parties to forgo the strike or lockout, adopt the contract they 
would have obtained after the work stoppage, and split the benefits of 
production gained by continuing production. Traditionally, econo-
mists explain strikes as the result of imperfect information.75 Unions 
undertake strikes either to adjust unrealistic expectations among rank-
and-file workers as to the wage increase that is possible76 or to allow 
the union to sort out low-wage from high-wage employers when less 
71. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 31. The amount the employees spend on organiz-
ing also depends on their taste for unionism. Id. at 30. 
72. Id. at 34. The amount employers spend resisting organization also depends on the taste 
of the employer for an unorganized workplace. Id. 
73. See John Kennan, The Economics of Strikes, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 
supra note 20, at 1091, 1104-12; Schwab, supra note 12, at 246. 
74. This puzzle has given rise to some consideration among economists. Indeed, under the 
famous "Hicks paradox" it is "impossible" to derive an accurate theory on the incidence, dura-
tion and results of strikes because, if the parties had access to such a theory, they would merely 
agree to the predicted post-strike bargain and forgo the strike, thus obviating the predictive abil-
ity of the model. SIR JOHN RICHARD HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 144-47 (2d ed. 1963); see 
also Kennan, supra note 73, at 1091. 
75. DAVID CARD, STRIKES AND WAGES: A TEST OF A SIGNALLING MODEL 1 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2550, 1988); Raquel Fernandez & Jacob 
Glazer, Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents, 81 AM. EcoN. REV. 
240 (1991) (observing that most economists explain strikes as the result of imperfect information, 
but offering an explanation for strikes consistent with perfect information). Although Hicks 
subscribed to the idea that imperfect information was the primary cause of strikes, he also pro-
posed in his famous "rusty weapon" passage the idea that unions may strike occasionally to 
maintain their ability to strike and to exert bargaining power: 
Weapons grow rusty if unused, and a Union which never strikes may lose the ability to 
organise a formidable strike, so that its threats become less effective. The most able Trade 
Union leadership will embark on strikes occasionally, ... in order to keep their weapon 
burnished for future use .... 
Under a system of collective bargaining, some strikes are more or less inevitable for this 
reason; but nevertheless the majority of actual strikes are doubtless the result of faulty nego-
tiation .... Any means which enables either side to appreciate better the position of the 
other will make settlement easier; adequate knowledge will always make a settlement 
possible. 
HICKS, supra note 74, at 146-47. To my knowledge no rigorous model of this theory of strikes 
has ever been constructed. 
76. Orley Ashenfelter & George E. Johnson, Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions and Indus-
trial Strike Activity, 59 AM. EcoN. REV. 35, 36-37 (1969). 
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expensive methods are not available. 77 Thus, strikes are merely the 
cheapest way to educate the workers as to the optimal wage that can 
be extracted from the employer. Labor economists have paid much 
less attention to the problem of enforcement of the collective agree-
ment. When they consider it, economists typically treat enforcement 
in a neutral fashion, as simply one of the services unions provide their 
members and as a cost of union administration.78 Under this analysis, 
the costs of collective bargaining are merely simple transaction costs 
to be subtracted from any benefits of collective bargaining. 
2. The Costs of Collective Bargaining as Positional Externalities 
Alternatively, one could explicitly account for the strategic nature 
of collective bargaining in modeling its costs. I define strategic behav-
ior as any activity undertaken by one party to an agreement to increase 
its benefit from the agreement at the expense of the other party to the 
agreement. 79 Examples of such activity include firing productive 
prounion employees, lying in negotiations, and intransigence or "hard 
bargaining" in negotiations or enforcement of the agreement. This 
type of activity results in costs, such as search and retraining to re-
place productive employees and strikes due to lying or intransigence in 
bargaining or enforcement. Thus, although these activities may in-
crease one side's expected benefit from the agreement, they decrease 
the total expected value of the agreement to both parties. Moreover, 
to the extent that the division of the benefits from the agreement de-
pends on the relative performance of the parties in collective bargain-
ing, both sides may have incentives to act strategically. If one party 
decides to act strategically, the other side must either respond in like 
manner or forfeit the contest over the benefits of the agreement. In 
such a case, the costs incurred in attempting to gain the upper hand in 
the agreement are known as a positional externality. 80 This is because 
the parties are competing for a relative position in undertaking the 
strategic behavior, for example who can be the most intransigent in 
bargaining, and the costs of responding to strategic behavior are exter-
nal to the original decision to undertake such behavior. Due to this 
77. Beth Hayes, Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information, 2 J. LAB. EcoN. 57, 58 
(1984); see Oliver Hart, Bargaining and Strikes, 104 Q.J. ECON. 25 (1989) (critiquing models 
used to explain the occurrence of strikes in the bargaining process); cf. Peter C. Cramton, Bar· 
gaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 51 
REV. EcON. STUD. 579 (1984). 
78. See Ashenfelter & Pencavel, supra note 70, at 430; Pencavel, supra note 70, at 181. 
79. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 45, at 1359 n.42. See generally Jason S. Johnston, 
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules. 100 YALE L.J. 615 
(1990). 
80. ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 629-38 (1991). 
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externality, the individual interests of the parties in pursuing strategic 
behavior diverge from their collective interest in avoiding it, and the 
conflict tends to escalate in cost even though the parties succeed only 
in wasting a portion of the benefit of the agreement. 
The costs of collective bargaining can be modeled as positional ex-
ternalities using game theory. In game theory, positional externalities 
arise in mixed motive or dilemma games that involve a divergence of 
individual and collective interests. 81 The most famous such game is 
the "prisoner's dilemma," in which two accomplices in crime face cer-
tain conviction on a lesser offense and probable exoneration on a 
greater offense. The prosecuting attorney gives each the following 
choice: turn state's evidence against your accomplice and receive a 
suspended sentence for the lesser offense while your accomplice is con-
victed of the greater offense; or remain silent and hope your accom-
plice does not rat on you. In this game, the strategic behavior is 
turning state's evidence while the positional externality is the addi-
tional jail time a criminal serves when his accomplice rats on him. 
Due to this externality, each criminal's individual interest in turning 
state's evidence diverges from their collective interest in remaining si-
lent. Each has individual incentive to turn state's evidence to reduce 
his jail time, but if each follows this individually rational choice they 
will both do time for the more serious offense. 
A similar simple dilemma game can represent the problem of stra-
tegic behavior and positional externalities in collective negotiations. 
Consider the problem of a union and an employer in deciding how to 
divide the benefits of their agreement to produce some product. For 
purposes of simplicity, assume that the union and the employer have 
already maximized the potential benefit of their agreement by includ-
ing all terms or conditions for which the benefits to the parties exceed 
their costs and are now bargaining over how to divide the total benefit 
of their agreement. 82 Each party must receive at least the benefit its 
81. See HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 69; MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SO-
CIAL SCIENCES 240 (1989). 
82. In reality, strategic behavior may sometimes prevent the negotiation of efficient contract 
terms. For example, in negotiating over the inclusion of an employee benefit such as a pension in 
the collective agreement, the union will have incentive to underrepresent the value of a pension 
while the employer will have incentive to overrepresent the cost of a pension in order to influence 
the ultimate division of the benefits of the agreement in their favor. See HAMBURGER, supra note 
18, at 117-22. If both are too successful in this misrepresentation strategy, the parties may fail to 
assess accurately whether a pension is worth more to the employees than it costs the employer 
and thus fail to include an efficient term regarding pensions in the contract. Id. at 122. For 
purposes of simplicity I exclude such possibilities from my negotiations game. I discuss below 
the realism of this assumption by examining whether transaction costs will prevent the negotia-
tion of efficient contract terms in collective negotiations. See infra note 228 and accompanying 
text. 
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members or investors could receive for their invested time and re-
sources by changing to other employers or employees; othenvise, they 
will pursue those options. In collective negotiations this minimum 
payment, known as the threat value of the agreement, 83 would be 
equal to the competitive wage for the employees and a competitive 
return on capital for the employer. The benefit of the agreement in 
excess of these minimum values is the real subject of dispute and is 
known as the cooperative surplus. 84 As previously discussed, in labor 
relations, this cooperative surplus will be made up of rents and pro-
ductivity increases that are protected by barriers to entry. For the 
purposes of this negotiating game, assume that the total cooperative 
surplus to be divided by the parties over the term of the agreement is 
$10. 
In this simple negotiating game, each side must decide whether to 
adopt a bargaining strategy of cooperation or intransigence in its ef-
forts to divide the cooperative surplus. 85 As previously discussed, in-
transigence constitutes a positional externality in collective 
negotiations. 86 This can be seen by examining the common sense as-
sumptions about the division of the cooperative surplus between the 
employees and the employer in Figure 3. The outermost diagonal line 
in Figure 3 shows all possible divisions of the cooperative surplus of 
$10 between the employees and the employer, from $10 for the em-
ployees and none for the employer, to $5 for each, to none for the 
employees and $10 for the employer. Assume that, if both parties bar-
gain cooperatively over the division of the surplus, they will decide to 
divide it in half with $5 each for the employees and the employer. 
This "split the difference" assumption concerning the results of coop-
erative collective bargaining is simple, but it comports with other 
much more sophisticated models of divisional bargaining. 87 If one 
side is intransigent in bargaining while the other is cooperative, the 
intransigent side will presumably achieve a larger share of the cooper-
ative surplus. Thus, assume that, if the union is intransigent while the 
83. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS 93-94 (1988). 
84. Id. 
85. This assumption may seem somewhat unrealistic because parties to collective negotia-
tions could adopt one strategy, for example cooperation, and then later change that strategy if 
the other side's actions warranted change. However, even if one were to take account of the 
potential dynamic nature of strategies in collective negotiations, one would obtain results similar 
to those of my simple model due to a similar dilemma in the incentives to change strategies. 
86. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
87. See Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and 
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 639, 660 (1989); Douglas Hecka-
thorn, A Unified Mode/for Bargaining Conflict, 25 BEHAV. Sci. 261 (1980); John F. Nash, Jr., 
The Bargaining Problem, 18 EcoNOMETRICA 155 (1950). 
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employer is cooperative, the division of the cooperative surplus will be 
$8.50 for the employees and $1.50 for the employer, while if the union 
is cooperative while the employer is intransigent, the division is $1.50 
for the union and $8.50 for the employer. However, if both sides are 
intransigent, a strike ensues, which consumes $4 of the cooperative 
surplus in the form of $2 in lost profits and $2 in lost net benefits from 
employment. The parties ultimately settle by agreeing to share equally 
the remaining cooperative surplus, with $3 each for the employees and 
the employer. 
To complete the negotiations game, all that is needed are assump-
tions about the time and information costs of collective negotiations 
and the distribution of bargaining benefits and costs among union and 
nonunion employees. Intransigence in bargaining will presumably 
also increase the time and information costs of negotiations. Thus, if 
both sides cooperate, then bargaining goes quickly, information is rela-
tively cheap to obtain, and the time and information costs of negotia-
tions are $0.25 for each party. However, if one or both sides are 
intransigent, then negotiations take longer, information is harder to 
obtain, and the time and information costs of negotiations are $0.50 
for each party. Regarding the distribution of the benefits and costs of 
bargaining among employees, assume that two thirds of the employees 
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are union members and that, although the benefits of negotiations are 
spread equally among all employees, the employees' share of the costs 
of bargaining, including strikes, is borne only by union members. 88 
Finally, assume that in playing the negotiations game the union is con-
cerned only with the benefits and costs to union members. 
The union and employer payoffs for each possible combination of 
bargaining strategies that can be selected by the parties are given in 
Matrix 1. The employer payoff for each combination of choices is 
given in the upper right-hand corner of the cell representing that com-
bination of choices, while the union's payoff for the same combination 
is given in the lower left-hand corner of the cell. These payoffs are 
computed by taking the relevant division of the cooperative surplus 
from Figure 3 and subtracting the relevant bargaining costs outlined in 
the above assumptions. For example, the employer's payoff when both 
parties are uncooperative in bargaining ($2.50) is computed by taking 
the employer's share of the cooperative surplus given in Figure 3 ($3) 
and subtracting the employer's time and information costs of bargain-
ing ($0.50). Similarly, the union's payoff when both parties are unco-
operative ($0.83) is computed by taking the union members' share of 
the cooperative surplus given in Figure 3 (2/3 x $3) minus the union's 
time and information costs in bargaining ($0.50) and the nonmembers' 
share of the costs of the strike, because all strike costs are borne by 
union members (1/3 x $2). Following game theory convention, I will 
refer to the cells of Matrix 1 from left to right, top to bottom, respec-
tively, as cells 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
Examining the payoffs of this game, one can see the divergence 
between individual and collective interests that characterizes posi-
tional externalities and dilemma games. From the individual perspec-
tive of each party, the strategy of intransigence in bargaining 
dominates because it yields a higher payoff regardless of what the 
other side does. Looking at the employer's payoffs, one sees that, if 
the union decides to cooperate, the employer does better by being in-
transigent ($8) than by being cooperative ($4. 75), and, if the union 
decides to be intransigent, the employer again does better by being 
intransigent ($2.50) than by being cooperative ($1). Similarly, exam-
ining the union's payoffs, one sees that, if the employer decides to co-
operate, the union does better by being intransigent ($5.17) than by 
88. The assumption that union members bear all the costs of strikes is roughly equivalent to 
the assumption that whenever there is a strike the employer maintains partial operations using 
the employees who are not union members. The assumption is somewhat unrealistic even on this 
account because it implicitly assumes that, during the strike, the strikebreakers always receive 
the wage for which the union ultimately settles. This unrealistic assumption, however, does not 
affect the conclusions of my model. 
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Including the values of union benefits received by employees who are not 
union members, the total wealth of each cell 1 through 4 is, respectively, 
9.5, 9, 9, and 5. 
being cooperative ($3.08), and, if the employer decides to be intransi-
gent, the union still does better by being intransigent ($0.83) than by 
being cooperative ($0.50). Thus, if each party acts according to its 
own individual interests, one would expect both to be intransigent and 
cell 4 to be the expected outcome or equilibrium for the game. How-
ever, from the collective perspective of both parties this outcome is 
clearly suboptimal. Both of the parties can do better if they cooperate 
and confine their conflict to cell 1 ($3.08 for the union and $4.75 for 
the employer) rather than escalating the conflict to a strike that wastes 
a portion of the cooperative surplus as represented in cell 4 ($0.83 for 
the union and $2.50 for the employer). Thus, to the extent the parties 
act individually rather than collectively, the conflict will tend to esca-
late despite the best interests of both parties. 
Although the results of a particular game can be changed by 
changing assumptions about the costs and benefits of intransigent be-
havior, the basic nature of collective negotiations as a dilemma game 
remains. Examining Figure 3 again, one can divide the triangle repre-
senting all possible divisions of the cooperative surplus after a strike 
into sectors I through IV according to the diagonal line from (0, 3.2) 
448 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:419 
to (8.5, 1.5)89 and the vertical line at (1.5, 0),9° If the expected settle-
ment after a strike is in sector I, the employer will give in and not take 
a strike because he will earn more ($1.50) by capitulating. Similarly, if 
the expected settlement after a strike is in sector III, the union will 
give in and not strike because it will gain more benefits for its members 
by capitulating. The upper border of this sector slopes down, rather 
than being horizontal at (0, 1.5), due to the free riding of nonmembers 
on the benefits of undertaking a strike. However, if the expected set-
tlement after a strike is in sector II or IV, both sides will have individ-
ual incentives to undertake a strike. This is true in sector II because 
each side will do better by striking than by capitulating to the other's 
hard bargaining. A strike is also possible in sector IV because, 
although each does better by capitulating, each will act recalcitrantly 
and hope that the other capitulates first.91 One can change the results 
of a particular game by changing the assumptions that determine the 
division of the surplus after a strike or the boundaries of the four sec-
tors in Figure 3. For example, one could move the expected payoffs 
after a strike by assuming the union gains a larger share through a 
strike, or one could shift the boundaries of the four sectors by assum-
ing each side gets a higher payoff for capitulating. However, if in a 
negotiations game between two parties the expected payoffs for a strike 
are consistently in sectors I or III so that one side is alway~ capitu-
lating, the other side will have incentive to lessen the share it gives for 
capitulation, expanding sectors II and IV and increasing the chances 
that the other side's expected payoffs recommend intransigence and a 
strike. History demonstrates that, in industrial relations, the parties 
89. This line is determined by comparing the union's net benefit after a strike with the 
union's net benefit from capitulating without a strike for a generalized division of the surplus 
after the strike. Assume that the employees' share of the surplus after a strike is Y while the 
employer's share is X Accordingly, the union's net benefit after a strike is its portion of the 
employees' share ((2/3) • Y) minus the costs of negotiations ($0.50) minus the free riders' share 
of the costs of the strike ((1/3) • (1/2) • ($10 - (X + Y))). The union's net benefit if it capitu-
lates without a strike is merely its portion of the employees' share (2/3 • $1.50) minus the costs 
of negotiations ($0.50). Setting the union's net benefits with and without a strike equal to each 
other and simplifying, one obtains the equation Y = 3.2 - 0.2x; which is the diagonal line from 
(0, 3.2) to (8.5, 1.5). If the expected division between the employer and the employees after a 
strike is above this line, the union does better by striking; if it is below, the union does better by 
capitulating. 
90. If the expected division between the employer and employees after a strike is to the right 
of this line, the employer does better by taking a strike. If the expected division between the 
employer and the employees after a strike is to the left of this line, the employer does better by 
capitulating. 
91. In game theory, as on the playground, games with such payoff structures are known as 
games of "Chicken." HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 83-87; SHUBIK, supra note 81, at 394. 
Games of chicken have an unstable "solution" where, as in dilemma games, individual incentives 
diverge from collective incentives and collectively irrational outcomes can result. HAMBURGER, 
supra note 18, at 86-87. 
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commonly feel that it pays to contest strikes - in other words, that 
both sides' expected payoffs from a strike are in either sector II or 
IV.92 Putting aside my many simplifying assumptions, if one accepts 
that the nature of intransigence in bargaining is that of a positional 
extemality, then one must accept the dilemma nature of collective 
negotiations. 
By proposing this simple game as an illustration of the problems of 
strategic behavior and positional externalities in collective negotia-
tions, I do not argue that unregulated collective negotiations inevitably 
degenerate into a strike. Both the employer and the union should rec-
ognize their dilemma and, to their mutual benefit, often be able to curb 
the temptation to bargain in an intransigent manner. The parties will 
be aided in this effort by the fact that, unlike some other dilemma 
games, employer-union negotiations often involve an established rela-
tionship and communication.93 Particularly in mature collective bar-
gaining relationships where the parties have a history of cooperative 
bargaining and can foresee future negotiations that could be jeopard-
ized by present strategic behavior, the parties usually will be able to 
avoid the costs of intransigent bargaining. My point is that, despite 
the parties' common incentive and frequent success at solving the di-
lemma game of collective negotiations to their mutual benefit, at the 
heart of the game lie individual incentives that tend to escalate the 
game and sometimes produce suboptimal solutions that waste a por-
tion of the cooperative surplus. 
Similar dilemma games can be constructed for organizing cam-
paigns and enforcement of the collective agreement. With respect to 
organizing, the cooperative or low-cost strategy might correspond to 
the mere publicity of pro- or antiunion views in an employee election 
on union representation, while the recalcitrant or high-cost strategies 
might correspond to organizational strikes and discriminatory dis-
charges. It seems reasonable to assume that a party's payoff in or-
ganizing depends on its relative performance, because resort to the 
recalcitrant or high-cost strategy by only one party will increase that 
party's chances of prevailing, while if both parties resort to the recalci-
trant or high-cost strategy their efforts will tend to cancel each other 
92. See, e.g., FOSTER R. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 166-83 (3d ed. 1966) 
(recounting the violent Homestead and Pullman strikes). · 
93. The prisoner's dilemma game previously discussed is commonly characterized as a di-
lemma in which the parties cannot communicate. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
However, even when the parties to a dilemma game cannot communicate and have no relation-
ship, empirical evidence suggests that many people can solve the dilemma to their collective 
benefit. See, e.g., Lester B. Lave, An Empirical Approach to the Prisoners' Dilemma Game, 76 
Q,J, EcON. 424 (1962). 
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out with respect to resolving the conflict. Thus, one would expect that 
organizational campaigns would have a tendency to escalate into 
costly affairs, wasting a portion of the cooperative surplus, in much 
the same way that negotiation conflicts can escalate. The parties are 
probably less likely to arrive at the mutually beneficial armistice of 
confining themselves to the cooperative or low-cost strategy in the case 
of the organizing game than in the case of the negotiations game, be-
cause in an organizing campaign the parties have not yet established a 
constructive relationship or steady communication and are probably 
quite hostile to one another. 
With respect to enforcement of the collective agreement, the coop-
erative or low-cost strategy is to resolve disputes over interpretation of 
the agreement through arbitration, while the recalcitrant or high-cost 
strategy is to resort to more costly litigation or strikes to resolve con-
tract disputes. Again, it seems reasonable to assume that a party's 
payoff in enforcement depends on its relative performance, because re-
sort to the recalcitrant or high-cost strategy by only one party will 
increase that party's chances of prevailing, while if both parties resort 
to the recalcitrant or high-cost strategy their efforts will tend to cancel 
each other out with respect to resolving the conflict. Thus, one would 
expect that enforcement conflicts have a tendency to escalate, wasting 
a portion of the cooperative surplus, in much the same way that nego-
tiation conflicts tend to escalate. In the enforcement game, it would 
seem very likely that the parties would achieve a mutually beneficial 
armistice by agreeing to confine their contract disputes to the coopera-
tive or low-cost strategies because they have an established relation-
ship and communication, and indeed have already successfully 
negotiated a collective agreement. It is thus not surprising that the 
vast majority of collective bargaining agreements provide arbitration 
as the means of resolving contract disputes. 94 
II. THE TRADITIONAL MONOPOLY MODEL OF UNIONS AND 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
Having established a sound basis in the economic analysis of un-
ions and collective bargaining, we can now examine the traditional 
monopoly model of unions and its implications for American labor 
law. In this Part, I present the traditional analysis, apply it to Ameri-
can labor law, and critique it from an economic perspective.95 
94. Approximately 99% of collective bargaining agreements sampled contain provisions to 
arbitrate contract disputes. 51 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 5 (Jan. 23, 1992). 
95. Several valuable critiques of monopoly model applications to American labor law have 
already been made from a historical and legal perspective. See WEILER, supra note 22; Julius G. 
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A. The Model and Its Implications for Public Policy 
The traditional monopoly model of unions and collective bargain-
ing combines the first assumption discussed in each of the three sec-
tions of the primer on economic analysis.96 First, practitioners of the 
monopoly model commonly assume that union wage increases come 
from labor cartels.97 Although economists have long acknowledged 
employer product market power rents and Ricardian rents as possible 
sources of union wage increases,98 the traditional analysis has consist-
ently focused on the labor cartel as the source of union benefits. 99 Sec-
ond, proponents of the traditional monopoly model of unions and 
collective bargaining assume that the employer responds to a union 
wage demand by moving up her labor demand curve.100 Many exposi-
tions of the monopoly analysis never consider the possibility of opti-
mal bargaining, 101 although some more sophisticated presentations 
assume that transaction costs prevent such bargaining. 102 Finally, ad-
herents of the traditional monopoly model of unions and collective 
bargaining implicitly assume that the costs of collective bargaining are 
simple transaction costs without any strategic nature. If one assumes 
that unions unilaterally set wages while employers unilaterally set 
levels of employment, there is little room to consider strategic behav-
ior in collective negotiations. 103 As previously discussed, the tradi-
tional model holds that strikes occur due to imperfect information. 
The traditional analysis also generally treats the costs of organizing 
the employees and enforcing the contract without explicitly taking ac-
count of the strategic nature of the underlying behavior.104 
Getman & Thomas C. Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Pro-
fessor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415 (1983); Paul R. Verkuil, Whose Common Law for Labor Rela-
tions?, 92 YALE L.J. 1409 (1983). 
96. For other expositions of the monopoly theory of unions, see EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra 
note 9, at 328-65; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21-22. 
97. See sources cited supra note 96. 
98. See HICKS, supra note 74, at 140; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21; ALBERT 
REES, THE EcONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 157-58 (1973). 
99. This also holds true for the applications of this theory to law. For example, although 
Epstein briefly discusses Ricardian rents as a source of union benefits, see Epstein, supra note 8, 
at 1384-85, he fails to deal consistently with this possibility throughout his analysis. For a simi-
lar treatment, see Campbell, supra note 52, at 1017. 
100. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21-22. 
101. See Epstein, supra note 8; Posner, supra note 52. 
102. See, e.g., HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 16. 
103. The only instance for strategic behavior under the monopoly model occurs when the 
monopoly union faces a monopsonist employer. However, as discussed below, this possibility has 
been traditionally dismissed in the labor economics literature due to the supposed rarity of em-
ployer monopsony power. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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The traditional monopoly analysis of unions and collective bar-
gaining is presented in Figures 4, 5, and 6. Respectively, these figures 
depict the organized labor market, the unorganized labor market, and 
the product market of the organized employers. In constructing these 
figures, I have assumed that both the organized occupation and the 
product market of the organized employers enjoy barriers to entry. 
Under the traditional analysis, when the union organizes a sufficient 
number of employees in an occupation in the relevant product market, 
it imposes an increase in their wage from We to Wu- as shown in Figure 
4.105 The occupational barriers to entry prevent the organized em-
ployers from replacing the employees, and the employers respond by 
moving up their demand curve, reducing employment from Ne to N"' 
The employers accomplish this decrease in employment by reducing 
production and substituting capital for labor in the production pro-
cess. This substitution of capital for labor results in "production ineffi-
ciency"106 because the organized firms now employ too much capital 
relative to labor, given the marginal productivity of capital and labor 
105. The size of the wage increase the union imposes depends on the union's estimate of the 
decline in employment that will accompany the wage increase and the union's priorities in choos· 
ing between higher wages or more employment. However, in no case can the union wage exceed 
the occupational barriers to entry or cause the employer's price to exceed the barriers to entry to 
the product market. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
106. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 9, at 360; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 
21-22, 181. 
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and their respective opportunity costs in terms of the competitive in-
terest rate and wage. 107 The higher union wage also results in unem-
ployment because more workers (NJ would like to work at the union 
wage than employers are willing to employ (N .). As shown in Figure 
5, some of these workers (Ne - Nu) will seek employment in the unor-
ganized labor market, 108 pushing out the labor supply curve in that 
market from S to S' and depressing wages from We to We: This move-
ment of workers from the organized to the unorganized labor market 
107. A profit-maximizing firm will employ additional units of an input only as long as the 
value of the marginal product those units of input produce exceeds the cost of those additional 
units of input to the firm. HAL R. v ARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 325-29 (1987). In a competitive market, the price of an input will be set equal to its 
opportunity cost in terms of the value of its marginal product in the best alternative use. Id. at 
326. Thus, when input prices are set competitively, the firm's profit-maximizing activity will 
result in efficient production, and the firm will employ an additional unit of input only if its value 
to the firm exceeds its value in its next best use. Id. at 515-16. Under the traditional monopoly 
theory of unions, firms respond to a union wage increase by employing only those units of labor 
the value of whose marginal product exceeds the higher union wage and substituting units of 
capital that are now relatively cheap in the firm's production process. This results in inefficient 
production because the firm now employs too little labor, given its opportunity cost, sending 
workers to be employed in less productive uses, and too much capital, given its opportunity cost, 
employing capital that could be better employed in other uses. Total wealth could be increased 
by doing away with the artificially high union wage so that inputs could once again be employed 
in their most valuable uses. 
108. Assuming that prior to organization the equilibrium wages in the organized and unor-
ganized labor markets were comparable (both W,), the number of workers who will leave the 
organized labor market to seek work in the unorganized labor market equals the number who 
were previously employed in the organized labor market (NJ minus those who are still employed 
there (NJ. 
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FIGURE 6 
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is commonly referred to as the "displacement effect."109 Finally, as 
represented in Figure 6, the decrease in production by the organized 
firms that accompanies the higher union wage results in a backward 
shift of the relevant product supply curve from S to S~ an increase in 
the product price from Pc to Pc' and a decrease in consumption of the 
good from Qc to Qc: This decrease in consumption results in "con-
sumption inefficiency"110 because consumers now enjoy too little of 
the product relative to other goods, given the opportunity costs of em-
ploying resources in the production of the organized good relative to 
other goods. 111 The barriers to entry in the product market prevent 
109. HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 306 (4th ed. 
1982); EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 9, at 350; see REES, supra note 98, at 160. 
110. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 9, at 360; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 
22, 181. 
111. In a competitive economy, firms will price their product at the marginal cost of produc-
ing that product, which in turn equals the opportunity cost of employing the resources used to 
produce the product in their next best use. VARIAN, supra note 107, at 322, 371. Efficient con· 
sumption ensues because consumers will purchase the good only ifthe benefit they derive from it 
exceeds the value that could be obtained by employing the resources used to produce the good in 
their next most valuable use. Under the monopoly analysis of unions, when the union raises the 
price oflabor the employer must raise the price of the good above its opportunity cost, resulting 
in decreased consumer demand for the good and a shifting of that demand to less valued goods. 
Total wealth could be increased by doing away with the high union wages and correspondingly 
high union product price and allowing consumers once again to purchase goods for their oppor· 
tunity cost. 
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other firms from entering and driving the product price back down to 
the competitive level. 
The only exception to the above analysis that is traditionally con-
sidered in the monopoly model occurs when the employers exercise 
monopsony power in the labor market. 112 Monopsony power exists 
when there is only one employer, or so few employers that they can 
explicitly or implicitly collude in offering wages. 113 When an effective 
monopsony exists in the labor market, the employers no longer accept 
the market wage as given, but instead realize that they can drive down 
the market wage by employing fewer employees. As characterized in 
Figure 7, the monopsony maximizes profits by employing fewer em-
ployees (N ,,J and driving the wage down from We to W"" 114 The oper-
112. See DAVEY ET AL., supra note 109, at 307-08; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 
22; Posner, supra note 52, at 991-92. 
113. See DAVEY ET AL., supra note 109, at 307. 
114. The marginal cost of labor curve for the monopsony (MCL) lies above the labor supply 
curve. This is because the monopsony realizes that purchasing additional labor drives up the 
wage; the marginal cost of additional labor for the monopsonist equals the increased wage it must 
pay for the additional labor plus the increase in wages that must be paid to each previously 
purchased unit of labor. Because the height of the labor supply curve is equal to the wage at 
every level of employment, the marginal cost of the labor curve must lie above this curve. As 
depicted in Figure 6, the monopsony maximizes profits by employing labor until the point where 
the marginal cost of labor equals the marginal benefit of labor as represented by the labor de-
mand curve (i.e., the monopsony will employ the quantity of labor (N ,J given by the intersection 
of the marginal cost of labor curve (MCL) and the labor demand curve (D}). This follows be-
cause, at levels of employment below this amount, the marginal benefit of additional employees 
exceeds their marginal cost, and the total net benefit of employing labor is increasing, while at 
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ation of the monopsony results in production inefficiency because the 
monopsony employs less than the efficient amount of labor in the pro-
duction process. A union solves this problem because, by fixing the 
wage for labor at a given rate, it prevents the monopsony from driving 
down wages by employing fewer workers. Because the monopsony 
can no longer drive down the wage by cutting employment, the mo-
nopsony no longer has incentive to employ fewer than the efficient 
number of employees.1 15 The problem of the negotiation of a wage 
between a monopsony employer and a monopoly union represents an 
indeterminate bargaining problem, but if one assumes the employer 
and the union seek to maximize the monetary value of the rents from 
their endeavors, they will bargain to the competitive wage (W J and 
the competitive level of employment (N,). 116 Thus, when facing em-
ployer monopsony power, monopoly unions can increase employment 
and economic efficiency. Traditionally, however, economists limit the 
importance of this exception by arguing that employer monopsony 
power is rare in the economy. 117 
The costs of collective bargaining merely make employee organiza-
tion even less attractive from a societal perspective. Under the mo-
nopoly model, employee organization will lower the short-run profits 
of organized firms because, at higher union wages and prices, the or-
ganized product market experiences excess capacity until the requisite 
number of producers leave the market to achieve the new organized 
levels of employment above this amount, the marginal benefit of additional employees is less than 
their marginal cost, and the total net benefit of employing labor is decreasing. Thus, at the point 
where the marginal cost of labor and the labor demand curve cross, the total net benefit of 
employing labor is maximized. The wage the monopsonist will seek to pay to employ this 
amount of labor (W,,,) is given by the labor supply curve, because this is the minimum amount 
the monopsony can pay to elicit the profit-maximizing amount of labor (N,,J. 
115. When confronted by a union, the monopsony faces a marginal cost of labor curve that is 
horizontal at the union wage from the origin until the labor supply curve and then rises above the 
labor supply curve. 
116. DAVEY ET AL., supra note 109, at 308-09; see also \V. Kip Viscusi, Unions, Labor Mar-
ket Structure, and the Welfare Implications of the Quality of Work, 1 J. LAB. RES. 175 (1980). 
117. See DAVEY ET AL., supra note 109, at 309; BELTON M. FLEISCHER & THOMAS J. 
KNIESNER, LABOR EcoNOMICS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 210-12, 219 (3d ed. 1984); 
HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 22; WEILER, supra note 22, at 126 ("Rarely does a firm 
enjoy a monopsonistic position vis-a-vis workers."); Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor 
Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (1984); 
Posner, supra note 52, at 991-92. But see LLOYD G. REYNOLDS ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS 
AND LABOR RELATIONS 51 (9th ed. 1986) (arguing that employer monopsony power is not 
uncommon). Despite the widespread belief among labor economists that employer monopsony 
power is not in general an important factor in the dynamics of the American labor market, some 
recent empirical work suggests that employer monopsony power can be important in some pro-
fessions, including nursing and teaching. See B.G. Dahlby, Monopsony and the Shortage of 
School Teachers in England and Wales, 1948-73, 13 APPLIED EcoN. 303 (1981); Richard W. 
Stratton, Monopoly, Monopsony and Union Strength and Local Market Wage Differentials, 44 
AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 305 (1985); Daniel Sullivan, Monopsony Power in the Market/or Nurses, 32 
J.L. & EcoN. Sl35 (1989). 
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market equilibrium. 118 It also seems safe to assume that employee or-
ganization conflicts with the preferences of most managers. Thus, 
firms will have incentives to expend resources publicizing their views 
or firing productive prounion employees to resist employee organiza-
tion.119 Organization will gain some employees a monopoly rent. 
However, because all workers commonly share the same wages and 
benefits whether they are union members or not, 120 employees have 
individual incentives to "free ride" on the efforts of others by not ac-
tively participating in the union even though they enjoy its benefits. 121 
Unions will thus have incentive to expend resources publicizing their 
views, absorbing discriminatory discharges, and undertaking other or-
ganizational activities, such as rallies or strikes, in order to overcome 
employer resistance and individual defection. 122 Additionally, both 
the union and the employer incur time and information costs in under-
taking collective negotiations. Indeed, under the monopoly model, the 
fact that the employees have imperfect information regarding the opti-
mal wage that can be extracted from the employer can lead to a strike 
to adjust employee expectations or sort out employers who can afford 
to pay a high wage from those who can only afford a low wage. 123 
Such a strike imposes costs on the employer and employees in the 
forms of lost profits and lost wages. If the strike is so widespread in a 
given product market that adequate substitute goods are not available, 
such a strike will also impose costs on consumers in the form of for-
gone consumption. 
Finally, given the imprecision of language, disagreements over the 
interpretation of the contract are inevitable. Because the value of an 
agreement is only as good as its enforcement, both the union and the 
employer will have incentives to expend resources to resolve disputes 
118. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 12-14, 21-22. 
119. Given the incentives of employers and unions, respectively, to resist and undertake em-
ployee organization under the monopoly model, it makes sense to call these activities "strategic 
behaviors" within the model because they are undertaken to benefit one party at the expense of 
the other. However, neither this characteristic of the activity nor the nature of these costs as a 
positional extemality is ever explicitly taken account of in the model. 
120. Indeed, similar treatment of union and nonunion employees is required by law. 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). 
121. Within the context of the monopoly model of unions such "free riding" is part of the 
ordinary defection from a cartel one would expect in a competitive economy. 
122. Employers and unions might also expend resources to lower or raise barriers to entry or 
to shift demand and supply curves to gain an advantage in organizing or negotiation of the union 
wage. Campbell, supra note 52, at 1007-09. For now, I will take barriers to entry and demand 
and supply curves as given and concentrate on the costs of collective bargaining discussed in the 
text. I consider these costs more central to the analysis of American labor law. 
123. Recall my discussion of imperfect information theories of strikes, supra notes 74-77 and 
accompanying text. 
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that arise under the agreement. These costs of collective bargaining 
are generally assumed to exceed the corresponding negotiation and en-
forcement costs that would be incurred under a competitive market. 124 
Under the monopoly model of unions and collective bargaining, the 
excess costs of undertaking collective bargaining are waste, because 
they further no productive purpose but only the cartelization of the 
labor market. 
The traditional monopoly analysis concludes that unions and col-
lective bargaining are inefficient and inequitable. Unions and their as-
sociated higher wages impose inefficiency in both the production and 
consumption of union goods. In addition, the collective bargaining 
process imposes costs on society in the form of discriminatory dis-
charges, strikes, and possibly foregone consumption. These costs ex-
ceed the negotiation and enforcement costs of a competitive labor 
market and represent a deadweight loss to society. 125 Unions are ineq-
uitable in that they achieve higher wages at the expense of other em-
ployees, who are displaced to now-depressed labor markets, and 
consumers, who have to pay higher prices for fewer goods. Given that 
these workers and consumers are likely to be similarly situated with 
respect to the initial distribution of wealth, it is hard to justify this 
redistribution of wealth on the basis of egalitarian or other common 
normative principles. In short, under the monopoly analysis, unions 
are bad and should be discouraged or outlawed. Moreover, any limi-
tations on union power, such as employer resistance or employee free 
riding, are beneficial and should be encouraged. 
B. Application of the Model to American Labor Law 
Various authors have analyzed American labor law from the per-
spective of the monopoly model of unions and collective bargaining. 126 
124. This assumption is implicit in many analyses. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 1396·97; 
Posner, supra note 52, at 997-98. Arguably there would be economies of scale in collective bar· 
gaining with respect to the ordinary time and information costs of negotiation and enforcement 
of labor agreements. However, proponents of the monopoly model of unions and collective bar· 
gaining typically assume that these economies of scale are outweighed by the organizing and 
strike costs of collective bargaining that are not incurred in a competitive market. See, e.g., 
Epstein, supra note 8, at 1396-97. To my knowledge no rigorous empirical test of either of these 
assumptions exists. 
125. In economics a deadweight loss is a cost that does not yield productive service or is not 
merely a transfer of wealth from one party to another. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN 
ECONOMICS, supra note 31, at 97. 
126. See Campbell, supra note 52, at 998-1003; Epstein, supra note 8; Fischel, supra note 117; 
H. Gregg Lewis, The Labor-Monopoly Problem: A Positive Program, 59 J. POL. ECON. 277 
(1951); Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 659 (1965); Posner, supra note 52; Simons, supra note 8; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., 
Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activi· 
ties, 13 YALE L.J. 14, 21-23 (1963). 
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Perhaps the most comprehensive of these studies was undertaken by 
Richard Epstein.127 In characterizing Epstein's work as a traditional 
monopoly analysis, I do not mean to oversimplify his arguments. Ep-
stein notes exceptions to the simple monopoly analysis, acknowledging 
possible sources of union wage increases besides labor cartel rents128 
and acknowledging the strategic nature of collective bargaining.129 
Moreover, Epstein expressly rejects one of the key conclusions of the 
monopoly model, that unions ought to be outlawed.130 However, 
although Epstein notes exceptions to the monopoly model, he does not 
consistently take account of these deviations throughout his analy-
sis, 131 the dominant thrust of which is unmistakably that of the tradi-
tional monopoly model. 132 Epstein's conclusions have proved very 
controversial among traditional labor law theorists. 133 Accordingly, I 
believe it is useful to examine Epstein's arguments within the context 
127. Although his analysis is couched in terms of "libertarian values" and "utilitarianism," 
Epstein acknowledges the strong relationship between his analysis and the traditional economic 
analysis of unions. Epstein attributes the insights of his article to "recent advances" in legal 
theory and law and economics. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1358. He explicitly equates his brand of 
utilitarianism with wealth maximization. See id. at 1379 n.70, 1380. He further states that the 
key difference between his utilitarian and libertarian analyses is that the former takes account of 
third-party effects, id. at 1380-81, a distinction which seems to make little difference to the con-
clusions of his analysis. 
128. See id. 1384-85 & n.85 (Ricardian rents), 1402 (product market rents). 
129. See id. at 1384, 1396-97. 
130. Epstein would allow voluntary contracts among workers to form unions, see id. at 1366, 
but would not afford union members any protection from employer discrimination. See id. at 
1394-95. 
131. For example, Epstein acknowledges the possibility of employer rents as a source of 
union wage increases, see id. at 1384-85 & n.85, 1402, but never takes this possibility into ac-
count in his discussion of the legality of yellow-dog contracts. See id. at 1370-75. Following the 
traditional monopoly union analysis, Epstein argues that yellow-dog contracts should be legal 
because, in a competitive market, workers will be compensated with higher wages for any losses 
they suffer in making such agreements. Id. However, if employer rents are available for employ-
ees to share, the employees' share of such rents is a public good among the employees that, due to 
free-rider problems, they will individually sign away for much less than their share is worth. 
Similarly, Epstein argues that employers cannot dictate wages to individual workers, because if 
they could they would reduce their wages to zero. See id. at 1372. He concludes that workers 
who individually bargain will not be taken advantage of in negotiations with their employer. 
However, if there are employer rents, then the employees can gain a share of those rents only by 
bargaining collectively. If the workers individually bargain, the employer will indeed reduce 
their share of any cooperative surplus to zero. 
132. In his analysis, Epstein also generally assumes that competitive markets will prevail in 
the absence of unions, see id. at 1359, 1372, 1382; but see id. at 1384-85, 1402 (acknowledging 
employer rents as a possible source of union wage increases); that unions are labor monopolies, 
see id. at 1380-81, 1384; and that employers will respond to union wage demands by moving up 
their demand curve. See id. at 1362, 1380-81. Epstein's analysis is inconsistent on the nature of 
negotiations between employers and unions because he adopts all of the other assumptions of the 
monopoly model and several times assumes employers have no monopsony power, see id. at 
1372, 1405, thereby logically precluding strategic behavior in collective negotiations, see supra 
note 117 and accompanying text, but he assumes that a union's formation creates a case of 
bilateral monopoly that will result in wasteful strategic behavior. 
133. See Getman & Kohler, supra note 95; Verkuil, supra note 95. 
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of the monopoly model and to comment on them in light of my alter-
native bargaining model. 
1. The Public Policy of Fostering Unions and Collective Bargaining 
The public policy of fostering unions and collective bargaining that 
has served as the foundation of American labor law since the 1930s 
does not make sense from the perspective of the monopoly model of 
unions. The drafters of the New Deal labor statutes134 believed that 
individual bargaining often failed the interests of workers and that col-
lective organization was a positive good that would allow workers to 
"exercise actual liberty of contract" and "obtain acceptable terms and 
conditions of employment."135 However, under the monopoly model 
of unions, individual bargaining will obtain for workers all the wages 
and benefits to which their productivity entitles them. 136 Moreover, 
unions are both inequitable137 and inefficient, 138 decreasing total 
wealth. Thus, the monopoly theory of unions, far from providing any 
logical basis for a law promoting employee organization, suggests un-
ions should be prohibited. 
Despite this fairly straightforward implication of the model, it is 
hard to find proponents of the monopoly model who actually advocate 
the prohibition of employee organization.139 Adherents of the model 
will sometimes acknowledge this deviation of existing law from the 
recommendations of the model but accept the basic determination to 
allow the cartelization of the labor market as a normative legislative 
decision. 140 Even Epstein, who is among the most devoted to the 
model, would allow private voluntary agreements among workers to 
negotiate collectively and withhold labor as part of the realization of 
his libertarian ideals. 141 However, Epstein would allow employers to 
discharge and discriminate against union members, 142 and almost 
everywhere, the logic of his analysis leads to the solution of no un-
134. Like Epstein, I include in my definition of the New Deal labor statutes the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988), and the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). 
See Epstein, supra note 8, at 1357. 
135. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (1988)). 
136. See supra notes 8, 107 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 9-10, 105-11 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 105-11, 118-25 and accompanying text. 
139. The only monopoly theorist I can find who has actually advocated prohibiting employee 
organization is Henry Simons. See Simons, supra note 8, at 1. 
140. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 52, at 995, 999; Posner, supra note 52, at 990. 
141. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 1365-66. 
142. See id. at 1389, 1391, 1394. 
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ions. 143 Epstein believes that individual bargaining is adequate to se-
cure for workers all the wages and benefits to which they are 
entitled 144 and that collective bargaining is a needless complication, 
largely the creation of statute, that only wastes resources. 145 Epstein 
also views individual defections from a union as part of the natural 
workings of the marketplace that serve to undermine the labor cartel's 
monopoly profits.146 
2. The Purposes of Promoting Bargaining Equity and Industrial 
Peace 
The monopoly theory of unions and collective bargaining provides 
no logical basis for the twin purposes of American labor law: promot-
ing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees 
and promoting industrial peace. As previously discussed, 147 the draft-
ers of the New Deal labor legislation sought to foster unionism as a 
means of promoting "industrial democracy" and greater equality of 
bargaining power between employers and employees.148 The monop-
oly theory recognizes no need for workers to combine to negotiate 
with their employers. The discipline of the market ensures that the 
employer will pay the employees all that their productivity entitles 
them to and no more. By encouraging employee organization, the law 
actually promotes employees to a bargaining position superior to that 
of their employer, allowing them to form a cartel that can then dictate 
the market wage. 
The proponents of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments also believed that encouraging collective bargaining and regu-
lating the conduct of industrial relations could decrease the strife and 
conflict that had too often characterized American industrial relations, 
thereby promoting industrial peace.149 The traditional monopoly 
model of unions recognizes little opportunity for conflict in bargain-
ing. Absent a strike that is undertaken as the low-cost method of low-
ering unrealistic rank-and-file workers' expectations or of sorting out 
low-wage employers from high-wage employers, the union merely tells 
the employer what the wage will be, and the employer responds by 
143. See id. at 1384-85, 1393-94, 1397, 1405-06. 
144. See id. at 1366, 1371-72. 
145. See id. at 1397-98, 1405. 
146. See id. at 1384. 
147. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
148. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 3, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (1988)); Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version, the NLRA, at 29 
U.S.C. § 151 (1988)); supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 {1988); supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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telling the employees how many of them should show up for work the 
next day. 150 Any law that sought to promote industrial peace and 
minimize the number of such informational strikes would focus 
merely on the reliable transmission to the employees of information 
about the employer's profitability rather than undertaking the wide-
ranging regulation of collective bargaining contained in the current 
law.151 Moreover, there would seem to be little the law could do to 
minimize the number of such strikes because, if there were a cheaper 
means of conveying the information necessary to lower worker expec-
tations or signal that the employer was a low-wage employer, the par-
ties would voluntarily undertake it to avoid the costs of a strike. 152 
Epstein's arguments concerning the twin purposes of American la-
bor law only partially track those of the monopoly model. 153 True to 
the theory of the monopoly model of unions, Epstein views collective 
bargaining as a needless and detrimental alternative to individual bar-
gaining.154 The power of the individual worker to leave his employer 
for work elsewhere will protect the worker from exploitation by his 
employer.155 Allowing workers to organize across a product market 
allows them to dictate that market's wages and prices. 156 However, 
with respect to the purpose of promoting industrial peace, Epstein 
deviates from the analysis of the traditional monopoly model of un-
ions. Epstein argues that the current law creates a situation of bilat-
eral monopoly between unions and employers in which these parties 
play noncooperative games of bluff and bluster that lead to costly 
strikes.157 In Epstein's view, the purpose of promoting industrial 
peace would be better served by leaving labor negotiations to individ-
ual bargaining that avoids such costly games. 158 This deviation from 
the monopoly model is problematic because Epstein fails to identify 
the source of the employer's power to resist a labor monopoly in a 
150. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
152. This statement is only strictly true if the third-party costs of the strike are insignificant. 
If such costs are significant, a reliable method of communicating such information may exist that 
the parties would not voluntarily undertake because it is more costly to them than a strike, but 
that nonetheless costs society as a whole less than a strike. However, ignoring third-party effects, 
if, for example, completely opening the company books to the union would sufficiently lower 
worker expectations or sufficiently clearly indicate that the employer was a low-wage employer to 
avoid a strike, one would predict that the employer would do so voluntarily. 
153. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 1403-08. 
154. See id. at 1405-06. 
155. See id. at 1370-72. 
156. See id. at 1381-82, 1384. 
157. Id. at 1396-97. 
158. See id. at 1404. 
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bilateral relationship and survive in the economy.159 Furthermore, 
Epstein fails to examine the implications of such sources of employer 
power and the results of bilateral bargaining solutions consistently 
throughout his analysis. 160 Thus, although Epstein abandons the mo-
nopoly model of unions on the subject of strikes where its logic and 
explanatory power seems weakest, he fails to treat consistently the im-
plications of this desertion throughout his analysis. 161 
3. The Law on Organizing 
The law on organizing also does not make sense from the perspec-
tive of the monopoly model of unions. Under the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 162 the question of employee organization is determined by 
majority rule of the affected employees.163 The primary means of de-
termining employee majority sentiment is through an election super-
vised by the National Labor Relations Board.164 Current law 
prohibits certain employer strategies in resisting unions, including yel-
low-dog contracts, 165 company unions, 166 discrimination on the basis 
of union affiliation, 167 and the making of threats or promises of bene-
fits on the basis of union support. 168 By providing this system of elec-
tions and restricting employer strategies, American labor law lowers 
employees' costs of organizing.169 From the perspective of the monop-
oly theory of unions, the government should not facilitate the carte-
lization of labor markets by lowering the cost of organizing. 
159. Although elsewhere in his article Epstein acknowledges both Ricardian rents and prod-
uct market rents as possible bones of contention between the employees and employer, his argu-
ments on industrial peace do not disclose the surplus that is the source of the bilateral 
negotiations. See id. at 1404-08. 
160. See supra note 131. 
161. Posner also abandons the pure form of the monopoly model of unions in discussing 
strikes and fails to take account of the implications of this abandonment for the rest of his analy-
sis. See Posner, supra note 52, at 997. 
162. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (1988). 
163. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988); see MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 27. 
164. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988). Unions can also demonstrate majority status through volun-
tary recognition by their employer, see l THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 341, or 
merely by a show of authorization cards signed by a majority of the affected employees where 
violations of the law by the employer preclude holding a meaningful election. NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
165. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1988); see supra note 4. 
166. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988). A company·union is an association of employees organ-
ized and controlled by the employer. Cox ET AL., supra note 2, at 41. Such organizations can be 
used as a bulwark against independent unions because they give the employees a portion of the 
benefits of organization and give some of the employees a vested interest in the employer's 
organization. 
167. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). 
168. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988). 
169. Posner, supra note 52, at 994. 
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Epstein's analysis of the laws on organizing directly tracks the mo-
nopoly union analysis. Epstein advocates abolishing the doctrine of 
exclusive representation170 that underlies the current system of elec-
tions, on the basis that individual employees have the right not to be 
represented by a union and individual defections will serve to under-
mine labor cartel rents. 171 Moreover, Epstein argues that employers 
should be able to resort to any strategy in resisting unions, short of 
fraud or violence.172 Epstein denigrates arguments that employees are 
effectively compelled to accept yellow-dog contracts as a condition of 
employment due to an inequality in bargaining power between em-
ployers and employees, arguing that if employers could compel em-
ployees to accept unfavorable contract terms they could logically 
reduce wages to zero.173 Through the machinations of the competitive 
market, employees will be compensated for any loss they suffer in ac-
cepting yellow-dog contracts; otherwise, they would not agree to em-
ployment under such terms.174 Similarly, Epstein argues that there 
may be value in the adjustment of grievances by a company union, 
and, if such a union is in fact a sham or even a burden to the employ-
ees, the employer will have to compensate them accordingly to retain 
them. 175 Epstein views the prohibition of discriminatory hiring and 
discharge as a similar, but more intrusive, restriction to that of the 
prohibition of yellow-dog contracts. 176 He argues that employers 
should not be prohibited from retaining only loyal employees who are 
the most valuable to the firm for the sake of encouraging employee 
organization. 177 Finally, Epstein argues that employers should be able 
to prohibit all employee organizing activities from their property and 
to make any antiunion statements they desire, short of fraud or threats 
of violence, including threats of reprisals or promises of benefits on the 
basis of union support. 178 The basis of his argument is that the em-
ployer cannot reasonably be expected to provide an in-kind subsidy to 
a union it considers antithetical to its prosperity, or to remain neutral 
on a question of such enormous self-interest to the firm.119 
170. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1398-99. 
171. Id. at 1384, 1398-99. 
172. See id. at 1365-66. 
173. Id. at 1371-72. 
174. Id. at 1382. 
175. Id. at 1391-92. 
176. Id. at 1392-93. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1388-91. 
179. Id. 
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4. The Law on Collective Negotiations 
Similarly, the law on collective negotiations makes no sense under 
the monopoly theory of unions. Current law designates the union se-
lected by the majority of the employees as the exclusive representative 
of all the employees in the unit180 and requires the employer to bargain 
with the union in good faith. 181 In Epstein's·view, the designation of 
the union as the exclusive representative combined with the obligation 
that the employer bargain in good faith merely places the force of law 
behind the union's labor cartel. 182 Returning to a competitive market, 
by allowing employers to partake in or even insist on negotiations with 
individual employees, would be more equitable and more efficient. Ex-
cept where prohibited by state law, 183 unions are allowed to negotiate 
and enforce "union security" agreements with their employers that re-
quire, as a condition of employment, that all employees contribute to 
the costs of collective bargaining.184 In addition, current law prohibits 
the employer from discharging striking employees, 185 although it does 
allow the employer to permanently replace them. 186 As Epstein points 
out, allowing the negotiation and enforcement of union security agree-
ments and prohibiting the discharge of striking employees merely pro-
vides additional barriers to the market forces that would naturally 
tend to erode and limit union monopoly power.187 
Moreover, the monopoly model yields no coherent basis on which 
to distinguish "good faith" from "bad faith" bargaining. To deter-
mine if a party is bargaining in good faith, the Board and courts ex-
amine whether the party has a bona fide intent to reach agreement. 188 
The presence or absence of such intent is judged from the totality of 
180. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). The employer is prohibited from negotiating with individual 
employees concerning terms and conditions of employment, GETMAN & PoGREBIN, supra note 
2, at 97, and even preexisting individual employment contracts are superseded by any collective 
agreement. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944). Similarly, bargaining efforts or 
"wildcat" strikes by individual employees or groups of employees do not enjoy the protections of 
the National Labor Relations Act. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community 
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65-70 (1974). 
181. 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1988). 
182. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1395-98. 
183. 29 u.s.c. § 164(b) (1988). 
184. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988); see Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738 
(1988). 
185. See 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1988); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 1003. 
186. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). 
187. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1384 (discussing union security agreements), 1392-94 (discuss-
ing discriminatory discharges). 
188. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co. 418 F.2d 736, 756-61 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 965 (1970); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1943). 
Alternatively, bad faith has sometimes been defined as the desire not to reach an agreement. 
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953). 
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circumstances surrounding the negotiations.189 Although such a de-
termination is very subjective, the Board and courts have determined 
that certain strategies and conduct are presumptively bad faith bar-
gaining.190 In one such strategy, known as Bou/wareism, 191 the em-
ployer determines a bargaining position and presents it to the union on 
a "take it or leave it" basis combined with an extensive publicity cam-
paign proclaiming that the offer will not be changed.192 Another such 
strategy, of particular interest to the discussion at hand, is the failure 
of the employer to provide requested information reasonably necessary 
for the union to perform its function as exclusive representative.193 
As previously discussed, the traditional monopoly model employs 
only a very simple model of collective negotiations in which the union 
sets the wage and the employer sets the level of employment. 194 Such 
a primitive model provides no basis for defining "good faith" or for 
evaluating various bargaining tactics such as Boulwareism. Epstein 
realizes this, but he blames his inability to rationalize the problem on 
the intractability of the concept of "good faith" rather than on the 
inadequacy of his model. 195 Because under the monopoly model 
strikes are the result of imperfect information, one might hope that the 
model could explain why the law requires employers to provide unions 
with certain information. However, under the monopoly model one 
would expect that employers will provide such information to unions 
voluntarily if doing so is the lowest-cost method of avoiding strikes. 196 
189. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1956); General Electric Co., 418 F.2d 
at 756. 
190. "Hard bargaining" is not in and of itself a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. 
Dierks Forests, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 923, 930 (1964). Both sides are allowed to make a firm final 
offer at some juncture in the negotiations. See, e.g., Philip Carey Mfg. Co., Miami Cabinet Div. 
v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir. 1964), cerL denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964). Moreover, the 
Act specifically states that the obligation to bargain in good faith "does not compel either party 
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). How-
ever, where a party's pattern of conduct in failing to meet sufficiently with the other side, respond 
to proposals, make and explain counterproposals, supply information, and supply a representa-
tive who can effectively negotiate on its behalf evidences a lack of a genuine desire to reach 
agreement, the Board will find a failure to bargain in good faith. See GETMAN & POGREBIN, 
supra note 2, at 126. 
191. The tactic is named after the man who developed it in the late 1940s, former General 
Electric Vice-President Lemuel Boulware. MERRIFlELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 512. 
192. General Electric Co., 418 F.2d at 756. 
193. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1958). Unions have a similar 
obligation to supply relevant information. Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic 
Communications Union, 233 N.L.R.B. 994, 996 (1977), ajfd., 598 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
But from a practical perspective it is much less important. 
194. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
195. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 1395-96. 
196. As previously discussed, this statement is only strictly true if the third·party effects of 
strikes are insignificant. See supra note 152. If there are significant third-party effects, then 
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Even if one attempts to append a more realistic model of bargaining to 
the monopoly model of unions to account for the possibility of strate-
gic behavior, these efforts to regulate collective bargaining make no 
sense. As Epstein notes, requiring disclosure of information to labor 
unions is merely another method of lowering the costs of organization, 
thereby encouraging labor cartelization with all its attendant 
problems.197 
5. The Law on Enforcement of the Collective Agreement 
Finally, the law on the enforcement of collective agreements seems 
somewhat inconsistent with the monopoly model of unions. Collective 
bargaining agreements are enforceable as a matter of federal substan-
tive law under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 198 
The Supreme Court has interpreted this federal substantive law to in-
clude federal authority to enforce agreements to arbitrate199 and sev-
eral other features that encourage the resolution of disputes under 
collective bargaining agreements through arbitration.200 Given the 
existence of a collective agreement, one could logically argue that, 
even under the monopoly theory of unions, the law should encourage 
arbitration as the low-cost method of resolving disputes over the con-
tract. Within the context of the monopoly model of unions, encourag-
ing arbitration would minimize the costs of collective bargaining to 
society, given the alternative solutions of resolving such disputes 
through economic warfare or through protracted and costly litigation. 
However, this argument still seems at odds with the monopoly model's 
general conclusion that collective bargaining is inequitable and ineffi-
cient. Why encourage the cartelization of the labor market by provid-
ing an inexpensive means of enforcing cartel contracts? Perhaps if the 
enforcement of cartel contracts were expensive enough, the cost would 
requiring the disclosure of information may minimize total societal costs even through it does not 
minimize the union's and employer's costs. 
197. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 1397. 
198. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988); see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 449-
52 (1957). 
199. Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 449-56. 
200. In Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962), the Court 
found that agreements to arbitrate include implied agreements not to strike or lock out over 
arbitrable issues. Moreover, in Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, 398 U.S. 235, 253 
(1970), the Court found federal authority to enjoin strikes in contravention of an arbitration 
agreement despite clear language in the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the contrary. Finally, in the 
Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court anriounced a federal policy of deferring to arbitration in 
determining which issues are arbitrable and in resolving those disputes. United Steelworkers v. 
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). 
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discourage cartelization. Moreover, one might argue that, even if soci-
ety encourages the low-cost method of enforcing cartel contracts, con-
sumers and unorganized workers who are injured by the cartel should 
have a right of action against the cartel similar to private suits for 
damages under the Clayton Act.201 
C. A Critique of the Monopoly Model from an Economic Perspective 
As previously discussed, in resolving the three issues presented in 
the primer on labor economics, the traditional monopoly model of un-
ions and collective bargaining combines the first of the various possible 
assumptions presented with respect to each issue. The monopoly anal-
ysis assumes that the source of union benefits is a labor cartel, that 
employers respond to union wage increases by moving up their labor 
demand curve, and that the costs of collective bargaining should be 
treated as ordinary transaction costs. The choice of each of these 
three assumptions is questionable on grounds of both logical argu-
ments and empirical evidence. 
1. The Assumption of a Labor Cartel as the Source of Union Wage 
Increases 
It seems very doubtful that cartelization of the labor market is the 
sole, or even the primary, source of union wage increases in the Amer-
ican economy.202 The establishment of a labor cartel in any market 
without licensure would seem very difficult.203 Workers are the con-
summate atomistic competitors. Moreover, if labor cartel power were 
the only source of union wage increases, an organizing campaign that 
proceeded to organize one competitive employer at a time would get 
nowhere because there would be only costs of unionization, but no 
benefits, to show employees until the requisite number of employers 
was organized. A labor cartel in a competitive product market with-
out employer rents or productivity increases associated with unionism 
would have to be simultaneously organized across many employers in 
order to survive - like Athena springing full-grown from Zeus' head. 
Employer product market power rents, Ricardian rents, and quasi-
rents constitute much more likely sources of union wage increases. If 
the requisite barriers to entry to a product market exist, the employers 
201. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1988). 
202. WEILER, supra note 22, at 124-33; Fischel, supra note 117, at 1072-73. 
203. The members of an occupation can use licensure to generate labor cartel rents by lobby-
ing to raise the requirements of Jicensure above what is needed to successfully perform in the 
occupation, thereby restricting the supply of labor in the occupation. In such a case the force of 
the licensure law enforces the labor cartel. 
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would be more likely to exploit them than would a labor cartel. The 
employers are much more concentrated than individual employees; 
moreover, normal economic profits sustain employers while they or-
ganize their cartel or increase their grasp on market share through 
expansion or merger. Indeed, when significant economies of scale ex-
ist in an industry, the employers, as producers, will naturally gravitate 
toward oligopoly or monopoly.204 No such anticompetitive gravity 
compels the workers to combination.205 Finally, it seems much more 
plausible that unions could organize employers who enjoy monopoly 
rents, Ricardian rents, or quasi-rents, because such organization could 
be undertaken on a more manageable basis, one employer at a time.206 
The arguments for the existence of at least some productivity in-
creases associated with unionism also seem compelling. The argument 
that long-term implicit contracts yield benefits in monitoring and firm-
specific human capital investment is intuitively appealing and well es-
tablished in the economics literature.207 Without unions, workers are 
left with only the uncertain and inefficient discipline of reputation to 
204. See SCHERER, supra note 24, at 81-118; WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD & CLAIR WILCOX, 
PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 45-48 (6th ed. 1979). 
205. The fact that antitrust laws prohibit employers from explicit cartelization and some 
means of achieving monopoly, see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988), while not prohibiting 
labor cartelization,see Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 
469 (1940), does not seem a very convincing basis for arguing that employer product market 
power rents are a less likely source of union wage increases than labor cartel rents. The laws still 
allow tacit collusion, see Theatre Enters. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 
(1954), and monopolization through legitimate means of competition. See United States v. Grif-
fith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d 
Cir. 1945)); see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 
342-45 (D. Mass. 1953), affd., 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Moreover, historically the antitrust laws 
have been notoriously ineffective, see Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victo-
ries?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43 (1969); Malcolm R. Pfunder et al., Compliance with Divestiture Orders 
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19 
(1972), with slack enforcement and minuscule penalties. See 2 JAMES M. CLABAULT & 
MICHAEL K. BLOCK, SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS 1955-1980, at 732-33 (1981) (showing that 
average antitrust fines range approximately from 0.1 % to 4% of the volume of commerce in-
volved in the cases); POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 26, at 320-22 (showing that incarcera-
tion of antitrust offenders is rare and almost never exceeds three months). See generally Walter 
Adams et al., Pareto Optimality and Antitrust Policy: The Old Chicago and the New Learning, 58 
S. ECON. J. 1 (1991); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, 1980s Gigantomania Follies, CHAL-
LENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 4; Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Corporate Size and the Bailout 
Factor, 21 J. ECON. ISSUES 61 (1987); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Corporate Power and 
Economic Sabotage, 20 J. EcoN. ISSUES 919, 936 (1986). 
206. In fact, unions have historically organized one employer at a time. See, e.g., VICTOR G. 
REUTHER, THE BROTHERS REUTHER AND THE STORY OF THE UAW 146-47 (1976) (discussing 
UAW attempts to organize General Motors); cf. Cox ET AL., supra note 2, at 281-82, 288 (noting 
that unions may prefer to organize divisions of a single employer separately). See generally DUL-
LES, supra note 92, at 88-90 (describing early attempts to form national unions); HENRY FEL-
LING, AMERICAN LABOR 70 (1960). 
207. See Parsons, supra note 45, at 789; Rosen, supra note 45; supra notes 45-49 and accom-
panying text. 
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prevent employers from breaching such contracts. Similarly, public 
goods dominate the conditions of employment in most employment 
contracts and pose a serious problem for the negotiation of efficient 
individual contracts.208 It seems quite plausible that collective bar-
gaining could help rectify this problem, as well as lower worker turn-
over, by giving employees a superior means of expressing their 
concerns. 
Several authors have argued that union productivity increases can-
not be real or substantial because, if they were, employers would en-
courage unionism and split the proceeds from these productivity 
increases with employees. 209 This argument ignores the fact that 
many employers are anxious to organize employees in committees or 
associations for the purposes of communication. Perhaps not coinci-
dentally, the decline of unions in the United States has been accompa-
nied by a rash of cases testing the legal bounds of employer efforts to 
organize employees despite the National Labor Relations Act's prohi-
bition against company unions.210 What employers are not interested 
in is organizing independent unions that could vie for a share of em-
ployer rents and interfere with management prerogatives. Even 
though such independent organization would yield greater productiv-
ity increases due to effective enforcement of long-term implicit con-
tracts, greater accuracy in the assessment of employee preferences 
with respect to collective goods, and more effective monitoring of 
management effi.ciency,211 employers do not want independent organi-
208. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Addressing this public good problem is one 
of the primary goals of the new field of study called Human Resources Management. See, e.g., 
ROBERT E. SIBSON, STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 142-55 
(1991); GEORGE E. STEVENS, CASES AND EXERCISES IN HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
(5th ed. 1991). 
209. See Campbell, supra note 52, at 996-97; Epstein, supra note 8, at 1402-03; Posner, supra 
note 52, at 1000-01. 
210. See NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); 
Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); 
Member Raudabaugh Forecasts NLRB Ruling in Electromation Case Before December 1992, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 141, at A-4 (July 22, 1992) (predicting that the Electromation, Inc. 
opinion on "employee involvement programs and quality circles" will be released before Christ-
mas, 1992). Prior to the enactment of the Wagner Act, three out offive union members belonged 
to unions organized by their employers. Cox ET AL., supra note 2, at 201. Although some of 
these company unions were undoubtedly organized merely as a bulwark against independent 
organization, some were honest attempts at increasing communication between the employer nnd 
employees that incidentally discouraged true organization. Id. 
211. Although employer organization of employee committees holds the promise of some 
productivity increases due to greater communication between employers and employees, it seems 
unlikely that employer-organized committees could achieve the full productivity increases that 
are possible with independent unions. Captive committees could not be as effective ns independ-
ent unions in enforcing long-term implicit contracts against the employer, solving the free-rider 
problem of collective goods in the workplace, or monitoring management, because the committee 
would be merely an extension of the employer. See JOHN F. WITTE, DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY, 
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zation because sharing rents with employees decreases profits, and 
managers prefer not to be effectively monitored.212 Furthermore, em-
ployers can realize some of the productivity increases associated with 
independent employee organization by free riding on the information 
obtained by observing the production and employment practices of 
their organized competitors. 
Empirical evidence also suggests that labor cartel power is less im-
portant than other sources of union wage increases. Based on avail-
able statistics, there seem to be few product markets in the United 
States that contain a percentage of organized workers that might even 
be imagined a labor cartel. Nationally, the proportion of private sec-
tor employees represented by a union is currently about 14%.213 
Among industry groups and occupations for which such statistics are 
collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the highest representation 
in any industry group on a national basis is 39%, while the highest 
representation in any particular occupation on a national basis is 
42%.214 Although the percent organized in particular industries, such 
as automobiles or steel, is undoubtedly higher, typically such indus-
tries suffered from product market concentration prior to organiza-
tion.215 Similarly, the highest percentage organized in any state is 
36%, although variations undoubtedly exist among local product 
markets.216 
AND ALIENATION IN WORK: WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN AN AMERICAN CORPORATION 90-
91 (1980); cf. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 8-9 (noting the difficulties faced by a 
worker without an independent union to back her up in addressing these problems). Of course 
captive employee committees would presumably also not tend to create the inefficiencies of con-
sumption and production that independent unions sometimes create. See supra notes 10, 20 and 
accompanying text. However, because empirical studies show that these inefficiencies are rela-
tively small, see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text, it seems safe to assume that the 
greater productivity effects of independent unions usually outweigh the inefficiencies. 
212. Empirical studies suggest that, despite possible productivity effects associated with em-
ployee organization, unions typically decrease company profits. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra 
note 20, at 181-90; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 211-14. This is because the wage 
increase associated with unionism generally exceeds the productivity increase employee organiza-
tion yields. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 22. 
213. There were approximately 82,462,000 private sector employees in the United States in 
1987, of whom 10,859,000 were union members and 11,887,000 were represented by unions. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CURRENT WAGE DEVELOPMENTS 7 
(Feb. 1988); see also LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, UNION SOURCEBOOK (1985); U.S. DEPT. OF 
LABOR, NEWS: UNION MEMBERS IN 1989, at 2 (1990). 
214. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 213, at 7. The most highly represented 
industries are communications and public utilities while the most highly represented occupation 
is protective services. Id.; see also Michael A. Curme et al., Union Membership and Contract 
Coverage in the United States, 1983-1988, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5 (1990). 
215. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 437-38 (1920) (noting 
the concentration of the steel industry in 1920). Price negotiation was also a factor in generating 
employer rents prior to organization in industries such as trucking and the airlines. 
216. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table No. 666 (1988) (using 1982 
data); TROY & SHEFLIN, supra note 213, at 7-4 (using 1982 data). Unlike the previous figures, 
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Direct empirical evidence of the source of union wage increases is 
difficult to produce due to the strategic incentives of employers in la-
bor negotiations. Product price increases may be associated with the 
negotiation of a union contract even if the union wage increase will be 
paid out of employer monopoly rents, because the employer has incen-
tive to underprice and plead poverty during negotiations and then ad-
just prices up after negotiation of the contract.217 However, the best 
available evidence suggests that union wage increases come largely at 
the expense of employers218 and are strongly associated with the mar-
ket power of the employing firm.219 Most empirical models,220 and 
even many modern presentations of the monopoly theory of unions, 
depend on employer product market power, Ricardian rents, or quasi-
rents as the source of union wage increases.221 
Finally, studies have found convincing evidence that some indus-
tries enjoy significant productivity increases from unionism.222 Per-
haps the best of these studies was conducted by Kim Clark, who 
compared the physical output of cement plants before and after organ-
ization and between different organized and unorganized plants, find-
ing statistically significant productivity increases with organization 
cited supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text, this figure includes the more highly organized 
public sector. As of 1982, the most highly organized state was New York, followed closely by 
Michigan. TROY & SHEFLIN, supra note 213, at 7-4. 
217. ALBERT REES, THE EcONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 101 (rev. ed. 1977). 
218. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN, UNIONISM, PRICE-COST MARGINS, AND THE RETURN TO 
CAPITAL (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1164, 1983); HIRSCH & 
ADDISON, supra note 13, at 211-14; Clark, supra note 54, at 918 (using accounting data on over 
900 product-line businesses to conclude that unionization substantially decreased profits but had 
little effect on price, output, or capital-to-labor mix); Paula B. Voos & Lawrence R. Mishel, The 
Union Impact on Profits: Evidence from Industry Price-Cost Margin Data, 4 J. LAB. ECON, 105, 
128-29 (1986) (using price-cost margin data on 139 industries over the years 1968-1970 to esti-
mate that on average 80% of union wage and benefit increases was paid out of company profits 
and only 20% was paid out of price increases to consumers). 
219. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 208-14; Thomas Karier, Unions and Monop-
oly Profits, 67 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 34 (1985); Thomas A. Pugel, Profitability, Concentration and 
the Interindustry Variation in Wages, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 248 (1980); Nancy L. Rose, Labor 
Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry, 95 J, PoL. ECON. 1146, 
1175 (1987); Michael A. Salinger, Tobin's q, Unionization, and the Concentration-Profits Rela-
tionship, 15 RAND J. ECON. 159 (1984). Rose and Salinger found that, where unions are success-
ful in organizing, they can capture the lion's share of firm monopoly profits (about 75% 
according to Rose's study). For a similar empirical argument that unions primarily share in 
employer product market rents based on the deregulation of the airlines, see WEILER, supra note 
22, at 131-32. 
220. See, e.g., HIRSCH, supra note 32; Clark, supra note 54. 
221. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 21. 
222. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 168-69; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 
13, at 195-208 (surveying and interpreting the relevant literature). But see John T. Addison & 
Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?, 
7 J. LAB. EcoN. 72 (1989) (concluding that productivity effect of unions has not yet been 
proved); Peter J. Turnbull, Trade Unions and Productivity: Opening the Harvard "Black Boxes'~ 
12 J. LAB. RES. 135 (1991). 
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that ranged from 6% to 10%.223 However, other studies suggest that 
not all industries enjoy such productivity gains224 and that productiv-
ity increases associated with employee organization can evaporate if 
labor relations turn sour.225 Although further work needs to be done 
in identifying the sources of union wage increases in particular indus-
tries and over the American economy as a whole, it now appears to be 
a gross oversimplification and mischaracterization to assume that la-
bor cartelization is the sole or even the dominant source of union wage 
increases in the American economy. 
2. The Assumption That Employers Respond to Union Wage 
Demands by Moving Up Their Demand Curves 
The assumption that employers will respond to union wage de-
mands by moving up their labor demand curve rather than bargaining 
over wages and employment is also theoretically unsound. The logic 
of the employer's and employees' incentive to bargain to solutions off 
the employer's labor demand curve has already been demonstrated.226 
The only real question is to what extent transaction costs prevent the 
negotiation of optimal terms. The relevant transaction costs include 
time and information costs, failures to negotiate efficient contract 
terms due to strategic lying,227 and enforcement costs. 
Traditionally, economists have assumed that time and information 
costs are relatively low under collective bargaining compared with 
other bargaining situations because the process generally involves only 
two principal parties who can readily meet and who understand the 
subject of negotiations.22s Accordingly, it seems unlikely such costs 
would prevent the negotiation of optimal contract terms in collective 
bargaining. The parties' knowledge will also make strategic lying diffi-
cult, particularly as to the optimal capital-labor mix. If nothing else, 
223. See Kim B. Clark, The Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study, 33 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 451 (1980); Kim B. Clark, Unionization and Productivity: Micro-Eco-
nomic Evidence, 95 Q.J. EcoN. 613 (1980) [hereinafter Clark, Evidence]. 
224. The available studies yield estimates of changes in productivity associated with em-
ployee organization from -18% to 32%. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 196-97. 
225. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 200. 
226. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. 
227. Among the possible strategic behaviors in bargaining, strategic lying is the only one that 
poses a serious threat to the negotiation of optimal contract terms. The others, including hard 
bargaining, pose more of a threat to the peaceful division of the cooperative surplus. Accord-
ingly, these strategic behaviors have a greater impact on whether a collective agreement can be 
reached without a strike than on the terms that wiII ultimately be negotiated in the collective 
agreement. 
228. See Schwab, supra note 12, at 267-68. 
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the union can check employer representations merely by observing 
what competing firms are doing. 
Regarding enforcement costs, arguably it may be difficult to nego-
tiate an optimal level of employment that can be effectively enforced. 
Employers need :flexibility to respond to changes in demand by adjust-
ing the level of output and employment, and it would seem difficult for 
the union to police changes in employment to determine whether the 
employer is laying off workers to respond to a drop in product demand 
or to return opportunistically to his labor demand curve.229 However, 
the union could detect such opportunism on the part of the employer 
by monitoring the capital-labor mix. If such opportunism is a serious 
problem, the contract could specify the composition of work crews for 
each station with the requirement that if the workers are laid off their 
machines must be idled.230 Alternatively, unions could lessen employ-
ers' incentives to act opportunistically by negotiating lump-sum pay-
ments to cover the employees' share of the expected cooperative 
surplus and a competitive hourly wage to cover the employees' oppor-
tunity costs in employment.231 Moreover, given the parties' continu-
ing relationship, the optimal level of employment could plausibly be 
set by implicit agreement with the union punishing perceived opportu-
nistic behavior by the employer in later negotiations. 
Recent empirical work strongly endorses the employer bargaining 
response over the employer labor demand curve response. Although 
transaction costs may prevent optimal bargaining in some individual 
cases, studies examining whether organized employers operate on their 
labor demand curve or at some higher negotiated level of employment 
consistently reject the labor demand curve response. 232 The shape of 
229. Indeed, collective bargaining agreements that explicitly specify the level of employment 
are not common. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 16; ANDREW J. OSWALD, EFFICIENT 
CONTRACTS ARE ON THE LABOR DEMAND CURVE: THEORY AND FACTS (Industrial Relations 
Section, Princeton University Working Paper No. 178, 1984). 
230. Such sunk cost loss provisions, requiring that the employer suffer a demonstrated loss 
(idling the machine) when purportedly responding to decreases in demand, decrease the em· 
ployer's incentive to act opportunistically and prevent her from moving to an inefficient capital· 
labor mix. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 45, at 1378-79. Examples of such provisions include 
specifying the minimum number of musicians in an orchestra, the minimum crew size, or the 
maximum number of students in a classroom. See Randall W. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, On tlte 
Contract Curve: A Test of Alternative Models of Bargaining, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 66 (1986); Freder-
ick R. Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control by Labor Unions, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 309 (1977). 
231. Campbell, supra note 52, at 1017-18. A variety of other devices can be used to achieve 
agreements off the employer's labor demand curve without explicit provisions governing the 
number of workers or hours. These devices include work reduction provisions, provisions cover-
ing changes in technology, profit sharing, tenure and seniority provisions, equipment differen· 
tials, and taxes on output. See Clark, supra note 54, at 897; Eberts & Stone, supra note 230; 
Warren-Boulton, supra note 230. Such provisions are fairly common in collective bargaining 
agreements. 
232. See John M. Abowd, Tlte Effects of Wage Bargains on tlte Stock Market Value of tlte 
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the contract curve between the parties will vary from case to case, and 
studies have found examples of both rightward- and leftward-leaning 
contract curves. 233 Although further work needs to be done, perhaps 
the best characterization of the impact of unions in this regard, based 
on the available empirical evidence, is that unions negotiate optimal 
contracts that have little impact on the capital-labor mix or the level of 
output by organized employers. This characterization is based pri-
marily on two studies, one by Kim Clark, the other by John 
Abowd.234 Clark examined a sample of over 900 union and nonunion 
businesses to gauge the impact of employee organization on various 
measures of firm performance, including return on capital, growth, 
and capital-labor mix. He found that, although organized firms tend 
to earn substantially lower returns on capital than nonunion firms op-
erating in comparable technological and competitive environments, 
employee organization had little effect on firm growth and the capital-
labor mix. 235 Abowd examined the effect of unexpected changes in 
collectively bargained labor costs on the value of common stock for a 
broadly representative sample of organized businesses. He found that, 
on average, unexpected increases in wealth to workers corresponded to 
decreases of similar size in the value of the common stock to share-
holders. 236 This equal and opposite relationship in worker and share-
holder wealth is consistent with the bargaining analysis237 and the 
characterization of the contract curve between employers and unions 
as typically vertical over the economy as a whole. 
3. The Failure To Account for the Strategic Nature of 
Collective Bargaining 
Finally, the traditional monopoly model of unions is deficient be-
cause it fails to account explicitly for the strategic nature of collective 
bargaining and the fact that many of the costs of collective bargaining 
are positional externalities. Perhaps the most damning shortcoming of 
Firm, 79 AM. EcON. REV. 774 (1989); Brown & Ashenfelter, supra note 54, at S40; David Card, 
Efficient Contracts with Costly Adjustment: Short-Run Employment Determination for Airline 
Mechanics, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 1045, 1066-67 (1986); Eberts & Stone, supra note 230; Macurdy 
& Pencavel, supra note 54, at S3. 
233. In his study, Card found a leftward-leaning contract curve, showing a willingness on the 
part of the examined unions to trade employment for wages. Card, supra note 232, at 1065-66. 
In the typographical industry, Macurdy and Pencavel found a rightward-leaning contract curve, 
indicating a willingness on the part of the union to trade wages for jobs. MaCurdy & Pencavel, 
supra note 54. 
234. See Abowd, supra note 232; Clark, supra note 54. 
235. Clark, supra note 54, at 918. 
236. Abowd, supra note 232, at 775. 
237. Id. 
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the traditional monopoly model is that the adoption of the first two 
assumptions of the model - that unions are labor cartels and that 
employers respond to union wage demands by moving up their de-
mand curve - logically precludes the consideration of strategic be-
havior in the conduct of collective negotiations.238 To preclude 
consideration of this fundamental characteristic of collective bargain-
ing in an economic model would seem to be a very serious mistake. 
Although some of the costs of collective bargaining are ordinary 
time and information costs, 239 it is quite evident that many activities in 
collective bargaining are strategic in nature and result in costs that are 
positional externalities. Organizing campaigns, discriminatory dis-
charges, recalcitrant bargaining, and some enforcement activities are 
all undertaken for the purpose of gaining a larger share of the joint 
benefits of production for the active party.240 Moreover, the reward of 
each party based on relative performance and the tendency for con-
flicts in collective bargaining to escalate into costly affairs are also evi-
dent. It seems reasonable that the more one side spends in an 
organizing campaign relative to the other, the better will be that side's 
chances of prevailing in the campaign. Because finishing second in an 
organizing campaign does neither the employer nor the union any 
good, both will have incentives to expend resources up to the amount 
the organized employees would be expected to benefit at the expense of 
the employer by successfully organizing, if they think it will allow 
them to prevail.241 Far from conceding high-rent industries to unions, 
employers will thus presumably contest these industries all the more 
vigorously to preserve their claim on the high rents.242 
Similarly, "hard bargaining" can have its rewards in collective ne-
gotiations. However, if both sides follow this individually rational 
strategy, the result may be the waste of resources in a strike or lockout 
that reduces the total value of the rents and productivity increases to 
be divided between the parties.243 The answer to the question of why 
238. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
239. Some minimum level of expenditure to negotiate and enforce an agreement is inevitable 
due to the costs of acquiring information, meeting a minimum number of times to negotiate the 
agreement, and good-faith disagreements over the later interpretation of the agreement. 
240. See HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 107-08; Posner, supra note 52, at 993-94. 
241. When a rent (here, the organized employees' expected benefit at the expense of the 
employer) is open to more than one-party competition, acquiring that rent can theoretically con-
sume the entire rent as well as prompt similar wasted expenditures by the losing side. Posner has 
made a similar argument with respect to the waste of monopoly rents by firm competition for the 
monopoly position. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
12-13 (1976). 
242. Some economists have begun to take account of this strategic argument. See, e.g., 
HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 31. 
243. Many authors have realized the strategic nature of collective bargaining and strikes, 
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the parties sometimes engage in strikes and lockouts despite their dele-
terious effect on the ultimate bargain is that activities like intransi-
gence in bargaining may be individually rational even though they do 
not always produce collectively rational results. 244 
Finally, enforcement of the collective agreement creates incentives 
for strategic behavior. If resort to economic weapons is allowed dur-
ing the course of the agreement, the union has incentives to reinterpret 
or renegotiate the contract whenever there is a backlog of orders and 
the employer is vulnerable, while the employer has similar incentives 
whenever demand for the product lags and the union is vulnerable.245 
The result, of course, would be a dramatic increase in bargaining and 
enforcement costs. Similarly, resort to costly litigation by a party 
whenever it loses an arbitration might yield individual gains but would 
significantly decrease the benefit of the agreement to both sides. 
Although it is too early to judge the empirical success of models 
that account for the strategic nature of collective bargaining, models of 
strikes as merely the result of asymmetric information do not ade-
quately explain the phenomenon. Models that explain strikes as nec-
essary to lower unrealistic worker wage expectations do well 
explaining aggregate macrodata of strike frequency, but these results 
depend on intuitive guesses as to the determinants of workers' resist-
ance and concessions in strikes, rather than any analysis of rational 
economic behavior. 246 Moreover, these models are intuitively unap-
pealing because they implicitly assume that the union leadership un-
although few have incorporated it explicitly in their analysis of unions and collective bargaining 
or labor law. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 8, at 1396-97; Posner, supra note 52, at 994. Probably 
the most extensive consideration of this aspect of collective bargaining and strikes can be found 
in Schwab, supra note 12, at 268-72. In his analysis Schwab intuits many of the results I derive 
in my more formal game theory analysis. 
244. Recently some sophisticated game theory models of strikes have taken advantage of the 
strategic nature of strikes to explain strike activity in models with perfect information. See, e.g., 
Fernandez & Glazer, supra note 75. In addition, Professor Masahiko Aoki has written some 
interesting articles describing firm production and growth as a cooperative game between share-
holders and employees. See Masahiko Aoki, A Model of the Firm as a Stockholder-Employee 
Cooperative Game, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 600 (1980); Masahiko Aoki, Equilibrium Growth of the 
Hierarchical Firm· Shareholder-Employee Cooperative Game Approach, 72 AM. EcoN. REV. 
1097 (1982). Another bargaining model that may prove useful in the analysis of labor law has 
been developed in Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model 
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). Finally, Professor Joel Rogers has recog-
nized and discussed the implications of dilemma games among workers in organizing. See Joel 
Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American La-
bor Laws," 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 10. 
245. The strategic nature of contract enforcement has long been recognized with respect to 
contracts in general. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 42-43 (1st ed. 
1972); Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 
310-11 (1983). However, to my knowledge no one has yet applied these arguments to labor law. 
246. Kennan, supra note 73, at 1102. 
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dertakes every strike knowing that the union will lose.247 Similarly, 
models that explain strikes as the low-cost method for unions to sort 
out high- and low-wage employers do not fare well empirically. These 
models predict an increase in the incidence of strikes when the econ-
omy declines and such sorting of employers would be useful, when in 
fact strike incidence decreases during recessions.248 Such models also 
predict that wage increases after long strikes that should successfully 
sort out low-wage employers should be lower, ceteris paribus, when 
again the opposite is true. 249 
III. A BARGAINING ANALYSIS OF UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
The shortcomings of the traditional monopoly model of unions 
suggest a need for greater examination of the alternative elements of 
an economic model of unions and collective bargaining discussed in 
Part I of this article. In this Part, I present a model of unions and 
collective bargaining that employs these alternate assumptions and ex-
plore its implications for public policy. Previous authors have pro-
vided analyses combining alternative assumptions concerning the 
source of union wage increases with the assumption of the employer's 
bargaining response to a union wage increase.250 I extend these analy-
ses by adding arguments regarding the strategic nature of collective 
bargaining and the proper characterization of many costs of collective 
bargaining as positional externalities. As will be seen later, these argu-
ments hold particular relevance for the economic analysis of labor law. 
I refer to this model as the bargaining model of unions and collective 
bargaining because it examines the possible bargaining solution be-
tween employers and employees to the problem of producing and di-
viding the benefits of their joint enterprise.25 1 
247. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 9, at 346. 
248. See Kennan, supra note 73, at 1112. But see Peter C. Cramton & Joseph Tracy, Strikes 
and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data, 82 AM. EcoN. REV. 100 (1992) (arguing 
that if one takes account of "holdouts" in which workers work without a contract, as well as 
strikes, asymmetric information models do better at explaining observed data). 
249. See Kennan, supra note 73, at 1114. 
250. See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 14-18; Clark, supra note 54, at 894; 
Macurdy & Pencavel, supra note 54, at S3. 
251. In the labor economics literature the term bargaining model or bargaining analysis is 
generally associated only with the assumption that the employer responds to a union wage in· 
crease by bargaining over wages and employment, not necessarily with assumptions concerning 
the source of union wage increases or the proper characterization of the costs of collective bar-
gaining. See, e.g., HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 14-18. Thus, I use this term in a 
somewhat more restrictive manner than is common in the literature. 
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A. The Model and Its Implications for Public Policy 
In the bargaining model of unions and collective bargaining I com-
bine all of the assumptions concerning unions and collective bargain-
ing discussed in Part I of this article that were not adopted in the 
traditional monopoly model of unions. First, I assume that product 
market power rents, Ricardian rents, quasi-rents, and productivity in-
creases associated with worker organization together constitute the 
dominant source of union wage increases that the model should con-
sider, although the implications of labor cartel rents are also consid-
ered. To the extent that organizational productivity increases are not 
generally enjoyed throughout the product market, these productivity 
increases and the employer product market rents constitute the coop-
erative surplus to be produced and divided by the parties in my bar-
gaining analysis. 252 Second, I assume that employers and unions seek 
to negotiate optimal contracts with respect to both wages and employ-
ment. To ease exposition, I assume that the employer and the union 
negotiate to maximize the monetary value of the cooperative surplus 
and thus have a vertical contract curve. However, the implications of 
a leftward- or rightward-leaning contract curve are also considered. 
Finally, I explore the implications for public policy of explicitly ac-
counting for the strategic nature of collective bargaining and the fact 
that many of the costs associated with collective bargaining are posi-
tional externalities. Based on my criticisms of the monopoly model of 
unions, I argue that this bargaining model of unions more accurately 
describes the typical operation of unions and collective bargaining in 
the American economy. However, at the very least it allows me to 
clarify the debate about the equity and efficiency of unions and to ex-
plore the implications of relaxing some of the assu~ptions of the tradi-
tional monopoly model. 
The conclusions about the equity and efficiency of unions derived 
from the bargaining model differ markedly from those derived from 
the traditional monopoly model. As shown in Figure 8, when con-
fronted with a union wage demand, rather than retreating along his 
labor demand curve, the employer bargains with the union to reach a 
joint welfare maximizing solution on the contract curve (CJ. To maxi-
mize the monetary value of employer rents, the employer and the 
union will agree to the employment of the same amount of labor (NJ 
that would have been employed in a competitive market. Where the 
union is more willing to trade employment for wages the contract 
252. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "cooperative 
surplus." 
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FIGURE 8 
The Employer and Union's Wage-Employment Contract Curve with 
Possible Productivity Increases 
Wage (W) 
c C' 




curve will lean to the left, and there will be some decrease in the level 
of employment associated with employee organization. Moreover, 
where the union delves into employer quasi-rents to raise wages, the 
long-run contract curve will lie to the left of the short-run contract 
curve, because in the long run the employer will cut back on his union 
workforce with the exhaustion of the firm's capital investments.253 In 
addition, if the rents that the union gains are from an effective labor 
cartel, then in the long run the employment of workers in the industry 
will fall as employers leave the industry to gain more competitive rates 
of return on their investment.254 However, this decrease in employ-
ment will be less than predicted by the traditional monopoly model 
because it will be mitigated by the bargaining response.255 
Any productivity increases associated with employee organization 
253. HIRSCH, supra note 32, at 10-11, 16-17. 
254. If the union can establish an effective labor cartel then it can dictate where on the 
contract curve the parties operate. Assuming the union selects a wage higher than the competi-
tive wage, the employers in the organized industry will earn less than the competitive rate of 
return they had previously earned, and there will be incentive for employers to leave the industry 
to gain greater returns elsewhere. This exodus of employers will continue until the supply of the 
good produced by the industry has fallen to the point where the now-higher price of the good 
yields a competitive rate of return on the remaining employers' investment. 
255. Because the contract curve lies to the right of the demand curve, the bargaining model 
predicts less decrease in employment and less increase in product price from the establishment of 
an effective labor cartel than does the traditional monopoly model. 
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will shift the employer's labor demand curve and the contract curve to 
the right (D' and C' respectively) because the employer will want to 
employ more labor at any given wage. 256 Such a productivity shift will 
increase the optimal level of employment negotiated by the employer 
and will tend to counteract any willingness on the part of the union to 
trade employment for wages in negotiations or any decrease in em-
ployment due to the formation of an effective lal:>0r cartel. Where the 
union is more willing to trade wages for employment so that the con-
tract curve leans to the right, the union in essence spends a portion of 
the employees' share of the cooperative surplus to increase the number 
of job openings above the competitive level. 257 Because in each of 
these cases the union wage exceeds the competitive wage, there should 
presumably be an excess supply of workers willing to take union jobs. 
However, under the bargaining model where employer rents and pro-
ductivity increases are the dominant source of union wage increases, 
little if any production inefficiency or displacement of workers from 
one labor market to another occurs. On the contrary, worker organi-
zation may lead to production efficiencies and an increase in employ-
ment in organized firms. 
Similarly, under the bargaining model the employer has little in-
centive or opportunity to pass on any of the union wage increase to 
consumers. Assuming that the employer was optimally pricing to 
maximize the value of his rents before the employees organized, any 
adjustment away from this optimal price will only reduce the rents 
that are divided between the employer and the employees. Where the 
union is willing to trade employment for wages so that the contract 
curve leans to the left, an employer who enjoys product market power 
rents may profit by decreasing supply and increasing price. 258 How-
ever, no such price increase is possible where the employer has already 
fully exploited the extent of his product market barriers to entry 
before the advent of the union.259 Where the union establishes an ef-
256. Productivity increases associated with employee organization are like any technological 
innovation in that they shift the employer's labor demand curve and may change the optimal 
labor-capital mix. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 13, at 202-04; Clark, supra note 54, at 896-
97. 
257. As previously stated, this most likely occurs in industries in which the level of employ-
ment is severely contracting so that even with attrition and productivity increases associated with 
organization, the employer's desired level of employment is well below the level desired by union 
members. Indeed, such a rightward-leaning contract curve has been found in the typographical 
industry, which has recently suffered a severe contraction in jobs due to technological innova-
tions. Macurdy & Pencavel, supra note 54. 
258. If the employer enjoyed only Ricardian rents, quasi-rents, and productivity increases 
associated with employee organization, she would not be able to raise the product price, because 
the employer is a price taker in the product market. 
259. Empirical evidence suggests that most cartels and monopolists price at the limit of their 
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fective labor cartel, the price of the good will rise as output is de-
creased, but once again the bargaining response will mitigate this 
effect.260 
Also, as before, productivity increases associated with employee 
organization will offset in part or in whole any tendency to increase 
price due to the willingness of the union to trade employment for 
wages or the establishment of an effective labor cartel. Indeed, to the 
extent that such productivity increases spread throughout the product 
market through organization, firm expansion, or free riding, they will 
tend to drive down the optimal price, and consumers may even enjoy 
lower prices due to employee organization.261 Where the union is will-
ing to trade wages for employment so that the contract curve leans to 
the right, the resulting contract can only increase output and reduce 
price relative to what would have existed in a competitive market, as-
suming the additional workers add anything to production. Under the 
bargaining model there is thus little, if any, consumption inefficiency 
or product price increase associated with employee organization, and, 
to the extent productivity increases associated with employee organi-
zation spread throughout the product market, consumers may enjoy a 
price decrease due to organization. 
Thus, one can argue under the bargaining analysis that unions 
serve the goal of equity and perhaps even the goal of efficiency. The 
absence of any appreciable displacement of workers or product price 
increase associated with employee organization means that union ben-
efits come largely at the expense of employers and from productivity 
increases associated with employee organization rather than from 
other workers or consumers. Assuming that the average stockholder 
barriers to entry rather than at the theoretically optimal price given by the product market de· 
mand curve at the output level where marginal revenue equals marginal costs. Measured elastici· 
ties of demand for various industries range from 1.98 to 0.03 with 0.56 as the unscientific 
"mean." HENDRIK s. HOUTHAKKER & LESTER D. TAYLOR, CONSUMER DEMAND JN THE 
UNITED STATES: ANALYSES AND PROJECTIONS 61-144 (2d ed. 1970); A. Koutsoyiannis, Goals 
of Oligopolistic Firms: An Empirical Test of Competing Hypotheses, 51 S. EcoN. J. 540 (1984); 
Ahsan Mansur & John Whalley, Numerical Specification of Applied General Equilibrium Models: 
Estimation, Calibration and Data, in APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 69-127 (Her-
bert E. Searf & John B. Shaven eds., 1984). Assuming a linear demand curve and a moderate 
increase in the marginal costs of production so that the ratio of the optimal monopoly price to 
the competitive price is equal to the elasticity of demand plus 0.25 divided by the elasticity of 
demand, POSNER, supra note 241, at 245-48, these elasticities suggest optimal price markups for 
cartels and monopolies of from 13% to 833% with an unscientific "mean" of about 45%. How-
ever, typical markups from real cartels and monopolies range from 12% to 35%. Mark A. 
Cohen & David T. Scheffman, The Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Punishment Worth the 
Costs?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. R.Ev. 331, 347 (1989). Given the historically low penalties and slack 
enforcement of our antitrust laws, this disparity suggests that cartels and monopolists typically 
raise their prices to the full extent of available barriers to entry. 
260. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
261. Clark, supra note 54, at 896-97. 
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is wealthier than the average worker and society generally favors re-
distributing wealth from rich to poor, or that society believes workers 
should share in the rents generated by their joint enterprise with em-
ployers regardless of the parties' relative wealth, unions serve society's 
redistributive goals.262 Moreover, if the productivity increases associ-
ated with employee organization exceed associated inefficiencies due to 
unions' willingness to trade employment for wages, unions' ability to 
establish effective labor cartels, possible increases in transaction costs 
due to collective bargaining, and any external costs on the public from 
strikes, then employee organization is also wealth maximizing.263 It 
follows that, at the very least, unions should be lawful and collective 
bargaining agreements should be enforceable. But are these two sim-
ple policies enough to ensure an optimal social policy with respect to 
industrial relations, or does society need more extensive regulation of 
the conduct of collective bargaining? 
The third assumption of the bargaining model, that collective bar-
gaining is a strategic endeavor and that many of its associated costs 
are positional externalities, suggests the need for extensive regulation 
262. There is no efficiency reason why some of the employer product market power or Ricar-
dian rents should not be redistributed to the workers who help produce them, because these rents 
are payments in excess of that necessary to call forth the employment of the employer's capital 
resources. Indeed, to the extent that unions force employers to share product market power 
rents, they discourage employer cartelization of the product market and increase economic 
efficiency. 
263. It seems plausible that employee organization is wealth maximizing in some industries. 
As previously discussed, in what are perhaps the most careful studies of productivity increases 
associated with employee organization, Clark found an increase in production of 8% to 10% in 
the cement industry. Clark, Evidence, supra note 223, at 635. One study found that the effi-
ciency gain from removing the union relative wage effect (using the monopoly model of unions) 
never exceeds 0.2% of GNP. Robert H. DeFina, Unions, Relative Wages, and Economic Effi-
ciency, 1 J. LAB. EcoN. 408, 428 (1983); see also REES, supra note 217, at 96-97; Albert Rees, 
The Effects of Unions on Resource Allocation, 6 J.L. & EcoN. 69, 69-78 (1963). Taking this 
estimate as an outside estimate of any production or consumption inefficiency under the bargain-
ing model, and assuming that 20% of employees are organized in the economy as a whole, one 
obtains an estimate of the average production and consumption inefficiency associated with an 
organized employer of about 1 %. There are probably economies of scale from collective bargain-
ing with respect to time, information, and enforcement costs. Assuming that these costs are the 
same for collective and individual bargaining, the only potential excess costs from collective bar-
gaining are the costs of organization and strikes. The average worker covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement spends fewer than three days a year on strike. Kennan, supra note 73, at 
1125. Tripling this, to include a crude accounting of organizational costs and external costs on 
the public from strikes, and assuming that the decrease in productivity associated with strikes is 
proportional to the number of days missed, one gets a rough estimate of about 3.6% as the 
decrease in productivity due to the excess costs of collective bargaining. Thus, a generous esti-
mate of the total average loss of efficiency in a shop due to collective bargaining is under 5%. 
Even if unions are not wealth maximizing, some authors have argued that there are sociopo-
litical benefits from allowing workers to organize and act as a voice for workers and a counterbal-
ance to organized capital in social and political fora. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 
191-206; Getman & Kohler, supra note 95, at 1433. If that is the case, even putting aside redis-
tributive objectives, unions may be social welfare maximizing even if they are not wealth 
maximizing. 
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of the conduct of labor relations. Recall that, as demonstrated in the 
negotiations game, because uncooperative or recalcitrant bargaining is 
a positional externality, conflicts in collective negotiations tend to es-
calate into costly strikes despite the parties' mutual interest in avoid-
ing such strikes. Similarly, because many of the more costly strategies 
in organizing and contract enforcement, such as discriminatory dis-
charges, strikes, lockouts, and resort to litigation, are also positional 
externalities, conflicts in these areas tend to escalate into costly affairs 
despite the mutual interest of the parties to avoid such escalation. Es-
calation of conflicts between employers and employees is not desirable 
from a societal perspective because it wastes the cooperative surplus 
produced by the parties.264 Therefore, it makes sense for the govern-
ment to undertake reasonable measures to regulate labor relations to 
avoid such waste and promote the efficient resolution of such disputes. 
There are two basic methods by which the government can seek to 
avoid such escalation and promote more efficient solutions to conflicts 
involving positional externalities. 265 First, the government can change 
the expected payoffs of the game by penalizing or prohibiting the 
wasteful high-cost strategies so that it becomes individually rational 
for each party to confine itself to the efficient low-cost strategies.266 
For example, in the bargaining game presented earlier, if the govern-
ment prohibited intransigent bargaining and enforced this prohibition 
with an expected penalty of $4, both the employer and the union 
would decide to bargain cooperatively.267 Second, the government can 
264. Returning to the bargaining game represented in Matrix 1, by combining all the benefits 
to the parties associated with the game and subtracting all costs, we see that the mutually cooper-
ative solution of cell 1 is wealth maximizing while the mutually uncooperative solution of cell 4 is 
wealth minimizing. See Matrix l, supra text accompanying notes 86-87. In addition, there may 
be some external costs to consumers from the strike not accounted for in the game if adequate 
substitutes do not exist and the consumers have to forgo consumption during the strike. These 
costs further undermine the mutually uncooperative solution of cell 4 from a wealth maximiza-
tion perspective. 
265. HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 177-81. The government or society can also attempt to 
solve dilemmas by a third method: shaping people's preferences to promote cooperative behav-
ior. Families teach taking turns or sharing to solve dilemmas that arise out of conflicting desires 
as to which activities to undertake together or who will use common resources that only one 
person can use at a time. HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 128-30. The government also uses 
preference shaping to attempt to solve dilemmas. For example, the government uses criminal 
punishment to promote preferences for respecting our common interest in respect for bodily and 
property integrity over individual interests in assault and theft. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUB-
LIC CHOICE II 9-15 (1989) (positing a model of crime as a dilemma game); Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 1. To date, however, preference shaping has not been used as an important solution to 
dilemmas in labor relations. 
266. HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 188-89; Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and 
the Evolution of Cooperation, 93 YALE L.J. 1147, 1164-68 (1984) (book review). 
267. The expected employer payoffs for cells 1 through 4 would then be, respectively, 4.75, 4, 
1 and -1.5, with the cooperative strategy dominating. Similarly, the expected union payoffs for 
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enact measures that promote the parties' ability to recognize and fol-
low their collective interest in not escalating the conflict and to ob-
serve an explicit or implicit private armistice that confines the 
resolution of their conflicts to the efficient low-cost strategies. 
Through logical arguments and empirical studies, social scientists 
have identified the following measures as promoting cooperative or 
low-cost solutions to dilemma games like those found in industrial re-
lations: promoting homogeneity among the constituencies of the play-
ers of the game; limiting the number of players; requiring exchanges of 
information among the players; prohibiting certain bargaining strate-
gies, including lying, committing to third parties, or cutting off negoti-
ations; promoting repeated play of the dilemma game; and enforcing 
explicit private agreements to refrain from undertaking the high-cost 
strategies.268 Promoting homogeneity and reducing the number of 
players simplifies the game so that the players are more likely to see 
their collective interest in cooperation.269 Reducing the number of 
players also prevents a few uncooperative players from free riding on 
the cooperative efforts of the rest.270 Requiring exchanges of informa-
tion on the game allows the parties to see their collective interest in 
avoiding escalation and promotes trust.271 Bargaining strategies such 
cells 1 through 4 would be, respectively, 3.08, 0.5, 1.17 and -3.17, with the cooperative strategy 
dominating. This example assumes that the recalcitrant party pays the entire penalty. Under 
different bargaining models, the incidence of a penalty for strategic behavior may not be so 
straightforward. For example, a penalty for employer recalcitrance in organizing will reduce the 
cooperative surplus and perhaps the union's share of that surplus. Although this subject deserves 
serious scholarly attention in the future, for the purposes of this article I will assume that penal-
ties on either party do not affect the other's ability to gain a share of the cooperative surplus and 
that the incidence of a penalty therefore falls entirely on the offending party. 
268. HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 114-16, 121-22, 126-27, 173, 190, 241-42; HOWARD 
RAlFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 12-19 (1982); Coleman et al., supra note 87, 
at 671-89; Jules L. Coleman, Afterword: The Rational Approach to Legal Rules, 65 CHl.-KENT 
L. REV. 177, 187 (1989); Huber, supra note 266, at 1164-67 (1984). 
269. MUELLER, supra note 265, at 13; see HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 173, 190, 242-43; 
Coleman et al., supra note 87, at 676; John Fox & Melvin Guyer, Group Size and Others' Strategy 
in an N-Person Game, 21 J. CONFLICT REsoL. 323 (1977); Henry Hamburger, Dynamics of Co-
operation in Take-Some Games, in MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Wil-
helm F. Kempf & Bruno H. Repp eds., 1977). The Coase Theorem, which is dependent on 
cooperative bargaining, can break down with as few as three bargainers due to potential complex-
ities in negotiations. MUELLER, supra note 265, at 31. 
270. HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 242-43; see MANCUR OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION 9-15 (1971); Coleman et al., supra note 87, at 676. For example, if an employer 
has to negotiate with three separate groups of employees of approximately equal size, all of which 
are necessary to production, and two groups are cooperative, the third may hold out, free riding 
on the cooperative surplus produced by the other employees. In such a case, the per capita 
benefits to the holdout group would be greater than if the employees all bargained in one group, 
and the chances of employer retaliation against one holdout would be smaller because the em-
ployer would not want to waste the cooperative surplus produced with the other employees. 
Hamburger provides a means to analyze such situations using relatively simple graphs. See 
HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 161. 
271. See HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 116, 126, 173, 241; ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT 
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as lying, committing to third parties, and cutting off negotiations are 
themselves strategic acts that can jeopardize the larger game.272 Re-
peated play increases the costs of strategic behavior by making such 
behavior a threat not only to current negotiations but also to future 
negotiations.273 Finally, making explicit private armistices enforceable 
encourages the parties to negotiate such armistices and changes the 
payoffs of the game to make cooperation individually rational.274 
Which of the two solutions the government should employ in a 
particular situation depends on their relative costs and benefits in that 
situation. For example, in conflicts over employee organization, the 
high-cost strategies of discriminatory discharges and strikes are rela-
tively easy to identify and monitor, and the chance of a voluntary ar-
mistice between the two unfamiliar, hostile parties seems remote. In 
M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 87-102 (1965); John Fox & Melvin Guyer, "Public" 
Choice and Cooperation in N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 469 (1978); 
Schwab, supra note 12, at 279. 
272. Although a party might capture a larger share of the cooperative surplus by misrepre· 
senting the value or cost of a contract term, if both parties successfully undertake this strategy 
they may miss opportunities for efficient exchange. See supra text accompanying note 86. Simi· 
larly, although one party might gain a larger share of the cooperative surplus by committing to a 
third party for a favorable division of the surplus, both parties' following this strategy can pre-
vent efficient contracts. For example, if during collective negotiations an employer commits to a 
creditor that he will obtain 80% of the cooperative surplus, the employer gains a great bargain-
ing advantage. However, if the union follows a similar strategy by committing to the member-
ship or public, in language too strong to retract, that it will obtain 80% of the cooperative 
surplus, clearly no contract can be reached that meets both of these commitments. In like fash· 
ion, each party might individually gain a strategic advantage by giving a final take-it-or-leave-it 
offer and cutting off negotiations, but if both parties follow this strategy negotiations break down. 
HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 117-22; Schwab, supra note 12, at 271-72. However, some bar· 
gaining strategies, such as the use of contingent offers, can help to promote cooperative solutions. 
HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 186. The common practice in collective negotiations of using 
tentative agreements on specific terms, subject to the understanding that "nothing is agreed to 
until everything is agreed to," may be as such a contingent bargaining device. 
273. See AxELROD, supra note 18, at 12; HAMBURGER, supra note 18, at 114-15, 126, 233; 
ROBERT D. CoOTER, THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO ADJUDICATING SOCIAL NORMS 17 
(Univ. Cal. Berkeley Working Paper No. 90-5, 1990); Coleman et al., supra note 87, at 672. 
Actually, by the logic of backward induction, if each party acts only according to its individual 
rationality, finite repeat play should not help solve dilemma games because it pays to be uncoop· 
erative in the last play of the game when there are no future games for revenge, and accordingly 
it pays to be uncooperative in the next-to-last game, and so forth; any incentives to be cooperative 
based on future plays of the game "unravel." See SHUBIK, supra note 81, at 259-60; MICHAEL 
TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION 29 (1976); Alexander J. Field, Microeconomics, Norms, 
and Rationality, 32 EcoN. REv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 684, 698 (1984). This argument breaks 
down, however, if the end of the relationship is uncertain or if the parties are willing to settle for 
a strategy that is only slightly short of the self-interested maximum. Drew Fudenberg & Eric 
Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Discounting or with Incomplete Informatio11, 
54 EcONOMETRICA 533 (1986); Roy Radner, Mo11itoring Cooperative Agreeme11ts i11 a Repeated 
Pri11cipal-Agent Relationship, 49 EcONOMETRICA 1127-28 (1981). Moreover, empirical studies of 
dilemma games show higher levels of cooperation in finite repeated games than nonrepeated 
games, although cooperation rates are lower in the beginning of play while people are learning to 
cooperate and also lower toward the end of play when they begin to act opportunistically. See 
Lave, supra note 93. 
274. AxELROD, supra note 18, at 11; Cooter, supra note 273, at 14-16. 
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such a situation, the efficient government policy to promote coopera-
tive or low-cost solutions in industrial relations would be to rely pri-
marily on penalties and prohibitions to regulate organizing conflicts. 
As a counterexample, in conflicts over collective negotiations, the 
high-cost strategy of intransigence may be harder to identify and mon-
itor, while the probability of a voluntary armistice between two parties 
with an established relationship is significant. In this circumstance, 
the efficient government policy to regulate labor relations would be to 
rely more heavily on measures that promote voluntary armistices in 
regulating collective negotiations. Finally, in conflicts over enforce-
ment of the collective agreement, the parties have a working relation-
ship, having successfully negotiated a contract, and they have had the 
opportunity to agree explicitly to a voluntary armistice. Because so 
many employers and unions seem willing to include the armistice of 
final binding arbitration in their collective agreements voluntarily,275 it 
seems adequate to confine government efforts in regulating enforce-
ment conflicts to the strategy of promoting such agreements and mak-
ing them enforceable, even though the high-cost strategies of strikes 
and litigation are easy to identify and monitor. 
The optimal labor policy that seems to emerge from the bargaining 
analysis is one that makes unions lawful and regulates labor relations 
to promote low-cost resolution of conflicts in collective bargaining.276 
Such a solution affords society the benefits of unions in redistributing 
and perhaps maximizing wealth while avoiding needless waste in in-
dustrial relations disputes. However, based on the analysis to this 
point, one could advocate some alternative policies as optimal. First, 
if employer strategic behavior is merely wasteful rent seeking, why al-
low it at all? The government could heavily fine employers for any 
resistance to employees in organizing or negotiations, and the employ-
ees could run the firm as a cooperative, taking all available rents. This 
proposal would seem to have the benefits of saving the strategic costs 
of even the low-cost strategies of resolving industrial conflicts and 
would redistribute even more wealth from employers to employees. 
Second, even if we are going to allow some employer resistance to un-
ions, why limit union strategic behavior? Although employer strategic 
behavior is a waste, union strategic behavior serves the beneficial pur-
pose of redistributing wealth from the employer to the employees. 
One could argue that if a little redistribution is good, the larger 
275. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
276. Within the context of the negotiating game presented in Matrix 1, this position amounts 
to promoting cell 1 as the optimal solution the government should encourage in its labor rela-
tions policy. 
488 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:419 
amounts that would occur if unions had the upper hand in industrial 
conflicts would be even better.277 Finally, assuming that the primary 
benefit of unions is their redistribution of rents from employers to em-
ployees, why undertake such a complex labor policy as outlined 
above? It would seem preferable simply to enact a stricter antitrust 
policy or a tax on employer rents that would redistribute this wealth 
more broadly among the population. By examining the limitations of 
these alternate proposals, one can see additional arguments and as-
sumptions that are necessary to support the adoption of a policy en-
couraging unions and limiting both sides to balanced, low-cost 
strategies for the resolution of labor relations conflicts. 
Each of the first two proposals entails significant costs. Prohibiting 
all employer resistance to unions would undermine the efficient opera-
tion of organized businesses. Independent management must offer 
some efficiency in the operation of a business, most probably in the 
monitoring of work effort, or else they would have been displaced by 
cooperatives in our economy a long time ago.278 Some minimum 
amount of employer resistance is part of the cost of maintaining in-
dependent employers. Besides, despite their obviously self-interested 
motive, employer communications regarding the desirability of em-
ployee organization or union demands undoubtedly carry some infor-
mation of value to the employees in deciding whether to organize and 
what negotiating demands to make.279 Similarly, allowing unlimited 
union strategic behavior would entail an expenditure of resources. 
Even in a one-sided contest, recognitional strikes, union recalcitrance 
in bargaining, and strikes to interpret the contract would waste a por-
tion of the cooperative surplus.280 Thus, it seems unlikely that either 
277. Within the context of the negotiating game presented in Matrix 1, this position would 
amount to advocating cell 3 as the solution the government should promote rather than cell 1. 
278. Indeed, to date worker cooperatives have had little success in American economy. It 
seems that whatever savings they realize in avoiding fights between the employer and the employ-
ees over shares of the cooperative surplus are more than made up for by problems of shirking and 
inability to make decisions. But see WHEN WORKERS DECIDE: WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 
TAKES OVER NORTH AMERICA (Len Krimerman & Frank Lindenfelf eds., 1992); c. GEORGE 
BENELLO, The Challenge of Mondragon, in FROM THE GROUND UP: EssAYS ON GRASSROOTS 
AND WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 89 (1992) (discussing the success of the Mondragon 
cooperative). 
279. The elimination of all employer resistance would also impinge on other concerns. Em-
ployers have a limited First Amendment right to speak out against employee organization and 
union demands. See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941) (suggesting 
that First Amendment concerns would be implicated if an employer were prevented from "ex-
pressing its views on labor policies or problems"); NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 928-29 
(2d Cir. 1967) (finding that the First Amendment protects an employer's prediction that unioni-
zation would harm the company and its workers). 
280. This waste can be seen by comparing the total wealth of cell 3, which represents a one-
sided contest in favor of the union, and cell 1, which represents the low-cost balanced solution, in 
the negotiating game represented in Matrix 1. 
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of the first two proposals would be wealth maximizing.281 
Moreover, although some might favor the additional redistribution 
of wealth these policies would entail, society as a whole may not share 
this view. A policy that involved only a limited redistribution of 
wealth could be supported by a widespread subjective belief that the 
additional benefits of redistribution to be gained by prohibiting em-
ployer resistance or allowing unlimited union strategic behavior are 
not worth the losses in efficiency those policies entail. Alternatively, a 
widespread belief may exist among the members of society that there 
should be some "equity" or balance in the contest between labor and 
management to divide the fruits of their joint efforts. Thus, in weigh-
ing the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution inherent in the 
selection among alternate possible labor policies, or in determining 
what rules lead to a fair and equitable distribution of the cooperative 
surplus, society might decide to restrict both sides in labor relations 
conflicts to the cooperative or low-cost solutions for normative rea-
sons, believing that this leads to the optimal distribution of the cooper-
ative surplus. Such a normative decision on a distributional matter is, 
of course, largely a matter of taste on which reasonable minds can 
differ.282 
On the possibility of preventing or taxing employer rents through 
our antitrust and tax policies, although some adjustment of these poli-
cies might be desirable, it would be very costly and probably impossi-
ble to eliminate all employer rents through such measures. The 
government is at a substantial disadvantage, relative to the employer 
and the union, in identifying and pursuing employer rents. Informa-
tion on market demand, competitiveness, barriers to entry, and meth-
ods of production that is necessary to estimate employer rents is 
available to the parties as part of their production process but would 
be very costly for the government to obtain. Moreover, economies of 
scale ensure that, under an efficient antitrust policy, some markets will 
inevitably become concentrated enough for firms to earn market 
power rents. Such rents could be eliminated only by pursuing divesti-
tures that would result in inefficient production and raise prices to 
281. However, a proposal to encourage employee stock ownership as a means of reducing 
incentives to strike would work along these same lines and may have some merit. If employees 
owned a significant share of the company, their interests in dividing the cooperative surplus 
would more closely coincide with those of the employer, decreasing the incentive for either side 
to act strategically. Under such an arrangement, effective monitoring by management and the 
employees would probably still be possible. 
282. Indeed, on a normative basis, one could even argue for the complete prohibition of 
unions if one believed employers should receive all of the cooperative surplus and that the social 
benefits of such an antiredistributive answer to the distributional question outweighed any possi-
ble wealth-increasing effects of unions. 
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consumers.283 There may also be normative objections to taxing away 
all Ricardian rents from those who jointly produce them. Thus, it 
seems that under any antitrust or tax policy that could be pursued at 
reasonable cost, employer market power and Ricardian rents would 
exist that would be available for redistribution through employee 
organization. 
In summary, the bargaining analysis concludes that unions and 
collective bargaining are equitable and perhaps even efficient. Unions 
increase employees' wages by gaining for employees a share of em-
ployer rents and by increasing productivity. Unions and employers 
have incentives to lessen the impact of the union wage increase on the 
level of employment and product price in order to maximize the value 
of the rents and productivity increases they divide. Employers are fur-
ther limited in their ability to pass on union wage increases to consum-
ers in the form of price increases to the extent of the product market 
barriers to entry they enjoy but have not yet exploited. Thus, union 
wage increases come largely at the expense of employers and not other 
workers or consumers. If the productivity increases associated with 
employee organization exceed any inefficiencies unions cause and any 
increase in bargaining costs associated with collective bargaining, un-
ions and collective bargaining will also be efficient. Therefore, it 
makes sense for the government to permit and encourage employee 
organization. 
Moreover, under the bargaining analysis, conflicts in collective 
bargaining are strategic endeavors, the costs of which tend to escalate 
in the absence of government regulation. In conflicts concerning or-
ganizing, negotiations, or enforcement of the collective agreement, the 
parties are commonly rewarded based on their relative performance 
with respect to various costly strategic behaviors. As a result, the 
costs of such conflicts are positional externalities that tend to escalate 
even though such escalation serves only to waste the joint benefits of 
production. Such waste is socially undesirable because it is inefficient. 
Thus, it makes sense for the government to regulate the conduct of 
labor relations to prohibit or discourage such waste. The government 
can accomplish this either by prohibiting costly strategic behaviors or 
by enacting measures to promote the parties' ability to perceive and 
act in their collective interest to avoid escalation. Which of these two 
strategies the government should adopt to govern a particular conflict 
will depend on the relative costs and benefits of each strategy as ap-
plied to the conflict. Finally, there are efficiency losses associated with 
283. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 223· 
24 (1978). 
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either prohibiting all employer resistance to unions or in allowing un-
ions to undertake unlimited strategic behavior. Assuming that society 
values these losses in efficiency more than the additional redistribution 
of wealth that would accompany such policies, or assuming society 
desires some balance or "equity" between unions and employers in 
industrial relations conflicts, society should attempt to limit both un-
ions and employers to cooperative or low- cost strategies in the resolu-
tion of industrial relations conflicts. 
B. Application of the Model to American Labor Law 
1. The Public Policy of Fostering Unions and Collective Bargaining 
The pervasive policy in American labor law of fostering unions and 
collective bargaining284 makes sense under the bargaining model of 
unions. The bargaining model holds that unions redistribute employer 
product market and Ricardian rents from employers to employees.285 
Thus, unions serve societal goals by redistributing wealth progres-
sively and allowing workers to gain a more equitable share of the pro-
ceeds from their labor. There is no productive reason why employers 
should not share these rents, which are payments in excess of what is 
necessary to call forth the employer's resources into employment. In 
addition, fostering unions may maximize wealth. Under the bargain-
ing solution, employers and unions who seek to maximize the mone-
tary value of the employer rents they divide will employ the same 
amount of labor and set the same product price as they would in the 
absence of a union. Inefficiency in production and consumption will 
occur only to the extent that the union is willing to trade employment 
for wages at the expense of maximizing the monetary value of the co-
operative surplus and to the extent that the union derives its wage 
increases from an effective labor cartel. Assuming that the union val-
ues the employment of its members, such inefficiency will be less than 
that predicted by the monopoly model of unions. Furthermore, un-
ions promote efficiency by spurring management to undertake greater 
efforts, enforcing long-term implicit contracts, negotiating efficient 
levels of public goods, and decreasing turnover costs as workers exer-
cise their collective voice to address dissatisfaction with working con-
ditions. In many cases, the increases in efficiency associated with 
employee organization will outweigh the decreases in efficiency associ-
ated with such organization. 
284. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
285. See supra notes 253-63 and accompanying text. 
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2. The Purposes of Promoting Bargaining Equity and Industrial 
Peace 
American labor law's twin purposes of promoting greater equity in 
bargaining power between employers and employees286 and promoting 
industrial peace find ready recognition within the context of the bar-
gaining model. 287 Employees can gain a share of the cooperative sur-
plus only by binding together to negotiate. Each individually will 
receive at most only the competitive wage for his services.288 In addi-
tion, only by binding together can the workers achieve all of the pro-
ductivity increases associated with employee organization, such as the 
monitoring of management efforts, the enforcement of long-term im-
plicit contracts, and the efficient negotiation of public goods.289 Thus, 
by fostering unions and collective bargaining, the law allows workers 
to elevate their bargaining power to a position of rough parity with 
their employer's and affords them the opportunity to make a produc-
tive contribution to the governance of the workplace. Similarly, the 
bargaining model suggests that the government should attempt to 
minimize the extent to which the parties engage in strategic behavior. 
Such behavior is costly and, although it may be individually rational, 
from a larger societal perspective it serves only to waste the coopera-
tive surplus. Thus, the purpose of promoting industrial peace finds 
direct translation into the bargaining model as society's desire to mini-
mize wasteful strategic behavior on the part of unions and employers. 
This interpretation of the purpose of promoting equity in bargain-
ing power also provides a rationale for several of the provisions of 
286. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra notes 1, 6 and accompanying text. 
288. Various Board and court decisions discussing the Act's purpose of promoting equality 
in bargaining power seem consistent with this view. See, e.g., NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 
U.S. 398, 404 (1947); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 23 n.2, 33-34 (1937); 
Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 929 (1960) 
(holding that union's threat to strike does not create unfair bargaining power in favor of employ-
ees sufficient to render employment contract illegal); Beckwith v. United Parcel Serv., 703 F. 
Supp. 138, 141 (D. Me. 1988) (noting that the NLRA is concerned with equating bargaining 
power between employer and employees), ajfd., 889 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. 
International Union, United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563, 567 (D.D.C. 1948) (stating that 
organization is the only means by which employees can achieve a measure of equality of bargain-
ing power with employers); National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 155-56 
(D.D.C.) (holding that Congress sought to promote equality of bargaining power not only by 
guaranteeing employees the right to act collectively but also by protecting an elected union's 
exclusivity as a bargaining agent and imposing on employers the duty to bargain in good faith), 
ajfd., 334 U.S. 854 (1948); Kinder-Care Leaming Centers, Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1172 (1990) 
(finding that employees are at a disadvantage in bargaining with their employer unless they are 
able to organize and bargain collectively); Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986) (holding that 
NLRA contemplates collective action as a means of achieving equality of bargaining power), 
ajfd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
289. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text. 
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American labor law previously discussed in relation to the monopoly 
model of unions. 290 The bilateral relationship between the employer 
and the union created by the grant of authority of exclusive represen-
tation and the employer's obligation to bargain in good faith is no 
longer the prelude to labor cartel exploitation envisioned by Ep-
stein. 291 Instead, this bilateral relationship and the employees' right to 
strike are the necessary prerequisites to the employees' fully sharing in 
the proceeds of the enterprise and fully contributing to its total prod-
uct. Similarly, the prohibition of yellow-dog contracts and the allow-
ance of union security agreements do not needlessly interfere with the 
individual's right to contract, as maintained by Epstein, 292 but instead 
rightly permit the employees to solve the free-rider problem that 
otherwise might undermine their ability to secure collectively a share 
of the cooperative surplus and to express their views on consumption 
and production. Because the benefits of collective bargaining consti-
tute a public good, individual bargaining will not adequately protect 
the employees' interest in collective bargaining, and the employees will 
individually bargain away their right to the benefits of collective bar-
gaining by signing yellow-dog contracts for much less than those bene-
fits are collectively worth. 293 In the same fashion, without union 
security agreements, it is individually rational for the employees to 
free ride on the efforts of the union, thereby undermining the chance 
that the union will actually succeed in gaining a share of the coopera-
tive surplus and a voice in the running of the business. The allowance 
of state right-to-work laws under section 14(b) of the National Labor 
Relations Act294 undermines the employees' ability to solve the free-
rider problem and thus seems contrary to the fundamental purposes of 
the Act. 
Similarly, the bargaining model's interpretation of the purpose of 
promoting industrial peace as an effort to discourage wasteful strategic 
behavior provides a rationale for the general strategy for regulating 
industrial relations found in American labor law. As discussed earlier, 
the government can seek to promote cooperative solutions to the di-
lemma games that arise in collective bargaining in two basic ways: 
290. See supra notes 126-201 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
293. This analysis is consistent with the historical view, denigrated by Epstein, that employ-
ees would too easily surrender their right to organize to employers. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 
1371-72. A similar argument can be made within the context of the monopoly model, but there 
we do not want employees to solve the free-rider problem because doing so results in a labor 
cartel. 
294. 29 u.s.c. § 164(b) (1988). 
494 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:419 
prohibit or fine costly strategic behavior, and enact measures that pro-
mote the parties' ability to recognize and follow their collective inter-
est in avoiding strategic behavior.295 American labor law contains 
both types of provisions. Moreover, the relative reliance on each of 
these methods to discourage strategic behavior and promote coopera-
tive solutions varies under the law in a way that seems efficient under 
the bargaining model. In regulating organizing, where the lack of an 
established relationship, beyond antagonism, between the parties dims 
the prospect that the parties will realize and follow their collective 
interest in avoiding strategic behavior, the law relies almost exclu-
sively on prohibiting strategic behavior to promote cooperative solu-
tions. In regulating collective negotiations, where the established 
relationship between the parties improves the prospect that they will 
realize and follow a cooperative solution, the law relies both on 
prohibitions of strategic behavior and on measures designed to en-
courage the parties to achieve the cooperative solution themselves.296 
In the area of enforcing collective agreements, where the parties have 
an established relationship and where the vast majority of parties 
achieve agreement on the cooperative method of resolving disputes 
through arbitration, the law merely endeavors to make such agree-
ments enforceable. 
3. The Law on Organizing 
American labor law's basic approach to organizing makes sense 
under the bargaining theory of unions and collective bargaining. The 
law severely restricts or prohibits the most costly strategic behaviors 
on both sides in favor of the cheaper method of determining represen-
tation questions through a Board-supervised election. The National 
Labor Relations Act severely limits both the circumstances under 
which unions may lawfully engage in recognitional picketing and 
strikes and the length of time that such activities may persist.297 These 
295. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
296. As a remedy to the problem that many a union never achieves a contract after being 
elected as the bargaining representative, Weiler has proposed that unions and employers have 
recourse to interest arbitration for impasses in the negotiation of first contracts. See WEILER, 
supra note 22, at 249-51. This proposal seems consistent with the bargaining model of unions 
and collective bargaining because in such cases, even though the parties are through the organiz-
ing stage, they still have no established relationship and thus would seem relatively unlikely to 
realize the cooperative solution on their own. See supra notes 93, 275 and accompanying text. 
297. The Act prohibits employees from engaging in recognitional picketing for more than a 
"reasonable" period, not to exceed 30 days, without seeking an election and entirely prohibits 
them from engaging in recognitional picketing if the employer has lawfully recognized another 
union or a valid election has occurred within the past 12 months. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1988). 
The employer may cut short even this limited period of lawful recognitional picketing by peti-
tioning for an election as soon as any picketing begins. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(l)(B) (1988). 
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limitations, combined with the availability of the relatively inexpensive 
alternative of conducting an election campaign, have led unions to rely 
on the election procedure as the primary method of resolving repre-
sentation disputes. Similarly, the Act prohibits employers from under-
taking discriminatory discharges, blacklisting employees, 298 locking 
out employees,299 or relocating the plant in order to avoid union or-
ganization.300 In contrast to the monopoly model, where such activi-
ties are useful because they undermine labor cartel power, 301 these 
activities are merely wasteful rent-seeking on the part of the employer 
that should be prevented in the context of the bargaining model. One 
may wonder how effective these prohibitions are, because the remedies 
under the Act are merely reparative, and employer incentives to com-
mit the offenses may greatly exceed the expected costs of the reme-
dies. 302 However, the effort to discourage costly strategic behavior in 
favor of the less expensive resolution of organizing disputes through 
elections seems well founded under the bargaining theory of unions. 
Even the Darlington doctrine, which states that the employer is 
allowed to close his plant completely to avoid unionism as long as this 
act is not intended to intimidate employees in other plants operated by 
the employer, 303 finds support within the context of the bargaining 
model. Under the model, a complete closure without intimidating in-
tent is distinguishable from a case in which the employer moves his 
plant to avoid unionism or locks out his employees to discourage 
unionism. When the employer closes his plant, the employer cannot 
hope to recoup any of the costs of this behavior from future rents that 
the firm might earn. 304 Because there is no hope of recouping the 
costs of closing from the future rents of the firm, the complete closing 
of a plant without intimidating intent cannot be a strategic activity.305 
Instead, the decision to close must be based on either the employer's 
conclusion that the employees have miscalculated in selecting a union 
and that insufficient rents or productivity increases exist to support 
298. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
299. Flora Constr. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 776 (1961), enforced, 311 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1962). 
300. Local 57, Intl. Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir 
1967). 
301. See supra notes 165-79 and accompanying text. 
302. See infra notes 370-76 and accompanying text. 
303. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1965). 
304. The absence of future benefits is precisely the basis on which the Court in Darlington 
distinguished these cases. See 380 U.S. at 272-73. 
305. Wachter and Cohen have made similar arguments with respect to the Supreme Court's 
decisions on subcontracting and partial closing in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 
U.S. 203 (1964), and First Natl. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See Wachter 
& Cohen, supra note 45, at 1386-405. 
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employee organization, or on the employer's strong personal distaste 
for dealing with organized employees. Thus, complete closure without 
intent to intimidate other employees is not a strategic behavior that 
the law should attempt to minimize under the bargaining theory of 
unions. 
Contrary to Epstein's analysis,306 the redistributive and wealth-
maximization arguments of the bargaining model support the com-
plete prohibition of company unions. Although company-sponsored 
employee organizations may be able to achieve some of the productiv-
ity-enhancing effects associated with employee organization, they 
probably never could achieve all of the productivity increases associ-
ated with independent unionism. 307 Moreover, even if employer orga-
nizations are wealth maximizing, 308 the employer has incentive to 
structure such organizations so that they never constitute an in-
dependent bargaining power that would vie for a share of the coopera-
tive surplus.309 To the extent that such organizations act as a bulwark 
against independent organization, either by mitigating some employee 
concerns or by giving some employees a personal investment in the 
company employee organization, employers may promote them even 
in the absence of productivity increases to avoid sharing the coopera-
tive surplus with the employees. By totally prohibiting company un-
ions, the National Labor Relations Act encourages independent 
employee organization, the productivity increases such organization 
entails, and the sharing of the cooperative surplus between employers 
and employees.310 
The bargaining model's analysis also supports the provisions that 
govern the conduct of representation elections. In contrast to the mo-
nopoly model,311 the bargaining model affirms the proposition that the 
government should facilitate means by which the employees can make 
306. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
307. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
308. This would be the case if inefficiencies associated with independent unionism out-
weighed any increases in productivity that could be achieved only through independent 
unionism. 
309. Thus, such organizations historically did not allow for employee meetings outside of the 
employer's supervision, procedures for voting to strike, or the accumulation of a strike fund. S. 
REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., !st Sess. 9-11 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 2, at 2309-11. 
310. Under this analysis, recent cases allowing employer-sponsored employee organizations 
based on the "newfound" benefits of employer-employee "cooperation" are misguided in that 
they ignore the purpose of the NLRA of promoting independent unions that can achieve not only 
the benefits of cooperation but also a share of the cooperative surplus. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); Hertzka & Knowles v. 
NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974). 
311. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text. 
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a reasoned decision about whether organizing is in their economic in-
terest.312 A Board-supervised election is an inexpensive procedure by 
which just such a decision can be made. The only legitimate role for 
the employer in such a procedure is to provide accurate information 
on the relative costs and benefits of organization to the employees. 
Because of the employer's strong incentives to do much more and to 
act strategically in coercing the employees not to organize, the govern-
ment must carefully regulate the employer's conduct in representation 
elections. 
Several provisions of American labor law seem aimed at minimiz-
ing the costs of elections. Allowing unions access to the names and 
addresses of all eligible employees and allowing employees access to 
the employer's property for purposes of union solicitation on nonwork 
time313 seems consistent with the objective of lowering election costs. 
However, the doctrine of allowing employers to exclude nonemployees 
from making union solicitations even in nonwork areas on nonwork 
time314 seems to raise the costs of elections, with the principal effect of 
merely indulging employers' strategic interest in resisting employee or-
ganization. The legitimate employer interest that this rule ostensibly 
preserves is the integrity of the employer's private property interest in 
the plant.315 However, the benefits of preserving such an interest in a 
public area such as a parking lot seem small compared with the costs 
the rule places on the process of organization. 
Similarly, many of the decisions governing the conduct of elections 
seem designed to limit the employer's role to providing useful informa-
tion and to prohibit employer strategic behavior or efforts to en-
courage the employees to free ride on others' collective efforts. For 
example, the doctrine that employer predictions about the conse-
quences of unionization must be based on objective facts and convey 
the employer's genuine belief as to demonstrable consequences beyond 
his control further these purposes.316 This doctrine limits the em-
ployer to conveying potentially useful information as to whether the 
rents earned by the firm merit employee organization. The doctrine 
312. This conclusion seems consistent with the Board's description of its objective to provide 
"laboratory conditions" in representation elections. See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 
427, 429-30 (1953); General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948); GETMAN & 
POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 37. 
313. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
314. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
315. 351 U.S. at 112; GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 41. 
316. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969); GETMAN & POGREBIN, 
supra note 2, at 47. 
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appropriately prohibits employer threats or promises of benefits31 7 be-
cause these are merely efforts to coerce or bribe the employees into 
sacrificing their collective interest in organization. Such activities un-
dermine collective bargaining by encouraging employees to act only on 
the basis of their individual interests and to free ride on others' collec-
tive action. Even benefit increases that the employer offers to all em-
ployees and does not condition on the rejection of employee 
organization but grants in an effort to prevent employee organization 
should be prohibited under the bargaining theory, because they en-
courage the employees to free ride on the collective action of employ-
ees outside the bargaining unit and will result in a less than optimal 
amount of union organizing.31 8 
One possibly contrary doctrine currently in the law is that the 
Board will not review campaign statements by employers or unions as 
to their truth or falsity.319 Intentional falsehoods would seem to have 
no place in a system designed to allow employees, at minimum cost, to 
decide what is in their own collective interest with respect to organiza-
tion. However, the Board may be correct that regulating campaign 
speech as to truth or falsity is just too costly and that such regulation 
impinges on First Amendment interests. 320 Again, one should wonder 
whether the simple reparative remedies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act offer sufficient incentive for the enforcement of the rules gov-
erning union organizing. 321 
4. The Law on Collective Negotiations 
The law with respect to collective negotiations is designed to dis-
courage strategic behavior and to promote industrial peace and thus is 
consistent with the arguments of the bargaining model. The law at-
317. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988). 
318. Employers grant such benefits not out of the goodness of their hearts but because other 
employees have organized unions that pose a viable threat of organizing the employer's shop. If 
the employer is allowed to frustrate organizing merely by offering the employees a wage increase 
equal or close to the union wage whenever organization threatens, the employees will be tempted 
to act in their individual interests and take the benefits of organizing without contributing to its 
costs; the result will be that too few employees will support collective activities and there will be 
too few unions. Fewer unions will provide less reason for employers to offer benefits to prevent 
employee organization and less realization of the redistributive and productivity benefits of em-
ployee organization. 
319. Although the Board has oscillated in its view on the subject, see GETMAN & POGREBJN, 
supra note 2, at 59-61, the Board will not currently set aside an election based on misrepresenta-
tion in election solicitations. Midland Natl. Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). The only 
exceptions to this rule are cases when one party invokes the Board and its processes in its solicita-
tion, 263 N.L.R.B. at 133 n.25, or uses forged documents in a solicitation. 263 N.L.R.B. at 133. 
320. 263 N.L.R.B. at 131-32. 
321. See infra notes 370-76 and accompanying text. 
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tempts to prohibit intransigence in negotiations by requiring the par-
ties to bargain "in good faith."322 As depicted in the simple 
negotiations game, "bad faith" or intransigence in bargaining is pre-
cisely what leads to strikes.323 Depending on one's model of bargain-
ing, one could haggle over the best standard for good-faith bargaining; 
however, the existing standard of subjective intent to reach agreement 
seems aimed at precisely the problem of intransigence described in the 
game. One can raise legitimate questions about the Board's ability to 
determine intent324 and about the adequacy of existing remedies to 
discourage intransigence in bargaining, 325 but the general concept of 
attempting to require cooperative bargaining in collective negotiations 
seems sound within the context of the bargaining model. 
Moreover, unlike the monopoly model, 326 the bargaining model 
provides a basis on which to evaluate strategies or conduct in collec-
tive negotiations that have been found to be in "bad faith." The prohi-
bition against Boulwareism that exists under current law seems sound 
under the bargaining model because Boulwareism is basically a strat-
egy under which the employer makes a strong commitment to the em-
ployees and the public not to change his bargaining position. 327 If 
only one side commits to a given solution of the bargaining problem, it 
can help ensure a solution that favors that side, but if both sides make 
such commitments in their own favor, the result will be a deadlock 
that prevents a cooperative solution. 328 Moreover, the unilateral 
method by which the employer arrives at her offer under Boulwareism 
bypasses potential productivity increases associated with employee or-
ganization. Even if the employer honestly tries to poll the employees 
as to their preferences and ideas, she cannot hope to do as well in 
assessing those preferences and ideas as an independent union, due to 
the employees' incentives to free ride and their fear of employer 
retaliation. 329 
Similarly, the doctrine that employers are required to supply the 
322. 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1988). 
323. See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text. 
324. See LABOR STUDY GROUP, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 82 
(1961); MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 505-06. 
325. See infra notes 368-80 and accompanying text. 
326. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
327. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 740, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 965 (1970). 
328. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. By the same token, other methods of 
"painting oneself into a comer" should be discouraged in collective bargaining. However, the 
Jaw should not discourage making "final offers" where the intent is not to act strategically but 
instead to communicate the extent of the cooperative surplus. 
329. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 8-9. 
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employees with all relevant information for the purposes of collective 
bargaining330 finds support within the context of the bargaining model 
because such information allows the parties to see mutually beneficial 
cooperative solutions and engenders trust on both sides. However, the 
limitation on this doctrine that the employer is only required to give 
information on his ability to meet union demands when he claims in-
ability to pay331 seems inconsistent with the Act's purpose of limiting 
strategic behavior and promoting industrial peace. Although this rule 
requires the full sharing of information when the chances of resort to 
economic warfare are probably greatest, the law, by allowing the em-
ployer to keep such information to herself absent a plea of poverty, 
encourages strategic behavior on the part of the employer in represent-
ing her ability to pay and decreases the chances of a cooperative solu-
tion in negotiations. The only purpose served by allowing such 
strategic behavior is to allow the employer to trick the union into ac-
cepting a smaller share of the cooperative surplus. A rule on the shar-
ing of information that sought to minimize the chances of strategic 
behavior and to maximize the parties' ability to realize cooperative 
solutions would require the full sharing of all relevant information.332 
The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bar-
gaining is another doctrine that finds some support within the context 
of the bargaining model.333 Under current law, employers and unions 
are only required to bargain over "mandatory subjects" that fall 
within the broad meaning of the statutory phrase "wages, hours ... , 
or other conditions of employment"334 and that "settle an aspect of 
the relationship between the employer and the employees."335 Bar-
330. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958); see NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 
U.S. 149 (1956). 
331. MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 550. 
332. See NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN & JAMES W. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 78 (2d 
ed. 1965); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETIING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981); LAVANIA HALL, NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES 
FOR MUTUAL GAIN (1993); see also Schwab, supra note 12, at 278-80. But see Wachter & Co-
hen, supra note 45, at 1373 (arguing that full disclosure of information is rarely efficient). 
333. Contrast this with Epstein's analysis of the obligation to bargain in good faith. See 
supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
334. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). 
335. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971); 
see also First Natl. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678 (1981); Fibreboard Paper 
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 
356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958). Industry practice concerning the accepted subjects of collective bar-
gaining is "highly relevant" in determining which subjects are mandatory. THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 761; see also GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 121-23. 
Examples of mandatory subjects include wages, hours, pensions, health benefits, safety precau-
tions, shift differentials, and union security agreements where they are not prohibited by state 
law. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 772-844. 
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gammg over other subjects concerning the employer's relationship 
with third parties or the union's relationship with the employees is 
"permitted," but not required, and neither side may resort to a work 
stoppage to enforce demands over such permissive subjects. 336 By re-
stricting the obligation to bargain to subjects that concern the employ-
ment relationship, the law simplifies the bargaining game. 
Negotiations over subjects that primarily concern the parties' relation-
ship with other people would seem very likely to complicate the nego-
tiations game in ways the parties cannot themselves resolve. 337 
However, due to the benefits of collective bargaining under the bar-
gaining model, the scope of mandatory subjects under the Act should 
be broadly construed. The Court's recent willingness to narrow the 
purview of mandatory bargaining and to find certain business deci-
sions concerning the scope and direction of the enterprise to be pecu-
liarly within the sole prerogative of management seems ill founded 
under the bargaining model.338 The Court's argument that the em-
ployer will voluntarily undertake bargaining with the employees on 
336. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 342. Permissive subjects are those the Board or courts con-
sider too remote from the employment relationship or deem a peculiar prerogative of either the 
employer or the union. MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 557. Examples of permissive sub-
jects include benefits for nonemployees, provisions governing the internal operations of the 
union, and multiunit bargaining. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, 404 U.S. at 160 (discussing 
benefits for nonemployees); Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 350 (discussing internal operation of 
union); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Intl. Union v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 1266, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (discussing scope of the bargaining unit). 
337. Moreover, the restriction of the obligation to bargain to subjects that concern the em-
ployment relationship helps ensure that collective bargaining and the possible resort to economic 
warfare are used only to further the purposes of employee organization of transferring wealth 
from employers to employees and achieving productivity increases in compensation and produc-
tion. For example, negotiations of terms related to political objectives are not considered 
mandatory subjects of bargaining, and so strikes over such issues would not be protected activi-
ties under the National Labor Relations Act. However, the ban on injunctions of strikes con-
tained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act has been interpreted to preclude injunction of such strikes. 
International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Allied Intl., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); Jacksonville Bulk Ter-
minals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 457 U.S. 702 (1982). 
338. In First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 666, the Court determined that the employer 
had no obligation to negotiate over a decision to close his business partially. Even though the 
subject was of paramount importance to the employees, the Court found other concerns of profit-
ability and efficiency that justified a unilateral employer decision on the matter. 452 U.S. at 682-
83, 686. According to the Court, "Congress had no expectation that the elected union represen-
tative would become an equal partner in the running of the business," 452 U.S. at 676, and 
"[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential 
for the running of a profitable business." 452 U.S. at 678-79 (footnote omitted). Following the 
Court's lead, a plurality of the Board announced in Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984), 
that henceforth all decisions affecting the direction, scope, or nature of a business would be 
treated as nonmandatory topics unless they turned upon labor costs and that the employer would 
be free to make such decisions without bargaining with the union. 269 N.L.R.B. at 893. How-
ever, in Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (1991), the Board retreated from this posi-
tion and employed an analysis that was more sensitive to the problem of employer strategic 
behavior and the benefits of collective bargaining to devise a rule covering decisions to relocate 
the business. This analysis expressly examined whether the employer's decision would result in 
the replacement of the employees, whether its scope was akin to a decision not to be in business 
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such topics if bargaining will be profitable339 misses the point that, due 
to the divergence of individual and collective interests in dilemma 
games such as collective negotiations, employers may decide not to 
bargain in good faith based on individual incentives when in fact such 
bargaining would be wealth maximizing from a collective perspec-
tive. 340 Moreover, within the context of the bargaining model, em-
ployees may have productivity-enhancing proposals to make through 
collective bargaining with regard to decisions concerning the scope 
and direction of the enterprise. 
Other provisions of the law prevent strategic behavior and promote 
industrial peace by facilitating the parties' ability to realize their col-
lective interest in reaching cooperative solutions in bargaining. The 
limitation that employees can organize only in "appropriate bargain-
ing units"341 seems designed to promote homogeneity in bargaining 
interests among the employees represented by the union. Under cur-
rent doctrine, the Board includes in a unit only those employees who 
share a sufficient ''community of interest" with respect to their terms 
and conditions of employment. 342 As previously discussed, such ho-
at all, and whether it turned on labor costs, to determine whether the decision was a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. Id. at 15. 
339. 452 U.S. at 682. 
340. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. This argument does not apply to man-
agement decisions that cannot result in a strategic behavior, for example the closing of a plant, 
because if there is no strategic gain for the employer in such decisions then there will be no 
divergence of his individual interests from the collective interests. Wachter and Cohen have 
made a convincing argument that, at least to date, the Court's determinations as to which deci-
sions concerning the scope or direction of the enterprise are not mandatory subjects of bargaining 
correspond to those decisions that cannot result in strategic behavior. Wachter & Cohen, supra 
note 45, at 1386-95. If this trend continues, the Supreme Court's doctrine on this subject will not 
pose a serious problem under the bargaining model. However, the rhetoric of the Court's opin-
ion in First National Maintenance is broader than a rule that simply allowed unilateral employer 
decisions where no strategic behavior was possible, see supra note 338, and I am not sanguine 
that the current trend will continue. 
341. Before conducting an election, the Board will determine ifthe employees the union has 
petitioned to represent constitute an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988). In the absence of agreement between the union and the employer 
on an appropriate unit, the Board will conduct a hearing to determine whether the unit proposed 
by the union is appropriate. To be approved, the unit sought by the union need not be the "only" 
or "most" appropriate unit, but instead merely "an" appropriate unit, possibly among several 
acceptable formulations. Continental Banking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777, 782-83 (1952). 
342. Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962); JOHN E. ABODEELY, THE 
NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 7-14 (1971); GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra 
note 2, at 24-25. In deciding whether employees share the requisite community of interest, the 
Board will consider a wide variety of factors, including methods of compensation, hours of work, 
employment benefits, supervision, training and skills, job functions and situs, contact with other 
employees, integration of work, and bargaining history. JOHN D. FEERICK ET AL., NLRA REP· 
RESENTATION ELECTIONS§ 8.2, at 290-96 (2d ed. 1985); GETMAN & PoGREBIN, supra note 2, at 
25. With respect to situs, in most industries a single geographically distinct facility is presump-
tively appropriate. See A. Harris & Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1628 (1956). Bargaining history is given 
weight largely because continuing an established unit is viewed as promoting stability in labor 
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mogeneity on the part of the employees simplifies the bargaining game 
and increases the likelihood that the parties will realize the coopera-
tive solution. 343 Board and court precedent confirms that the driving 
purpose behind the doctrine of appropriate bargaining units is to mini-
mize strategic behavior or "promote industrial peace."344 The current 
doctrine that allows the parties mutually to agree to bargain on a mul-
tiunit basis345 probably does not undermine this purpose and may pro-
mote it, because parties would probably not agree to such an 
arrangement if it afforded one side a strategic advantage or if it de-
creased the total expected outcome from bargaining by increasing the 
chances of strategic behavior.346 The prohibition of unilaterally with-
drawing from such multiunit bargaining once negotiations have be-
gun347 was designed to prevent one side from strategically 
withdrawing from negotiations that it perceives as going badly, 
thereby increasing negotiating costs and decreasing the chances of a 
cooperative solution. 348 
The doctrine of exclusive representation also facilitates cooperative 
solutions in bargaining. By prohibiting individual and subgroup bar-
gaining, the National Labor Relations Act limits the number of parties 
to the negotiations game, thus simplifying it and increasing the 
chances of a cooperative solution. 349 The success of this strategy in 
relations and thus industrial peace, one of the purposes of the NLRA. Buffalo Broadcasting Co., 
242 N.L.R.B. 1105 (1979); Marion Power Shovel Co., 230 N,L.R.B. 576 (1977). 
343. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text. Professor Leslie has previously argued 
that the legal doctrine on appropriate bargaining units is designed to group employees according 
to their preference with respect to public goods in order to facilitate the optimal provision of 
those goods in the workplace. Leslie, supra note 45, at 407-08. Although it may be true that the 
current rules fulfill this function, I would argue that the purpose of the rules goes beyond pro-
moting the optimal consumption of public goods to simplifying the negotiations game and pro-
moting cooperative solutions without economic warfare. 
344. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 392 (1966) (holding that, in defining an 
appropriate unit, the Board will take into account the interest of employees and the public in 
stability of labor relations and accordingly uninterrupted operation of facilities); Cox ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 286 (demonstrating that Board's rule on hospital units was drafted with intent of 
minimizing work stoppages); see also Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 
412 (1982) (stating that rules on multiemployer bargaining were designed to promote industrial 
peace). 
345. See Retail Assoc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958). 
346. However, society may want to prohibit such multiunit bargaining because it facilitates 
labor cartelization and horizontal price-fixing among employers. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1382; 
Leslie, supra note 45, at 418. 
347. Western Pac. Roofing Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 501 (1979), ajfd., 669 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 
1982). This prohibition allows unilateral withdrawal after negotiations have begun only under 
"unusual circumstances." 244 N.L.R.B. at 507. 
348. Bonanno Linen Serv., 454 U.S. at 412. For a more traditional economic analysis of the 
multiunit bargaining rules, see Douglas L. Leslie, Multiemployer Bargaining Rules, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 241 (1989). 
349. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text. 
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simplifying the bargaining problem is limited by the fact that there 
may be more than one appropriate unit among an employer's employ-
ees. Thus, in facilitating cooperative solutions, there is a tradeoff be-
tween organizing the employees according to homogeneity of 
bargaining interests and minimizing the number players to the bar-
gaining game. Case law recognizes this tradeoff. 35o 
Finally, the presumption of the union's continuing majority facili-
tates cooperative solutions in bargaining by increasing the expecta-
tions of repeated play of the bargaining game. Under current legal 
doctrine, once a union has been recognized as the representative of the 
employees, it enjoys a strong presumption of continuing majority sta-
tus. 351 This presumption is sometimes irrebuttable. For example, the 
Board will not entertain evidence of loss of majority status, or even 
petitions for an election on that status, within a "reasonable time" af-
ter voluntary recognition, 352 within one year after certifying the union 
pursuant to a valid election, 353 or within the first three years of the life 
of a collective bargaining agreement. 354 However, even outside these 
instances, the presumption remains strong. The Board has been very 
hesitant to accept employer evidence that a recognized union lacks 
majority status, preferring instead to see such issues resolved through 
decertification elections. 355 The presumption of continuing majority 
even extends to cases involving successor employers who purchase the 
assets of a business and hire a majority of employees from the old 
unit. 356 By increasing the expectations that the union will be around 
for a while and that the bargaining game will be repeated, the doctrine 
raises the expected costs of strategic behavior, because such behavior 
threatens the success not only of current negotiations but also of fu-
ture negotiations in which the other side might seek revenge.357 The 
350. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 392 (1966). 
351. GETMAN & PoGREBJN, supra note 2, at 29-34. This presumption exists whether the 
union was voluntarily recognized by the employer or certified by the Board pursuant to an elec-
tion. Id. 
352. Id. at 83 n.63. 
353. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). This rule is com-
monly known as the election bar rule because a valid election will bar reconsideration of the 
union's majority status for one year. 
354. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). This rule is commonly known as the 
contract bar rule because negotiation of a valid contract will bar reconsideration of the union's 
majority status for up to three years. 
355. GETMAN & POGREBJN, supra note 2, at 31. 
356. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). In order to take 
advantage of the presumption in this circumstance, the union must request bargaining before or 
at a time when the new employer has hired a "representative complement" of employees that 
includes a majority of employees from the old unit. 482 U.S. at 46-54. 
357. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court's announced purpose behind the presumption of the 
union's continuing majority comports with this interpretation of its 
value in reducing strategic behavior and promoting industrial peace. 358 
5. The Law on Enforcement of the Collective Agreement 
The law on the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements 
also seems prudent under the analysis of the bargaining model. As 
previously discussed, the Supreme Court has found that agreements to 
arbitrate disputes under collective bargaining agreements are enforcea-
ble as a matter of federal substantive law.359 The courts can compel 
either side to comply with the agreement to arbitrate and can enjoin 
strikes or lockouts in contravention of that agreement. 360 Moreover, 
the courts must show great deference to arbitrators, as to both their 
jurisdiction under the agreement and their resolution of the dispute, 
forsaking the temptation to allow the parties to litigate such mat-
ters. 361 Agreements to arbitrate disputes under the collective bargain-
ing agreement are the logical low-cost cooperative solution to the· 
problem of contract enforcement. Resorting to economic warfare or 
costly litigation to resolve contract disputes is a positional extemality 
that wastes the cooperative surplus. Thus, courts properly should en-
force and encourage agreements to arbitrate while prohibiting or se-
verely limiting the parties' recourse to economic or legal weapons. 
Moreover, the rationale for such provisions under the bargaining the-
ory is that they will discourage wasteful strategic behavior and pro-
mote industrial peace, precisely the rationales given by the Court in 
developing this doctrine. 362 
358. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing, 482 U.S. at 38-39 ("The upshot of the presumptions [of a 
continuing majority] is to permit unions to develop stable bargaining relationships with employ-
ers, which will enable the unions to pursue the goals of their members, and this pursuit, in turn, 
will further industrial peace."). 
359. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 449-56 (1957); see supra note 6 
and accompanying text. 
360. United Steel Workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 564-69 (1960). 
361. United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583-85 (1960). 
362. Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 455 ("It [the Labor Management Relations Act] 
expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce •.. agreements [to arbitrate] ... and 
that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way."); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas 
Flour Co. 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962) ("We approve that doctrine [of finding implied no-strike 
clauses in agreements to arbitrate] .... [A] contrary view would be completely at odds with the 
basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for eco-
nomic warfare.") (footnote omitted); see also American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68; Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578-85; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 
363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
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6. Recent Proposals for Labor Law Reform 
Up to this point in my application of the bargaining model to 
American labor law, my objective has been to demonstrate how the 
bargaining model confirms the logic of the core principles of American 
labor law and to contrast that confirmation with the condemnation 
those same principles receive under the monopoly model of unions. 
However, the bargaining model does not confirm the wisdom of every 
doctrine under current law. Some problems under the bargaining 
model with current law, including the allowance of state right-to-work 
laws under section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,363 the 
restrictions on union access to employees during organizing,364 the 
limitations on the union's access to financial information,365 and the 
recent trend in cases expanding the category of permissive subjects of 
bargaining to include management decisions over the scope of opera-
tion, 366 have already been mentioned in passing. These imperfections 
may pose substantial barriers to the effective operation of unions,367 
thus denying workers some of the benefits of unions that an interpreta-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act that was fully consistent 
with the bargaining model would allow. This section examines several 
of the recent proposals for reform of American labor law and evalu-
ates them in light of the bargaining model. The analysis reveals sev-
eral important ways in which current American labor law does not 
coincide with the optimal labor policy prescribed by the bargaining 
model. 
One possible reform discussed by many legal theorists368 is to in-
crease the penalties for violations of the National Labor Relations Act. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Board's power to respond to 
violations of the Act is remedial, not punitive, in nature. 369 Accord-
363. See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
364. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
365. See supra note 331 and accompanying text. 
366. See supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
367. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern 
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 307-10 (1978); Rogers, supra note 244, 
at 113-44. 
368. See J. FREEDLEY HUNSICKER, JR. ET AL., NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR 
PRACTICES (rev. ed. 1986); MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 540; WEILER, supra note 22, at 
247-49, 251-52; William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor 
Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REV. 937, 939 
(1986); Charles Morris, The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in the Collective Bargaining Pro-
cess: A Fresh Look at the Conventional Wisdom and Unconventional Remedies, 30 V AND. L. 
REV. 661, 676-87 (1977); Theodore St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 
WAYNE L. REV. 1039 (1968). 
369. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 208 (1941) (Stone, J., concurring) (citing 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). 
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ingly, the Board can fashion a remedy that attempts to correct the 
harm done, but it cannot punish a union or an employer to deter fu-
ture misconduct. In policing organizing campaigns, the Board most 
often uses its remedial authority to undo benefits or reprisals distrib-
uted on the basis of union support or to set aside elections that have 
been tainted by unfair labor practices or a lack of the requisite "labo-
ratory conditions."37° For employees who have been discharged for 
union affiliation, the Board can order reinstatement and backpay, with 
interest, net of any interim earnings. 371 Moreover, because the Board 
has decided that "make whole" remedies in which employees are com-
pensated for lost wages and benefits due to employer failure to bargain 
in good faith are outside its power under the Act, 372 the Board lacks 
full remedial power to remedy bargaining offenses. For the most part, 
the Board's remedies for bargaining violations consist of cease-and-
desist orders combined with affirmative orders to bargain in good 
faith. 373 When an employer or union has committed an unfair labor 
370. GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 73. Under NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 
U.S. 575 (1969), the Board can order an employer to bargain with a union on the basis of author-
ization cards signed by a majority of the employees where the employer has won the election but 
has committed such serious unfair labor practices that they effectively preclude the running of a 
fair rerun election. However, this remedial power is exercised sparingly. GETMAN & POGREBIN, 
supra note 2, at 74-77. In some cases of repeated and flagrant violations, the Board has awarded 
litigation and organizing expenses to a union. Autoprod, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 331, 332 (1982); 
GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 148. The Board als'b has authority, under§ lO(j) of the 
NLRA, to seek immediate injunctions of such unfair labor practices as the discriminatory dis-
charge of an employee during an election campaign. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1988). However, the 
Board has been loath to exercise this power, perhaps fearing that such remedies would them-
selves unduly influence the outcome of the election. GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 73. 
371. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716 (1962), revd. on other grounds, 322 
F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963). Similarly, in the case of an employer who relocates to avoid unioniza-
tion, the Board can order that the aggrieved employees be offered jobs in the new shop and 
receive backpay until they take the new jobs or find comparable employment in the old location. 
GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 78. 
372. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970). The Board's rationale was that such a 
"make whole" remedy would be tantamount to requiring the employer to accept a contract term, 
a remedy that defies the statute's premise of freedom of contract. 185 N.L.R.B. at 110; see also 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). 
373. MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 540. Such bargaining orders are ultimately en-
forced through the contempt powers of the federal courts. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988). An addi-
tional remedy for a bargaining violation may be reinstatement after a strike or the loss of a 
troublesome employee. If an employer's unfair labor practice contributes in whole or in part to 
the employees' decision to strike, or if such a practice prolongs a strike, then the strike becomes 
what is known as an unfair labor practice strike and the strikers have a right to reinstatement 
even if they are permanently replaced. GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 148. Similarly, if 
the union commits an unfair labor practice by, for example, striking over a permissive subject, 
then striking employees can be discharged without right to reinstatement. Mastro Plastics Corp. 
v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 284-89 (1956); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-
46 (1938). If an individual employee commits misconduct during a strike, such as violence or 
vandalism, he can be discharged without right to reinstatement. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical 
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256-57 (1939); NLRB v. Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F.2d 721, 726-27 (6th Cir. 
1943); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1] 16,083, at 27,418 (1984). 
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practice, the Board will also order the offending party to post notices 
stating that it will no longer violate employee rights under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 374 Many scholars believe these purely re-
medial penalties are inadequate to deter employers and unions from 
committing violations of the Act. 375 As a result, proposals have been 
made to increase penalties, including double backpay for workers dis-
charged during organizing campaigns and monetary compensation for 
employer refusals to bargain in good faith.376 
Analysis of the problem under the bargaining model confirms the 
need to increase penalties under the National Labor Relations Act. 
Even if society valued the benefits the parties received from violating 
the Act, economic theory would suggest that, to maximize social wel-
fare, the penalties for such activities should be set so that the perpetra-
tor's expected cost from engaging in the activity equaled the cost the 
activity imposed on other people. 377 Because not all violators are suc-
cessfully caught and prosecuted, this would mean that the actual pen-
alties for violations of the Act should be set higher than mere remedial 
damages so that the expected cost to the perpetrator equaled the costs 
imposed on the victim. 378 However, under the bargaining model, vio-
lations of the Act, such as firing prounion employees and refusing to 
bargain in good faith, merely constitute wasteful rent-seeking on the 
part of the perpetrator and do not yield social benefits. Ideally, to 
maximize social welfare, sbciety should set penalties for such activities 
so high that potential perpetrators will always be deterred from under-
taking the activities.379 In the real world, however, arbitrarily high 
penalties for dismissing prounion employees may deter legitimate dis-
charges based on job performance, and employers or unions may be 
mistakenly convicted of bargaining in bad faith when no violation has 
374. GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 73. 
375. See supra text accompanying note 368. 
376. H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Labor Reform Act]; 
WEILER, supra note 22, at 247-49, 251; George Meany, Common Sense in Labor Law, 27 LABOR 
L.J. 603, 607-08 (1978). 
377. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 169, 
191-93 (1968). Setting the penalty at this level maximizes social welfare because the perpetrator 
will commit the offense only if the benefits he receives from it exceed the costs of the offense to 
others. Id. 
378. The expected cost of a violation of the Act to a perpetrator equals the probability that 
she will be caught and successfully prosecuted times the actual penalty. If not all offenders are 
successfully caught and punished, the probability of being successfully caught and punished must 
be less than one. Therefore, in order for the expected costs of the offense to the perpetrator to 
equal the costs of the offense to the victim, the actual penalty for the offense must exceed the 
costs of the offense to the victim. 
379. Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non-monetary Sanctions as a 
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1242 (1985). 
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occurred. Accordingly, economic theory suggests that, to maximize 
social welfare, penalties for socially valueless activities should be set so 
that the social benefits from increased deterrence equal the social costs 
of deterring marginally lawful activity and sometimes mistakenly im-
posing penalties on innocent defendants. 380 The current remedial pen-
alties of the National Labor Relations Act, which often do not even 
fully compensate the victim, fail to meet this standard. 
Another commonly suggested reform is to streamline and speed 
the union certification process.381 The current system of elections, the 
argument goes, allows employers too many opportunities to delay and 
to coerce employees through threats or the discharge of union sup-
porters. 382 Statistics on the filing of unfair labor practice charges 
against employers during organizing campaigns suggest that the prob-
lem has substantially worsened in the late 1970s and 1980s.383 To 
remedy this problem, some have proposed relatively simple solutions, 
such as setting shorter deadlines for holding elections after filing certi-
fication petitions. 384 Paul Weiler has proposed the more extreme solu-
tion of adopting the Canadian system - certifying unions based on 
cards signed by a majority of employees stating that they want the 
union as their representative. 385 This system avoids the need for 
lengthy election proceedings and denies employers the opportunity to 
coerce employees. 
Under the bargaining model, the purpose of certification elections 
is to provide an inexpensive means by which the workers can accu-
rately weigh the benefits of organization against its cost. 386 Delays, 
and the opportunity for strategic behavior they create, are a cost of the 
certification process that should be kept to a minimum. Shorter dead-
lines for elections are desirable as long as they leave employees ade-
380. Id. at 1243-45. Theoretically, one should also take into account the marginal costs of 
destroying marginal incentives for good behavior. Id. I have omitted this point from the text for 
purposes of simplicity. The costs of deterring marginally lawful behavior, mistaken punishment, 
and destroying marginal incentives for good behavior all also enter the problem of setting the 
optimal penalty when society values the perpetrator's benefits from the offense. They are, how-
ever, generally omitted from simple analyses of that problem because they are commonly as-
sumed to be swamped by the costs of deterring the beneficial but prohibited activity. 
381. Labor Reform Act, supra note 376, at 5; Meany, supra note 376; Paul Weiler, Promises 
to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1769, 1776-86 (1983). 
382. Weiler, supra note 381, at 1776-86. 
383. Id. at 1780. Weiler's statistics show that in 1970, 1975, and 1980 the numbers of em-
ployer discrimination charges filed in organizing campaigns were 9290, 13,426, and 18,315, re-
spectively. During this time the number of petitions filed by unions for representation elections 
declined from 7773 and 8061 in 1970 and 1975, respectively, to 7296 in 1980. Id. 
384. See Labor Reform Act, supra note 376, at 5. 
385. Weiler, supra note 381, at 1806-19. 
386. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text. 
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quate time to consider the question and make a reasoned decision. As 
for Weller's proposal, whether the current system of elections or the 
Canadian system based on cards is the cheaper means of determining 
union representation is an empirical question. Although his proposal 
would undoubtedly save costs over the present system by precluding 
employer opportunistic behavior, it would also impose some addi-
tional costs by preventing employers from providing useful informa-
tion on the question of representation and by increasing the possibility 
of fraud and coercion on the part of unions. The benefit of Weiler's 
proposal in discouraging employer opportunistic behavior might be 
lessened if the National Labor Relations Act had penalties adequate to 
deter such behavior. However, Weiler can reasonably argue that the 
current system's costs in terms of employer opportunistic behavior 
outweigh any additional costs that would be incurred under his 
proposal. 387 
Another reform that has recently gained support is to limit or pro-
scribe the employer's ability to permanently replace striking employ-
ees. Under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 
employers are prohibited from firing or discriminating against striking 
employees. 388 However, in an opinion that baffles even my best stu-
dents, the Supreme Court in Mackay Radio held that the Act did not 
prohibit employers from "permanently replacing" striking employ-
ees. 389 Initially, the problems posed by this case were largely theoreti-
cal because few employers permanently replaced employees. 
However, employers have recently resorted to this strategy with in-
creasing frequency. 39° As a result, in the 1980s and early 1990s there 
has been a growing consensus that the loophole created by Mackay 
must be addressed, 391 and indeed a bill currently before Congress, 
which has passed the House, would limit employers' ability to perma-
387. This seems particularly true given the Board's current determination that it cannot ef· 
fectively police the truth or falsity of campaign statements. See supra note 319 and accompany-
ing text. 
388. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1988); NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972). 
389. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). The primary distinctions 
between permanent replacement and discharge are that an employer must have a replacement 
employee in hand in order for the act to be a replacement, and permanently replaced strikers 
enjoy a preference in filling positions as they become open with the employer, while discharged 
employees do not. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968). 
390. WEILER, supra note 22, at 111; see also 137 CONG. REC. H5454 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) 
(statement of Rep. Fazio) ("[Employers in the 1980s have] discovered a forgotten loophole that 
[allows] them to permanently replace striking workers, [and] they used it every chance they 
got."). According to Rep. Owens, the threat of permanent replacements, while held over work· 
ers' heads, was not used until recently. Id. at H5455. Rep. Levin noted that the purpose ofH.R. 
5 is to restore the NLRA to its historic purpose of promoting democracy, equity, and stability, 
and not to permit the 1990s to be a repeat of the 1980s. Id. 
391. Weiler was among the first to make this argument. Paul Weiler, Striking a New Bal-
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nently replace striking employees.392 
The bargaining model offers qualified support for this proposal. 
Allowing employers to permanently replace striking employees creates 
a tremendous opportunity for costly strategic behavior whereby the 
employer escapes the bargaining game by permanently replacing prou-
nion employees with justifiably intimidated employees. Allowing per-
manent replacements provides some impetus toward cooperation in 
bargaining on the part of the union by raising its expected costs from a 
strike; however, the one-sided nature of this impetus frustrates the re-
distributive purposes of encouraging unions. Allowing employers to 
permanently replace strikers merely leads to union capitulation, not 
bargaining equity and industrial peace. 393 However, even from the 
perspective of the bargaining model, if one were concerned about the 
potential growth of labor cartel power, one might want to adopt some 
intermediate policy discouraging employer strategic behavior without 
completely prohibiting the permanent replacement of striking employ-
ees. In addition to preventing employer strategic behavior, the com-
plete prohibition of permanent replacements also raises significant 
barriers to entry in the labor market that could facilitate 
cartelization. 394 
A final proposal on which the bargaining model allows useful com-
ment is Weller's proposal to include interest arbitration as a remedy 
for employers' failure to bargain in good faith in first-time contract 
negotiations. 395 Citing the recent rise in the failure rate of unions to 
obtain first contracts after organizing an employer,396 Weiler has ar-
gued that such a bargaining remedy would put some teeth in the Act's 
directive to bargain in good faith and help ensure that employees real-
ance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351, 
387-94 (1984). 
392. H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill's stated purpose is "[t]o amend the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act to prevent discrimination based on par-
ticipation in labor disputes." The bill would prevent employers from hiring permanent 
replacement workers for employees engaged in a lawful strike. 
393. If employers need the alternative of continuing operations during a strike to achieve an 
"equitable" balance of bargaining power, this problem can be met with temporary replacements. 
The National Labor Relations Act allows the temporary replacement of strikers. 2 THE DEVEL-
OPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 1012-13. Any additional benefit the employer could achieve 
by obtaining more or better replacements with the promise of permanent positions would be 
outweighed by the tremendous opportunity for strategic behavior that allowing permanent 
replacements creates. 
394. Of course, if one is really concerned about the existence or growth of labor cartel power, 
probably none of these proposals for labor law reform makes sense. 
395. See Weiler, supra note 391, at 405-12. 
396. Id. at 354-55. Between 1950 and 1980, the rate at which unions achieved first contracts 
after organizing an employer decreased from 86% to 63%. Id. 
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ize their right to bargain collectively after choosing to organize.397 
Although increasing monetary penalties for failure to bargain in good 
faith may also solve the problem, Weiler's proposal has some appeal 
under the bargaining model because it recognizes that the parties' 
awareness of their collective interest in cooperation will be weakest 
when their relationship has just begun. Accordingly, the proposal 
reserves the most extreme and intrusive remedy, having a neutral 
party specify the terms of the collective agreement, for the cases in 
which the parties' ability to see their collective interest in agreement is 
probably lowest. 
CONCLUSION 
The traditional monopoly model of unions and collective bargain-
ing is deficient for three reasons. First, the model focuses on only one 
among several possible sources of union wage increases, the carteliza-
tion of the labor market. Logical arguments and empirical evidence 
suggest that this exclusive focus on labor cartelization is misplaced 
and that employer rents, quasi-rents, and productivity increases asso-
ciated with unionism are also important in the American economy as 
sources of union wage increases. Second, the model assumes that em-
ployers respond to union wage demands by moving up their demand 
curves when such a response is not Pareto optimal and both the em-
ployees and employers could be made better off by negotiating agree-
ments that call for lower wages and higher levels of employment. 
Empirical evidence rejects the employer demand curve response and 
supports the proposition that employers and unions negotiate optimal 
contract terms. Finally, the model implicitly assumes that the costs of 
collective bargaining are ordinary time and information transaction 
costs, ignoring the strategic nature of collective bargaining. These de-
ficiencies suggest the need for a new economic model of unions and 
collective bargaining that recognizes alternative sources of union wage 
increases, assumes that the parties optimally bargain over contract 
terms, and explicitly recognizes the strategic nature of collective bar-
gaining. In this article, I have developed such a model, which I call 
the bargaining model of unions and collective bargaining. 
The bargaining model confirms the basic logic of the fundamental 
tenet of American labor law that the government should foster unions 
and regulate the conduct of industrial relations in order to promote 
bargaining equity and industrial peace. Under this analysis, unions 
allow workers to gain a greater share of the proceeds of the business 
397. Id. at 405-12. 
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and to make valuable contributions in the running of that business 
through the expression of their collective voice. Thus, by promoting 
workers to a more equitable bargaining position relative to their em-
ployer, unions can serve societal goals of redistributing wealth from 
employers to employees and perhaps even maximizing total wealth. 
Despite these beneficial attributes of collective bargaining, both em-
ployers and unions often have individual incentives for strategic be-
havior in the conflicts that occur in organizing, negotiations and 
enforcement of the collective agreement. Because of these incentives, 
the conflicts of collective bargaining have a tendency to escalate into 
costly affairs, wasting a portion of the potential proceeds of the busi-
ness, despite the parties' - and society's - collective interest in 
avoiding such waste. The government can minimize such waste by 
regulating the conduct of collective bargaining to prohibit or discour-
age strategic behavior and to promote industrial peace. 
Many specific provisions of American labor law make sense within 
the context of the bargaining model. To resolve conflicts in organiz-
ing, the National Labor Relations Act promotes elections as a rela-
tively low-cost method for employees to make a reasoned decision 
about whether the benefits of organization outweigh its costs. The em-
ployer is prohibited from using yellow-dog contracts or promises of 
benefits or reprisals to encourage employee free riding on efforts to 
organize. Costly strategic behavior by either side, such as discrimina-
tory discharges or recognitional picketing, is prohibited or severely 
limited. To resolve conflicts in collective negotiations, the law en-
forces a bilateral relationship in which the employer is required to bar-
gain with the union, as the exclusive representative of the employees, 
over wages, hours, and working conditions. This bilateral relationship 
promotes equity in bargaining between employers and employees with 
its attendant benefits of wealth redistribution and increased productiv-
ity. Strategies or behaviors in collective negotiations that are likely to 
result in costly strikes, such as intransigence in bargaining and 
Boulwareism, are prohibited or discouraged. Moreover, the law pro-
motes the parties' ability to recognize their collective interests in coop-
erative bargaining by organizing the employees in relatively 
homogeneous units, encouraging repeat negotiations through the pre-
sumption of a continuing majority, and requiring exchanges of rele-
vant information. Finally, to resolve conflicts in the enforcement of 
collective agreements, the law enforces and encourages agreements to 
arbitrate as the low-cost method of resolving such disputes while dis-
couraging resort to costly litigation or strikes. 
The bargaining model also suggests several ways in which current 
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American labor law could be improved. Perhaps chief among these 
improvements would be a substantial increase in penalties for viola-
tions of current law. The current remedial penalties of the National 
Labor Relations Act do not adequately deter costly strategic behavior. 
Additional benefits from collective bargaining can be gained by further 
facilitating employee organizing and promoting cooperative solutions 
in collective bargaining. This might be achieved by giving unions 
greater access to employees on employer property during organizing 
campaigns; streamlining employee organizational campaigns; giving 
the union greater access to employer financial information; repealing 
section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, which allows state 
right-to-work laws; and requiring good-faith bargaining on all subjects 
of direct relevance to the employees' and employer's relationship. Fi-
nally, the bargaining model provides qualified support for recent legis-
lative efforts to restrict employers' ability to permanently replace 
striking employees. The possibility of permanently replacing striking 
employees creates tremendous potential for costly strategic behavior 
on the part of employers and encourages union capitulation to em-
ployer demands, frustrating the redistributive purposes of allowing 
employee organization. Although the bargaining model demonstrates 
the consistent logic behind the core principles of American labor law, 
some further substantial changes would allow workers to enjoy more 
fully the benefits of collective bargaining. 
